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Comment
THE UNSOUNDNESS OF SILENCE: 1 SILENT
CONCURRENCES AND THEIR USE IN MARYLAND
SHANE M.K. DOYLE *
“When a judge on [the Court of Appeals] concurs in the
judgment only, it is helpful to explain why. Then the reader
knows whether there is a substantive reason for that judge’s
reticence and can assess whether that reason has any merit.” 2
This Comment will discuss the judicial practice of issuing a “silent
concurrence,” and examine the use of silent concurrences in Maryland. A
silent concurrence is when an appellate judge concurs only in the judgment, 3
but does not write a separate opinion. 4 Concurring only in the judgment
means a judge agrees with the outcome of a case, but “refuses to join the
majority opinion.” 5 Or, more consequentially, 6 the judge refuses to join the
lead opinion in a plurality decision. 7 Usually, a judge concurs only in the
judgment because the judge believes the main opinion is wrong about why
the outcome is correct. 8 We know this because judges concurring only in the
© 2020 Shane M.K. Doyle.
1. But see SIMON AND GARFUNKEL, The Sound of Silence, on SIMON AND GARFUNKEL’S
GREATEST HITS (Columbia Records 1972).
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author thanks Grace O’Malley, Bianca Spinosa, and other editors of the Maryland Law Review for
their thoughtful comments and valuable contributions. He dedicates this Comment to his mother,
whom he would like to thank for working so hard to raise him and for making everything he has
accomplished possible—“I’ll love you forever, I’ll like you for always, as long as I’m living my
Mommy you’ll be.” ROBERT MUNSCH, LOVE YOU FOREVER (1986).
2. State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring in
judgment only). Judge McDonald begins his concurring opinion in Payne with this apparent
criticism of Maryland Court of Appeals judges who issue silent concurrences. Id.
3. Sometimes called simply “concurring in the judgment,” and also “concurring in the
judgment only,” “joining in the judgment,” “joining in the judgment only,” and “joining only in the
judgment,” with the word “result” sometimes being used instead of “judgment.” See App. Tb. 1
(listing the 175 Maryland cases that had a silent concurrence(s) from January 1, 1990, to August 31,
2019, some of which use one formulation while some use others).
4. Greg Goelzhauser, Silent Concurrences, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 351, 351–52 (2016);
Alexander I. Platt, Deciding Not to Decide: A Limited Defense of the Silent Concurrence, 17 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 141, 141–42 (2016).
5. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 351–52.
6. See infra text accompanying note 17; Sections I.B & I.E.2.
7. This Comment uses the term “main opinion” to refer to majority and lead opinions
collectively.
8. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS OR
THE SCIENCE OF CASE LAW 135–36 & n.306 (1912) (taking it for granted that when a judge concurs
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judgment typically write separate opinions explaining their alternative
reasoning. 9 A “silent” concurrence, though, is when a judge concurs only in
the judgment without writing a separate opinion. 10 In other words, the judge,

only in a judgment, it is because the judge has alternative reasons for reaching the result);
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352–54 (explaining that a judge who writes an opinion concurring
only in the judgment agrees with the result but disagrees with the main opinion’s reasoning).
9. For example, see State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719–21, 104 A.3d 142, 165–66 (2014)
(McDonald, J., concurring in judgment only). In Payne, the court vacated and remanded the
decision below, holding that a police officer’s testimony regarding cell phone location data was
“expert” testimony requiring the officer to be admitted as an expert. Id. at 164–65. Judge McDonald
explained in his concurring opinion that he disagreed with the majority that the officer’s testimony
was “expert” testimony, but still agreed the case should be vacated and remanded. Id. at 165–66.
Judge McDonald explained that, in his view, the officer only provided lay testimony, but vacating
and remanding was proper because the officer’s testimony required the additional testimony of an
expert to be probative. Id. See BLACK, supra note 8, at 135–36 & n.306 (taking it for granted that
a judge concurring only in the judgment would write separately explaining their alternative reasons
for reaching the result); Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 357 (explaining that when a judge concurs
only in the judgment but does not write separately, no one really knows why that judge, in that
particular case, voted for the result but refused to join the main opinion); see also Platt, supra note
4, at 143–44 (explaining that silent concurrences are rare, i.e. judges usually write separately when
concurring only in the judgement).
10. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352 (“By definition [a silent concurrence] provides no
explanation for why a[n appellate judge] agrees with the judgment but refuses to join the majority
opinion.”).
To avoid confusion, note that there are two kinds of concurrences, a concurrence in the
judgment only (a “special” concurrence), and a so-called “regular” concurrence. Goelzhauser,
supra note 4, at 353–54. As explained below, only the former can be issued “silently” because it
would be impossible to issue a regular concurrence without writing a separate opinion, but it is
possible to concur in the judgment only without writing a separate opinion. Id. But see infra note
76 and accompanying text (providing an exception: in California, a swing-vote judge cannot concur
in the judgment only without writing a separate opinion because the California Constitution, as
interpreted by the California Supreme Court, prohibits it).
A regular concurrence is when a judge does join the main opinion; i.e. the judge agrees both
with the result the court reached and the main opinion’s reasoning for why that result was correct,
but the judge also writes a separate opinion of their own. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 353–54. In
such a case the opinion would state, for example, “Judge A delivered the opinion of the court, joined
by Judges B, C, D, E, F, and G. Judge G also filed a concurring opinion.” The separate note about
Judge G is only there because Judge G decided to write separately, while if Judge G had not done
so, the opinion would just state that Judge G joined the majority opinion because there would be no
“concurrence” to speak of. Id. at 358.
Alternatively, if Judge G concurred in the judgment only, this means Judge G did not join the
majority opinion, so regardless of whether Judge G writes separately, the opinion must still explain
Judge G’s disposition in the case. Thus, the opinion will state, for example, “Judge A delivered the
opinion of the court, joined by Judges B, C, D, E, and F. Judge G concurred in the judgement only.”
While one might expect Judge G to write a separate concurring opinion explaining why he
refused to join the majority opinion (as judges concurring in the judgment only usually do, see supra
text accompanying note 2; supra note 9 and accompanying text), Judge G’s refusal must be noted
either way. Silent concurrences only exist, then, because a judge can vote for a result while refusing
to join the main opinion, which necessitates noting that this judge concurred in the judgment only;
and if said judge does not file a separate opinion, no one knows why Judge G voted for the result
but refused to join the main opinion (i.e. Judge G’s concurrence is “silent”). Goelzhauser, supra
note 4, at 352, 356–57; see infra text accompanying notes 14–16.
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without offering any explanation, votes in favor of the result but refuses to
join the main opinion. 11
Commentators have described silent concurrences as “puzzling,” 12 and
even indefensible, 13 although there have been attempts to defend it as an
unfortunate, but occasionally necessary, judicial technique. 14 One thing is
certain, though. When a judge concurs silently, the only person who knows
why that judge refused to join the main opinion is that judge. 15 Therefore, it
is anyone’s guess whether the judge actually had any substantive issues with
the legal reasoning of the main opinion, and if so, why the judge did not
articulate any alternative rules the judge thought were superior. 16
Furthermore, while a silent concurrence does not usually impact the
precedential value of a case, when a swing-vote judge concurs silently,
resulting in a plurality decision, the swing-vote judge unilaterally prevents
the case from establishing any clear precedent—but does not explain why. 17
This Comment will explore the criticisms of, and potential justifications
for, silent concurrences in general; specifically examine their use in
Maryland; and make three ultimate conclusions. First, silent concurrences
are a generally unsound practice because, notwithstanding their potential
justifications, litigants and the public have the right to expect judges who
vote for the result but do not join the main opinion to offer at least a brief
explanation rather than no explanation at all. 18 Second, the data suggest that
regardless of whether the potential justifications for silent concurrences are
valid, they do not explain the most recent silent concurrences in Maryland.19
Third, the Court of Appeals should promulgate a rule that nullifies the effect

11. See supra note 10.
12. Madelyn Fife et al., Concurring and Dissenting Without Opinion, 42 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 171,
171 (2017); Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352.
13. Richard B. Cappalli, What is Authority? Creation and Use of Case Law by Pennsylvania’s
Appellate Courts, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 303, 380 (1999) (calling it “a debilitating practice with no
visible redeeming value”); see also Platt, supra note 4, at 142 (“[The silent concurrence] is widely
regarded as illegitimate. It has been criticized as ‘perplexing,’ ‘an abomination,’ ‘unnecessary,’
‘trouble-provoking,’ and ‘condemnable,’ accused of ‘thwart[ing] the judicial process,’ of offering
‘little value,’ or none at all, and condemned as a practice that ‘cannot be justified as appropriate
judicial methodology,’ and must be ‘eradicated’ or ‘abandon[ed].’” (alterations in original) (internal
footnotes omitted))).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 294–300; infra note 362.
15. See infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. Not to mention why the judge agreed the
outcome was correct in the first place and voted for it. See infra text accompanying notes 247–252.
16. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 152–53 (3d ed. 2012); see also State v. Payne,
440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring in judgment only) (pointing
out that when a Maryland Court of Appeals judge concurs silently, no one knows “whether there
[was] a substantive reason for that judge’s reticence” (emphasis added)); supra text accompanying
notes 8–9; infra text accompanying notes 61–62, 301–312 (explaining reasons other than
substantive legal disagreement for which a judge might silently concur).
17. See infra Sections I.B, I.E.2, II.D.
18. See infra Sections II.A–B.
19. See infra Section II.C.
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of silent concurrences on the precedential value of plurality decisions and by
extension discourages the use of silent concurrences generally. 20
Part I of this Comment will give the following relevant background.
First, it will discuss what silent concurrences mean in the context of stare
decisis. 21 Second, it will explain how they impact the precedential value of
a case when a court is divided, in general, and in Maryland specifically. 22
That analysis requires examining how the Court of Appeals applies its
plurality decisions, which, it turns out, contrary to popular belief, does not
appear to be the Marks rule. 23 Third, it will provide a survey of the criticisms
levied at silent concurrences generally. 24 Fourth, it will give potential
explanations for the use of silent concurrences. 25 Fifth, it will discuss the
trends associated with, 26 and the consequences of, 27 the use of silent
concurrences in Maryland from January 1, 1990, to August 31, 2019.
Part II will analyze whether silent concurrences are justifiable, in
general, 28 and in Maryland specifically, 29 by examining whether their
potential uses outweigh the criticisms levied at them, in light of the
alternative options judges have besides issuing a silent concurrence. 30 Part
II will argue that silent concurrences are a generally unsound practice that
should be questioned and discouraged, 31 particularly in Maryland, 32 and are
an indefensible practice in the context of plurality decisions. 33 Part II will
also suggest a rule to help prevent the problems silent concurrences can
cause. 34
Silent concurrences do not appear to serve any function so worthwhile
that we should expect litigants and the public to ignore that silent
concurrences undermine the principles and ideals of our legal system. 35

20. See infra Section II.D.
21. See infra Section I.A.
22. See infra Section I.B.
23. See infra Section I.B.1; see also infra Section I.B.2.b (critiquing the approach to plurality
decisions the Court of Appeals apparently uses).
24. See infra Section I.C.
25. See infra Section I.D.
26. See infra Section I.E.1.
27. See infra Section I.E.2.
28. See infra Section II.A–B.
29. See infra Section II.C.
30. See infra Sections II.A.–C.
31. See infra Sections II.A–B.
32. See infra Section II.C.
33. See infra Sections II.A–D.
34. See infra Section II.D.
35. See infra Part III.
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BACKGROUND

Silent concurrences are worth discussing primarily because judicial
decisionmaking in the American legal system operates under the maxim of
stare decisis. Stare decisis, “Latin for ‘to stand by things decided,’” 36 means
appellate courts treat their own prior decisions, or the decisions of higher
courts in the same jurisdiction, as binding precedents that dictate how to
resolve new cases with the same or analogous facts. 37 This doctrine operates
under the general assumption that courts, and by extension judges, issue
written opinions explaining why they voted for the result in a given case. 38
Section I.A briefly reviews how the doctrine of precedents operates and how
the silent concurrence arises under this framework. Section I.B explains how
silent concurrences disrupt precedent-setting, which is of course integral to
stare decisis. Section I.B also explains that, contrary to popular belief,
Maryland does not actually apply the Marks rule to its own plurality
decisions. Rather, Maryland uses the “all opinions approach,” a “related
principle” of Marks that differs significantly from the Marks rule. 39 Section
I.C presents the criticisms levied at silent concurrences. Section I.D
discusses potential explanations for the use of silent concurrences. Finally,
Section I.E discusses the use of silent concurrences in Maryland.
A. The Mechanics of Stare Decisis and Silent Concurrences
When the majority of an appellate panel agrees that a particular outcome
is the proper result in a given case, that will be the result and the resolution
of the dispute between the two parties. 40 Importantly, appellate courts also
publish opinions that tell not only the parties, but the rest of us, why the court
decided the outcome was correct. 41 Explaining the result is at the heart of
36. Stare Decisis, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis (last
updated Mar. 2017).
37. Id.; BLACK, supra note 8, at 2–5, 7, 10–11; see also infra notes 200–203 and accompanying
text (explaining the justifications for subscribing to the doctrine of stare decisis).
38. See BLACK, supra note 8, at 2–5, 7, 10–11 (taking it for granted, in explaining the doctrine
of precedents under the maxim of stare decisis, that courts issue written opinions to explain their
decisions).
39. See infra Section I.B.1; see also infra Section I.B.2.a (explaining how silent concurrences
impact the precedential value of a plurality decision in Maryland under the all opinions approach);
Section I.B.2.b (critiquing Maryland’s use of the all opinions approach).
40. BLACK, supra note 8, at 136. For example, if party A seeks reversal of a trial court decision
while party B seeks affirmation, and the court decides in favor of party A to reverse, reversal is the
result. Id.
41. Id. at 2–3, 131–132. For example, picking up from the hypothetical in note 40, the opinion
explaining why reversal is the proper outcome might be something like, “In this situation, a trial
court must do XYZ before making the kind of decision at issue in this case. The trial court, however,
did not do XYZ. Therefore, we are reversing the trial court’s decision.” Thus, the court articulated
a rule that dictates reversing the lower court decision, and that rule is essentially, “in a factual
scenario like the one here, when a lower court is making the kind of decision at issue here, that court
has to do XYZ, so if a lower court makes this kind of decision, in this kind of scenario, without doing
XYZ, then that decision gets reversed on appeal.” Under stare decisis, future courts would thus need
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stare decisis because when the majority of an appellate panel agrees on both
(1) the outcome of a case and (2) the legal reasoning for why that outcome is
correct—the single opinion that enjoys majority support binds that court, and
lower courts in the same jurisdiction, in future cases. 42 Majority opinions
therefore articulate rules, tests, and/or principles that lower and future courts
must apply to similar factual scenarios. 43 That is why, as law students learn
on day one, appellate opinions are the lifeblood of our legal system.
For purposes of this discussion, it is helpful to (simplistically) visualize
the appellate decision-making process as the judges casting two separate and
successive votes: First, the members of an appellate panel vote on what
should happen as it pertains to the case at hand. If a majority of the panel
members vote for outcome A, then outcome A becomes the judgment of the
court that binds the parties of that case. 44 That vote only determines the
outcome, it does not establish binding precedent for future cases. 45 This is
where the second vote comes in, as the judges who formed a majority in favor
of outcome A will then vote amongst themselves on why outcome A is
correct, i.e. the legal rule(s) that dictate outcome A. 46
For example, in a seven-member appellate panel, five judges may agree
that the proper result is a reversal of the lower court decision. This means
the result of the first vote is 5-2, so reversal will be the outcome of the case.
It might also be that only four of those five judges agree on the legal
reasoning for why reversal is proper in that case. Thus, the result of the
second vote is 4-1. Notice that there is still a majority of the court (four out
of seven) voting in favor of both the result, and a particular opinion
explaining that result (of course, one of those four is the one writing the
opinion in the first place). Thus, the single opinion with the support of those

to apply this rule in similar (or sufficiently analogous) situations and reverse or affirm as dictated
by the rule. See infra note 42.
42. BLACK, supra note 8, at 2–5, 10, 135–136; Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the
Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1596 (1992); Richard M. Re,
Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1948 n.28, 1966 (2019); see, e.g., Cappalli, supra
note 13, at 324 (explaining that at least two members of a three-judge panel must agree on both the
result and the underlying rationale to create binding precedent); see also supra notes 40–41 (giving
a hypothetical explaining binding precedent under stare decisis in more detail); infra notes 200–203
and accompanying text (discussing the justifications for subscribing to the doctrine of stare decisis).
43. BLACK, supra note 8, at 2–4. Of course, any court of last resort is free to overrule its own
precedents, but this departure from stare decisis is supposed to be reserved for “exceptional cases
and for the very strongest reasons.” Id. at 3.
44. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. It is not strictly speaking true that a result by
itself has no precedential value. The result itself can be precedential, i.e. a future court with identical
or analogous facts would be bound to reach the same result but could use whatever reasoning. See
infra text accompanying notes 78–80. The current discussion, however, is about precedential
opinions, which is the reasoning behind the result.
46. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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four— the majority opinion—becomes binding precedent under the principle
of stare decisis. 47
As for the one remaining judge who agreed with the other four about the
result but disagreed with them as to why that result is correct, that judge is
said to be concurring only in the judgment. 48 In other words, concurring only
in the judgment means that judge is voting along with the other four for
reversal, but refusing to vote for the legal reasoning the other four agreed
justifies reversal. 49
A judge concurring only in the judgment has two options. 50 First, they
can write a separate opinion explaining what they believe to be the superior
grounds upon which the court should have based its decision. 51 The separate
opinion will not be binding of course, but it can at least be persuasive
authority that points out where the judge believes the majority went wrong
and can contribute to further developments in the law. 52 Second, a judge can
simply state they concur in the judgment only and leave it at that without
writing a separate opinion. 53
This second option, the “silent” concurrence, tells readers nothing more
than that the judge agreed with the result but chose not to join the main
opinion explaining that result. 54 While one might assume the judge had some
47. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
48. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 351–52.
49. Id.
50. See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., supra note 9 (summarizing an opinion concurring only in the judgment in State
v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 104 A.3d 142 (2014)); see supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. Or,
the judge can at least write a “perfunctory opinion,” i.e. a brief explanation as to why the judge did
not wish to join the main opinion, e.g., stating simply that the judge agreed with the lower court’s
original reasoning for its decision rather than the main opinion’s reasoning for affirming that
decision. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352; see, e.g., infra note 441 (gathering and quoting brief
statements provided in lieu of a full separate opinion).
52. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 354 (“Written concurrences, like written dissents, are
potentially valuable for a number of reasons. As an initial matter, a concurring opinion may prove
to be highly influential in the subsequent development of law.”). Professor Goelzhauser cites as an
example Justice Robert H. Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952). Id. See ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 149–50 (explaining that a concurring opinion
may “appeal to the intelligence of a future day, when a change in the law may be forthcoming”
(quoting R. Dean Moorehead, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 821, 823
(1952))); id. at 154 (citing the “classic” example of such an opinion—Justice Traynor’s famous
concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 453 (Cal. 1944) that
commanded majority approval from the court eighteen years later); Fife, supra note 12, at 171 (“As
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg once wrote, separate opinions ‘may provoke clarifications,
refinements, [and] modifications in the court’s opinions.’ Justice Antonin Scalia echoed this point,
emphasizing that a ‘dissent or concurrence puts [an] opinion to the test, providing a direct
confrontation of the best arguments on both sides of the disputed points.’” (alterations in original)
(footnotes omitted)).
53. See supra note 10.
54. See Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1127 (Cal. 1995) (“[A silent
concurrence] is equivocal. ‘It could mean that the concurring justice does not agree with the
principles [stated in the main opinion]; or that [the justice] agrees with the principles or some of
them but not with the manner of their statement or the reasoning or authorities set forth in support
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issue with the main opinion’s reasoning and had alternative reasons for
reaching the same result, 55 that is just an educated guess. 56 A judge who
concurs silently, by definition, leaves us with no definitive explanation for
why they refused to join the main opinion. 57 Thus, all anyone can truly say
about a silent concurrence is that the judge refused to join the main opinion—
but one can only speculate about why they refused. 58 No one really knows
whether the judge had substantive issues with the main opinion (e.g., the
judge disagreed with the legal rule the opinion establishes), or if instead the
judge refused to join the main opinion for personal, political, or other
reasons. 59
Consider that a judge might silently concur over some inconsequential
issue with the main opinion that is purely a matter of linguistic preference. 60
For example, based on private papers that later became publicly available,
here is why former Chief Justice Burger silently concurred in Army & Air
Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan: 61
After Justice Blackmun circulated a draft opinion . . . Chief Justice
Burger sent him a private note that read in part: “I have tried—and
I think succeeded in getting almost everyone to avoid the term plea
‘bargain.’ That word has no place in the judicial vocabulary. I can
join your opinion heartily if you can change ‘bargain’ . . . to
of them; or that [the justice] neither agrees nor disagrees but wishes to stay aloof and keep himself
[or herself] intellectually free to examine the question anew at some later date (perhaps as the author
of an opinion); or that [the justice] objects to something in the opinion—a quotation, reliance on an
authority that is anathema to him [or her], humor or satire, or castigation of a litigant or counsel—
and withholds his [or her] signature because the author would not take it out.’” (third, fourth, fifth,
sixth, and seventh alterations in original) (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT
OPINIONS 223 (1977))); supra note 10 (explaining that a silent concurrence by definition tells us
nothing more than that the judge refused to join the main opinion).
55. See Ira P. Robbins, Concurring in Result Without Written Opinion: A Condemnable
Practice, 84 JUDICATURE 118, 118, 163 (2000) (assuming that silently concurring judges took some
issue with the main opinion’s legal reasoning); see also supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text
(explaining that judges usually write separately explaining alternative reasons for reaching the result
when they concur only in the judgment).
56. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 357 (“[B]ecause the [judge] has not revealed why he or she
is concurring, one is left to speculate regarding the possible reason.” (quoting PAMELA C. CORLEY,
CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 19 (2010))); see supra note 54.
57. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352. The judge also leaves us with no explanation for why
they voted for the result in the first place. See infra text accompanying notes 247–252.
58. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 357 (“[B]ecause the [judge] has not revealed why he or she
is concurring, one is left to speculate regarding the possible reason.” (quoting PAMELA C. CORLEY,
CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 19 (2010))).
59. See State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring
in judgment only) (implying that when a judge concurs silently, no one knows “whether there [was]
a substantive reason for that judge’s reticence”); supra note 54; infra text accompanying notes 61–
71; see also infra Section II.A (criticizing silent concurrences precisely because they lead people to
believe there is something wrong with the main opinion, even though judges sometimes issue silent
concurrences for reasons that have nothing to do with the reasoning of the main opinion).
60. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 373.
61. 456 U.S. 728 (1982).
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‘negotiations.’” Burger concluded with an ultimatum: “So, show
me accordingly as joining or joining the judgment.” Blackmun
refused Burger’s request, suggesting that the phrase had “acquired
an accepted meaning in the judicial vocabulary” and was “far more
accepted than the noun ‘commute’ for which I fought a
battle . . . when no one supported me, and surely is far more
acceptable than the Court’s constant misuse of the word ‘viable.’”
Blackmun closed by citing several opinions Burger had joined that
included the phrase “plea bargain,” to which Burger playfully
responded: “Yes, but I’ve joined the last one. It is a perversion of
the English language [and] the law!” As a result of this exchange,
appended to the end of Blackmun’s otherwise unanimous opinion
in Sheehan is the line: “The Chief Justice concurs in the
judgment.” 62
One might also infer from circumstance that optics, rather than an issue
with the main opinion, could be the reason a judge silently concurred in a
particular case. For example, consider International Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump. 63 In International Refugee, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, in an opinion by Chief Judge Gregory
and joined by Judges Motz, King, Wynn, Diaz, Floyd, and Harris, that (1) the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland properly granted a
preliminary motion for injunction on President Trump’s so-called “Muslim
ban” 64 because the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of “succeed[ing] on the
merits of their Establishment Clause claim,” 65 and (2) the district court erred
in extending that injunction to President Trump directly. 66 Although the
opinion stated that “Judge Traxler wrote an opinion concurring in the
judgment,” 67 that “opinion” amounted to nothing more than a silent
concurrence. 68 Since Judge Traxler agreed with everything the court did and
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 373 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Id. at 576 (quoting J.A. 480).
Id. at 579, 588, 601–02.
Id. at 604–06.
Id. at 571.
Below is Judge Traxler’s opinion in its entirety:
I concur in the judgment of the majority insofar as it affirms the district court’s
issuance of a nationwide preliminary injunction as to Section 2(c) of the Executive Order
against the officers, agents, and employees of the Executive Branch of the United States,
and anyone acting under their authorization or direction, who would attempt to enforce
it, because it likely violates the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.
I also concur in the judgment of the majority to lift the injunction as to President Trump
himself.
Id. at 606 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment). This only amounts to a silent concurrence
because Judge Traxler did not indicate what led him to refuse to join the majority opinion, since he
notes no points of disagreement. See Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352 (“By definition [a silent
concurrence] provides no explanation for why a[n appellate judge] agrees with the judgment but
refuses to join the majority opinion.”).
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offered no indication that he refused to join the majority opinion over
disagreements with the majority’s reasoning, one is compelled to guess why
he refused to join. 69 One guess could be that Judge Traxler, who has an
overwhelmingly conservative voting record, 70 agreed with the majority but
did not wish to sign his name to an opinion otherwise joined exclusively by
the liberal judges in a high-profile, politically-sensitive en banc case. 71
B. The Impact of Silent Concurrences on Precedent-Setting
In the hypothetical from Section I.A, the judge’s refusal to join the
majority opinion does not prevent the setting of a precedent. 72 A four-judge
majority already exists, so regardless of whether the concurring judge writes
separately (or even dissents), there is still a majority opinion that is binding
precedent. 73 In such a situation, while one may take issue in the abstract with
judges neglecting to explain their judicial decisions, 74 at least the silent
concurrence does not affect the precedential value of the case. 75
When a court is so divided that it issues a plurality decision, however,
there is no majority opinion. For example, only four judges in a sevenmember panel agree that outcome A is correct, but only three agree on why.
In such a scenario, a silently concurring judge is unilaterally (by withholding
their swing vote) deciding to leave ambiguities in the law while offering no
explanation of why they did so, let alone alternative legal rules. 76
California’s Constitution, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court,
actually prohibits swing-vote silent concurrences that result in a plurality
decision. 77

69. Id.; see supra note 10; supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
70. Sharon McCloskey, Is the 4th Circuit Veering Back to the Center?, N.C. POL’Y WATCH
(Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2013/02/13/is-the-4th-circuit-veering-back-to-thecenter/.
71. See infra text accompanying note 312 (elaborating on what Judge Traxler may have been
trying to avoid).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 46–49.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 46–49.
74. See infra note 497; notes 240–254 and accompanying text.
75. But see ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“The cryptic statement, ‘I concur in the
judgment,’ has bothered many readers. . . . It produces all the evils of a concurring opinion with
none of its values; i.e., it casts doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion without
indicating why they are wrong or questionable.” (emphasis added) (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL
ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))).
76. BLACK, supra note 8, at 135–36; Cappalli, supra note 13, at 327–30; Kimura, supra note
42, at 1596; Robbins, supra note 55, at 118, 160, 163.
77. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1126–28 (Cal. 1995); see also infra notes
509–512 (explaining in more detail how the California Supreme Court interpreted the California
constitution as prohibiting swing-vote silent concurrences).
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Traditionally, a plurality decision resulted in no binding precedent for
future courts, aside from the result itself. 78 The result is binding in the sense
that a majority of the court agrees that in situation X, outcome A is the proper
result; they just cannot agree on why. 79 Thus, a future court may be bound
to reach the same result should situation X arise again, but said court is free
to use whatever reasoning to explain this result. 80 Section I.B.1 explains how
the United States Supreme Court changed the status quo in Marks v. United
States, 81 making it possible for Supreme Court plurality decisions to establish
binding precedent. Section I.B.1 explores how the Court of Appeals extracts
precedent from its plurality decisions, which is somewhat similar to the
Supreme Court’s rule, but also significantly different. Section I.B.2 discusses
the potential impact of silent concurrences on the precedential value of a
plurality decision in Maryland, 82 and also examines the implications of
Maryland’s approach to plurality decisions. 83 Section I.B.3 summarizes the
impact of swing-vote silent concurrences on the precedential value of
plurality decisions.
1. How Post-Marks Courts Sometimes Afford Precedential Weight
to Plurality Decisions
Although plurality decisions are traditionally non-precedential, 84 today,
there are mechanisms by which an appellate court can afford precedential
weight to an opinion, or opinions, in a plurality decision. The Supreme Court
established the Marks rule to determine which opinion in a Supreme Court
plurality decision is binding: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’” 85 Courts faced
78. BLACK, supra note 8, at 135–36; see also Re, supra note 42, at 1948 n.28 (gathering preMarks authorities that doubted the precedential value of plurality decisions or dismissed them as
non-precedential).
79. See supra note 78.
80. See supra note 78.
81. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
82. See infra Section I.B.2.a.
83. See infra Section I.B.2.b.
84. See supra note 78.
85. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality
opinion)). Ironically, Gregg was itself a plurality decision, and so although the Marks rule
originated from Gregg, it was not until the majority in Marks adopted the rule that it became a
binding legal test. Re, supra note 42, at 1948–49. Even more interesting is that Justice Powell, who
authored the Marks opinion, was a member of the plurality in Gregg. Id. at 1951. So, first, in
Gregg, the plurality invented a new “narrowest grounds” rule that, if accepted, would suddenly
mean the plurality’s own nonbinding opinion was actually binding (since the lead opinion in Gregg
was likely the “narrowest grounds” opinion). Id. at 1948. Then, a year later, a member of that
Gregg plurality authored a majority opinion in Marks officially adopting the very rule the Gregg
plurality had self-servingly invented. Id. at 1951. Thus, “[i]n this way, the clear precedential
authority of a majority opinion indirectly blessed the more dubious authority of a plurality.” Id.
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with applying a Supreme Court plurality decision can use this rule to find that
the lead opinion, or a concurring one, is binding because it reached the
judgment “on the narrowest grounds.” 86
Since Marks, some state courts of last resort have adopted the Marks
rule, or something similar, to apply to their plurality decisions. 87 This
includes the Court of Appeals, which appears to use a technique known as
the “all opinions approach.” 88 The all opinions approach is a “related
principle” of the Marks rule that differs in essential ways, as explained
below. 89
Some believe the Court of Appeals adopted the Marks rule in State v.
Falcon, 90 but the court only said in that case that Maryland uses a “somewhat
similar approach” to Marks. 91 An analysis of Falcon reveals that this
“somewhat similar approach” is the “all opinions approach,” which differs
from the Marks rule in two significant ways. 92 First, unlike the Marks rule,
the all opinions approach considers all the opinions in a plurality decision—
including the dissents 93—a clear departure from the Marks rule’s search for
“that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on

86. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193–94; Re, supra note 42, at 1947–50; see also supra note 85.
Although, even the Supreme Court has recognized that the rule can be “more easily stated than
applied.” Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994); see also Re, supra note 42, at 1995
(referring to the preceding quote from Nichols as “an exercise of understatement”).
87. Re, supra note 42, at 1944, 1960–65, 1977, 1980.
88. State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 161–62, 152 A.3d 687, 701 (2017) (explaining that the Court
of Appeals applies “a somewhat similar approach [to the Marks rule] in determining the precedential
significance of a case without a majority opinion by this Court,” while citing cases that looked at
both concurring and dissenting opinions in a plurality decision to identify particular legal
propositions of which a majority of the judges agreed); id. at 161–73, 701–08 (looking at all the
opinions in a Court of Appeals plurality decision to extract a precedential legal proposition of which
a majority agreed and then applying that proposition to the case at hand); Re, supra note 42, at
1988–89 (explaining that the “all opinions approach,” a “related principle” of Marks is substantively
different from Marks in that it allows for consideration of all the opinions in a plurality decision,
including the dissents, and involves deducing particular legal propositions that at least a majority of
the court agreed with); see also infra note 106. But see infra notes 179–180 and accompanying text
(explaining that the all opinions approach was only ever proposed as a way for lower courts to
predict how a higher court would rule, not for courts of last resort to apply to their own plurality
decisions); infra Section I.B.2.b. (explaining why it is concerning that a court of last resort would
apply the all opinions approach to its plurality decisions).
89. Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89; see supra note 88; infra text accompanying notes 90–100.
90. For example, the Maryland State Bar Association’s Litigation Section interprets Falcon to
mean that Maryland applies the Supreme Court’s Marks rule to its plurality decisions. See Alan B.
Sternstein, Locating a Fragmented Appellate Court’s Rule of Decision – The Marks Rule Marks the
Spot?, MD. APP. BLOG (Aug. 28, 2018), https://mdappblog.com/2018/08/28/locating-a-fragmentedappellate-courts-rule-of-decision-the-marks-rule-marks-the-spot/ (citing Falcon for the proposition
that Maryland uses the Marks rule).
91. Falcon, 451 Md. at 161–62, 152 A.3d at 701.
92. Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89.
93. Id. But see id. at 1990 (suggesting that there are subversions of the all opinions approach
that would still focus on individual points of law rather than looking for a single binding opinion
but would not consider the dissents).
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the narrowest grounds.” 94 Second, unlike the Marks rule, the all opinions
approach does not look for a single binding opinion. 95 Rather, the all
opinions approach extracts individual points of law that at least a majority of
the judges either implicitly, 96 or explicitly, agreed on. 97
Therefore, the all opinions approach is substantively different than the
Marks rule. 98 The Marks rule is an exercise in determining which opinion in
a plurality decision, the lead opinion or a concurring one, is the single opinion
that must be treated as binding. 99 Meanwhile, the all opinions approach only
looks to find individual points a majority of the judges could be said to have
agreed on, regardless of whether those judges concurred or dissented. 100
While the Court of Appeals has never explicitly defined Maryland’s rule
as the “all opinions approach,” and even though many think Maryland uses
the Marks rule, 101 an analysis of Falcon reveals that the Court of Appeals
actually applies the all opinions approach to its plurality decisions to extract
binding precedent. 102 In Falcon, the court considered how to apply Schisler
v. State, 103 a plurality decision. 104 Schisler was “a significant case” bearing
on the matter at hand, but because Schisler was a plurality decision, it was
unclear how Schisler applied to the facts in Falcon. 105 The Falcon court
explained that Maryland uses a “somewhat similar approach” to Marks, while
citing to other Maryland cases that looked at all the opinions in a Court of
Appeals plurality decision, including the dissents, to extract individual
propositions a majority of the court agreed on (i.e. the all opinions
approach). 106 The Falcon court spent about ten pages applying this
94. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion))); see also Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 760 F.3d 600, 620 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[U]nder Marks, the positions of those Justices who
dissented from the judgment are not counted in trying to discern a governing holding from divided
opinions.” (emphasis in original)).
95. Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 183–188.
97. Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89; see also infra note 100.
98. Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89.
99. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193–94; Re, supra note 42, at 1947–50; see also supra note 94.
100. Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89. But see infra notes 179–180 and accompanying text
(explaining that the all opinions approach was only ever proposed as a way for lower courts to
predict how a higher court would rule, not for courts of last resort to apply to their own plurality
decisions); infra Section I.B.2.b. (explaining why it is concerning that a court of last resort would
apply the all opinions approach to its own plurality decisions).
101. See supra note 90; infra note 349 (citing two pre-Falcon Court of Special Appeals cases
where the court implied that Maryland uses the Marks rule).
102. See supra note 90.
103. 394 Md. 519, 907 A.2d 175 (2006).
104. State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 161, 152 A.3d 687, 701 (2017); Schisler, 394 Md. at 519,
907 A.2d at 175.
105. Falcon, 451 Md. at 161, 152 A.3d at 701.
106. Id. at 161–62, 152 A.3d at 701. The following sentence and its accompanying citations are
the only discussion in Falcon about how exactly Maryland affords precedential weight to its
plurality decisions:
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“somewhat similar [to Marks]” approach to Schisler, ultimately determining
that “careful examination” of Schisler revealed useful precedent. 107
To understand how swing-vote silent concurrences can impact the
precedential value of a case in Maryland, it is necessary to first examine the
Falcon court’s lengthy analysis of how it applied Schisler. 108 An analysis of
Falcon provides insight into what Maryland’s application of the all opinions
approach looks like in practice, revealing how silent concurrences could
impact the approach. Examining the court’s analysis is essential because the
court did not actually explain the mechanics of what it was doing in any
detail, and so the only real explanation of the rule comes from the court’s
discussion of how Schisler applied. 109
Falcon was a separation of powers case, where the ultimate question
was whether the Maryland General Assembly had unconstitutionally usurped
the power of the governor by only terminating the gubernatorially appointed
members of a statutorily created commission. 110 The General Assembly
amended the statute that established the School Board Nominating
Commission of Anne Arundel County, removing the governor’s statutory
authority to appoint five of the eleven members of the commission. 111 Under
the amended statute, those five members would, like the other six members,
be appointed by some entity besides the governor. 112 The issue in Falcon
was that the amendment also terminated the five incumbent gubernatorial
appointees before their terms had ended. 113 Four of the five gubernatorial
appointees on the commission at the time filed suit, arguing that the Maryland
Constitution only allows the governor to terminate civil officers appointed
by the governor for a term of years, and so the General Assembly had
This Court has applied a somewhat similar approach [to Marks] in determining the
precedential significance of a case without a majority opinion by this Court. See, e.g.,
Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 318, 321, 26 A.3d 899, 910, 911 (2011) (In analyzing what
this Court termed a “fractured” opinion, we explained why we were adopting the
reasoning of the dissent, stating: “For purposes of stare decisis, we note that this is a
proposition that garnered the support of four Judges[.]”); see also State v. Giddens, 335
Md. 205, 213 & n.6, 642 A.2d 870, 874 & n.6 (1994) (This Court stated that the issue of
whether a prior conviction bears on witness credibility is a matter of law because, in an
earlier case with no majority, “two concurring judges and two dissenting judges[—i.e.,
four Judges—]each thought that the question was a matter of law.”).
Id. at 162, 152 A.3d at 701 (second and third alterations in original). The opinion then states,
“Having discussed how precedential value is determined with a [Maryland] plurality opinion, we
turn to Schisler.” Id. The court then proceeded to analyze how to apply Schisler by looking at all
the opinions, including the dissents, ultimately finding that a majority of the judges, in fact all seven,
implicitly agreed on a particular point. Id. at 161–73, 152 A.3d at 700–08.
107. Falcon, 451 Md. at 161–73, 152 A.3d at 700–08. But see infra Section I.B.2.b (critiquing
the court’s approach and conclusion in Falcon).
108. Falcon, 451 Md. at 161–73, 152 A.3d at 700–08.
109. Id.; see also supra note 106.
110. Falcon, 451 Md. at 141–42, 152 A.3d at 689–90.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 142–43, 152 A.3d at 689–90.
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unconstitutionally usurped this exclusive power of the governor when it
ended their terms early. 114
The parties disagreed about how Schisler applied to the case at hand. 115
Schisler was “a significant case” addressing a somewhat similar question, but
both parties in Falcon believed Schisler stood for opposite propositions. 116
The plaintiffs argued that under Schisler, “the General Assembly may abolish
or reconstitute a commission, but may not terminate only the gubernatorial
appointees on a commission.” 117 Alternatively, the State argued that, under
Schisler, the General Assembly has the power to restructure a statutorily
created entity and change who appoints its members, even if that results in
the early termination of the existing gubernatorial appointees. 118
In Schisler, the plurality held that the General Assembly had
unconstitutionally usurped the governor’s power when it terminated the
members of the Public Service Commission, all of whom were gubernatorial
appointees, and restricted how the governor could choose their
replacements. 119 Unlike in Falcon, the General Assembly had not amended
the law that created the commission, removing the governor’s authority to
appoint the members and assigning that authority to some other entity.120
Rather, in Schisler, the General Assembly left the statute that gave the
governor authority to appoint the members untouched, amending a different
statute in the Public Utilities Article to provide that (1) “all existing members
of the Public Service Commission would be terminated by a certain date,”
and (2) “that the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House would
submit lists of names, from which the Governor would choose five new
members.” 121 Distinguishing that amendment, the Falcon court explained
that “the legislation at issue in Schisler did not involve a restructuring or
reconstituting of the Public Service Commission that would implement
changes that would apply prospectively to all future appointees.” 122 Instead,
the legislation in Schisler “involved the General Assembly wresting authority
away from the Governor and giving itself the one-time authority to submit
lists to the Governor and make appointments before reverting back to the old
gubernatorial appointment process.” 123
In Schisler, the lead opinion, concurring opinion, opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, and dissenting opinion disagreed about: (A)
114. Id. at 159, 152 A.3d at 699–700.
115. Id. at 161, 152 A.3d at 701.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 141–42, 159, 152 A.3d at 689–90, 699 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 158, 152 A.3d at 699.
119. Id. at 163–66, 152 A.3d at 701–04 (citing Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 596, 907 A.2d
175, 220 (2006)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 163, 178, 152 A.3d at 702, 711 (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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which, if any, constitutional provision the above-quoted 124 amendment
violated, and (B) which part of the amendment was unconstitutional, if
either. 125 The plurality believed both part (1) and part (2) of the
amendment 126 unconstitutionally usurped the governor’s power. 127 The
plurality believed each action independently violated article II, section 15 of
the Maryland constitution. 128 The plurality further explained, though, that if
the General Assembly were to amend the law defining a commission’s
membership to reconstitute or restructure the commission, then there would
be no constitutional violation even if this resulted in the early termination of
the existing gubernatorial members of that commission. 129
The concurring opinion agreed with the plurality that what the General
Assembly had done was unconstitutional, but disagreed that part (1) of the
amendment, ending the appointees’ terms early, independently violated
article II, section 15. 130 The concurrence believed instead that because the
General Assembly had (1) ended gubernatorial appointees to a statutory
commission’s terms early; (2) vested itself with the authority to interfere with
the governor’s still existing statutory authority to appoint their replacements;
and (3) otherwise left the commission “intact,” these circumstances taken
together violated article 8 of the Maryland declaration of rights and article II,
sections 1 and 9 of the Maryland constitution. 131 Disagreeing with the
plurality, the concurrence stated that it would have been permissible for the
General Assembly to have merely ended the appointees’ terms early, as such
124. See supra text accompanying note 121.
125. Falcon, 451 Md. at 161–73, 152 A.3d at 700–08.
126. See supra text accompanying note 121.
127. Falcon, 451 Md. at 164–67, 171–72, 152 A.3d at 703–04, 707 (discussing the plurality
opinion in Schisler).
128. Id.; MD. CONST. art. II, § 15 (granting the governor the power to remove “civil officers
who received appointment from the Executive for a term of years.”). Only the dissent doubted that
gubernatorial appointees to a statutorily created commission counted as “civil officers” under article
II, section 15, but only the plurality believed that ending the appointees’ terms early implicated
article II, section 15. See Falcon, 451 Md. at 165–71, 152 A.3d at 703–07 (discussing the different
opinions in Schisler). The Falcon court declined to resolve whether the appointees were civil
officers because it was able to use the all opinions approach to find that, under the circumstances in
Falcon, no member of the Schisler court would have found a constitutional violation regardless. Id.
at 142–43,171–73, 152 A.3d at 690, 707–08; supra notes 88, 106 (explaining how the court’s
analysis of the precedential value of Schisler constituted an application of the “all opinions
approach”).
129. Id. at 167, 152 A.3d at 704 (citing Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 598, 907 A.2d 175, 222
(2006) (plurality opinion)).
130. Id. at 167–68, 172, 152 A.3d at 704–05, 707 (citing Schisler, 394 Md. at 605–06, 907 A.2d
at 226 (Wilner, J., concurring)).
131. Id. at 167–68, 152 A.3d at 704–05 & n.5 (citing Schisler, 394 Md. at 605–06, 907 A.2d at
226 (Wilner, J., concurring)) (“It is the entirety of the legislative assault that runs afoul of Article
8.”); MD. CONST., DECL. OF RTS., art. VIII (“[T]he Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of
Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the
functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.”); MD.
CONST. art. II, § 1 (vesting the executive power of the state with the governor); MD. CONST. art. II,
§ 9 (“[The governor] shall take care that the Laws are faithfully executed.”).
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an action, in and of itself, would not have separately violated article II,
section15. 132
The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part disagreed with the
plurality that part (1) of the amendment, ending the terms early, was
unconstitutional, but agreed that part (2), restricting whom the governor
could appoint as a replacement, was unconstitutional. 133 The dissenting
opinion believed neither were unconstitutional. 134
In Falcon, what the General Assembly had done was somewhat
analogous to part (1) and part (2) of the amendment 135 in Schisler, and also
somewhat different, in important ways. The General Assembly’s action in
Falcon was similar to Schisler in that the action only affected gubernatorial
appointees. 136 The action was different in that, in Falcon, there were other
members of the commission whom had never been gubernatorial appointees,
and who were, therefore, not terminated. 137 Furthermore, unlike in Schisler,
the General Assembly in Falcon actually amended the law that created the
commission to remove the governor’s statutory authority to appoint the five
members who were terminated. 138 Similar to Schisler, however, the General
Assembly had only focused on removing the gubernatorially appointed
members, as the amendment left who appoints the other members
unchanged. 139 But, unlike in Schisler, the General Assembly in Falcon had
not quite left the membership of the commission “otherwise intact.” 140 In
Schisler, the lead opinion and concurrence thought ending gubernatorial
terms while leaving the membership of the commission otherwise intact
pointed toward a constitutional violation. 141 In Falcon, the General
Assembly left the current membership otherwise intact, 142 but the
amendment also made other changes to the overall membership of the
commission. 143
Therefore, in Schisler, the General Assembly had terminated the
members of a commission comprised entirely of gubernatorial appointees
132. Falcon, 451 Md. at 167–68, 152 A.3d at 704–05 (citing Schisler, 394 Md. at 605–06, 907
A.2d at 226 (Wilner, J., concurring)).
133. Id. at 168–69, 152 A.3d at 705–06 (citing Schisler, 394 Md. at 606–07, 907 A.2d at 227
(Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting)).
134. Id. at 169–70, 152 A.3d at 705–06. (citing Schisler, 394 Md. at 615, 907 A.2d at 232
(Battaglia, J., dissenting)).
135. See supra text accompanying note 121.
136. Falcon, 451 Md. at 141–43, 163–66, 152 A.3d at 689–90, 701–04 (citing Schisler, 394 Md.
at 596, 907 A.2d at 220).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 163–64, 152 A.3d at 702.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 173, 152 A.3d at 708.
141. Id. at 167, 152 A.3d at 704; see supra text accompanying note 131.
142. See supra text accompanying note 139.
143. Such as adding two new members, comprising the commission of thirteen members rather
than eleven. Falcon, 451 Md. at 173, 152 A.3d at 708.
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and restricted the governor’s still-existing statutory authority to appoint their
replacements, but otherwise left the commission intact. 144 In Falcon,
however, only five of the eleven members of the commission were
gubernatorial appointees, but the legislature had only changed who appoints
those five seats, thereby only terminating the gubernatorial appointees’ terms
early, while leaving who appoints the other six seats intact. 145
The plaintiffs in Falcon argued that the General Assembly had not
restructured the commission such that the General Assembly could end the
plaintiffs’ terms early. 146 The plaintiffs argued that, similar to Schisler, the
legislature had singled out governor-appointed commission members, only
changing who appoints those five positions. 147 The plaintiffs did not dispute
that the legislature could change who appoints the members as it sees fit, they
just argued that the legislature could not end the existing appointees’ terms
early through such an action. 148 The plaintiffs argued that although the
General Assembly had, unlike in Schisler, actually amended the law that
created the commission to alter how its membership is determined, the
General Assembly had clearly singled out only the gubernatorial appointees
and terminated them early after changing the rules only for the gubernatorial
positions. 149 The plaintiffs argued that such a focused change only impacting
the gubernatorial appointees could not fairly be viewed as “reconstituting” a
commission whereby the General Assembly could then permissibly end the
incumbent members’ terms early. 150 Rather, the plaintiffs argued, this was
clearly the legislature singling out only those members appointed by the
governor and terminating only those members while leaving the rest of the
current membership intact, similar to what the General Assembly had done
in Schisler. 151
Thus, the relevant disagreement in Schisler that the Court of Appeals
sought to square with the facts in Falcon was the following: The Schisler
plurality believed it is unconstitutional for the General Assembly to terminate
the existing gubernatorial appointees of a commission before their terms are
up, unless such termination results from a restructuring or reconstituting of
the commission itself. 152 Alternatively, all the other judges in Schisler
disagreed with the plurality that such a qualification was necessary. 153 Those
judges believed, instead, that the court does not need to concern itself with

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08; supra notes 138–143.
Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08; supra notes 138–143.
Id. at 142, 159, 152 A.3d at 689–90, 699–700.
Falcon, 451 Md. at 142, 159, 152 A.3d at 689–90, 699–700.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 172, 152 A.3d at 707.
Falcon, 451 Md. at 159, 152 A.3d at 699–700.
Id. at 172, 152 A.3d at 707.
Id.; supra text accompanying notes 130–134.
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whether the termination results from a restructuring. 154 They thought such
an analysis was unnecessary because they believed there is nothing
unconstitutional in the first place about the General Assembly prematurely
ending the terms of gubernatorial appointees on a statutorily created
commission. 155
After “careful examination” of all the opinions in Schisler, the Falcon
court explained that regardless of their other disagreements, all seven judges
in Schisler would apparently agree, at least, that no matter who appointed the
members, a constitutional violation does not automatically occur when the
General Assembly ends statutory-commission members’ terms early. 156 The
Falcon court explained that the lead opinion simply believed that the
termination of gubernatorially appointed members must be incidental to
reconstituting the membership of a commission to be constitutional, while
the other opinions did not think there needed to be any such rule because the
termination would be constitutional regardless. 157 Thus, the Falcon court
held that, under Schisler, the General Assembly’s restructuring of the School
Board Nominating Commission of Anne Arundel County did not violate the
Maryland Constitution simply because that restructuring incidentally resulted
in the early termination of only the governor-appointed members. 158
It is clear that the court did not apply the Marks rule, as the court did not
decide that either the lead opinion or the concurring one reached the result on
the narrowest grounds and was therefore the single binding opinion.159
Rather, the court looked at all the opinions, including the dissents, to see if a
majority would have agreed on whether there was a constitutional violation
just because the legislature terminated only the gubernatorially appointed
members. 160 The court found that the answer was yes—a majority of the
judges, in fact all seven, would have agreed that just because all the
terminated members were appointed by the governor does not mean there
was a constitutional violation. 161 It was on this basis—that a majority of the
154. Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08.
155. Id. Strictly speaking, the concurrence only believed that there was nothing unconstitutional
in and of itself about terminating the members but did believe terminating the members was
unconstitutional in Schisler, only because of additional facts in that case that did not exist in Falcon.
See id.; supra text accompanying notes 130–132.
156. Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08.
157. Id.
158. Id. But see infra Section I.B.2.b. (critiquing Falcon’s use of the all opinions approach and
its conclusion based on that approach).
159. Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08; see supra notes 99–100 and
accompanying text (explaining the difference between the Marks rule and the all opinions
approach).
160. Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08. But see infra notes 179–180 and
accompanying text (explaining that the all opinions approach was only ever proposed as a way for
lower courts to predict how a higher court would rule, not for courts of last resort to apply to their
own plurality decisions); infra Section I.B.2.b (explaining why it is troubling for a court of last
resort to apply the all opinions approach to its own plurality decisions).
161. Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08.
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judges would have necessarily agreed on a particular point—that the Falcon
court decided that, under Schisler, the State prevails. 162 Therefore, while
some seem to take for granted that Maryland uses the Supreme Court’s Marks
rule, 163 this is incorrect. Maryland apparently uses the all opinions approach,
not the Marks rule, to afford precedential weight to Maryland plurality
decisions. 164 Answering the question of how silent concurrences impact the
precedential value of plurality decisions in Maryland, then, depends on the
effect of silent concurrences when applying the all opinions approach.
2. The Potential Impact of Silent Concurrences on the Precedential
Value of a Plurality Decision in Maryland and a Closer Look at
Falcon
Silent concurrences can confound the precedential value of a Maryland
plurality decision, 165 but they would not have done so in Falcon. 166 It turns
out, though, the fact that silent concurrences in Schisler would not have
mattered in Falcon makes clear that the all opinions approach, particularly as
applied in Falcon, seems oddly detached from why stare decisis exists in the
first place. 167
a. How Silent Concurrences Complicate Plurality Decisions but
Would Not Have Changed the Outcome in Falcon
None of the concurrences in Schisler were silent. 168 Thus, the Falcon
court had every judge’s alternative reasoning available to help determine how
Schisler applied. 169 If the concurrences had been silent, it would not have
mattered in Falcon because the plurality and either of the dissenters in
Schisler (four of seven judges) could still be said to have “agreed” about the
relevant proposition the Falcon court extracted from Schisler. 170
162. Id.
163. See supra note 89 (providing an example of an organization believing Falcon meant
Maryland uses the Marks rule); infra note 349 (citing two pre-Falcon Court of Special Appeals
cases where the court seemed to believe Maryland uses the Marks rule).
164. See supra Section I.B.1. The Court of Appeals using the all opinions approach is odd for
many reasons, see infra Section I.B.2.b., not the least of which being that the all opinions approach
was only ever proposed as a tool for lower courts to predict how a higher court would rule based on
a plurality decision from the higher court. See infra notes 179–180 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Section I.E.2.
166. See supra Section I.B.2.a.
167. See supra Section I.B.2.b.
168. Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 907 A.2d 175 (2006).
169. State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 161–73, 152 A.3d 687, 700–08 (2017).
170. See supra note 106 (providing a quote from Falcon where the court cited to a Maryland
case that combined two concurring opinions and two dissenting ones to find a single precedential
proposition because all that is needed is a majority); supra text accompanying notes 156–158
(explaining that the Falcon court found all seven of the judges in Schisler would have agreed on the
relevant point). But see infra Section I.B.2.b. (discussing why finding precedent by combining
separate opposing opinions based on what they technically “agreed” about is problematic).
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Hypothetically, though, if it had been unclear whether the lead opinion and
the dissents agreed on the relevant point (and had the concurrences been
silent), then the Falcon court would have had no binding precedent to
apply. 171 There would only have been five judges who explained their
reasoning at all, and only three in agreement, thus no majority. 172
Therefore, while swing-vote concurrences always disrupt the flow of
precedent by preventing a majority opinion, swing-vote silent concurrences
complicate matters even further. 173 They complicate matters further because
even though Maryland can afford precedential weight to a plurality decision
via the all opinions approach, this enterprise relies on judges writing
separately so future courts can examine their opinions. 174 When the
concurrences are silent, a later court is left with nothing but a lead opinion
and a dissent(s), which may or may not have any points of overlap, implicit
or otherwise. 175
b. Falcon Reveals a Disconnect Between the Court of Appeals’s Use
of the All Opinions Approach and the Point of Stare Decisis
This subsection is a slight diversion from the discussion of silent
concurrences in and of themselves, but there is something essential to note
about the all opinions approach, particularly as applied in Falcon. Focusing
on how silent concurrences would not have altered Falcon’s application of
Schisler fleshes out how the court’s use of the all opinions approach, while
using the language of stare decisis, has little to do with why stare decisis
exists. 176 Again, the Falcon court found that all seven of the judges in
Schisler implicitly agreed on a particular point and that this point was
therefore precedential because a majority would have agreed with it. 177 Such
a rule is concerning because (1) it seems to allow courts to mix and match
171. Falcon, 451 Md. at 162, 152 A.3d at 701 (explaining that the precedential weight of a
Maryland plurality decision depends on finding something a majority of the judges could be said to
have agreed about); supra note 106 (quoting the relevant language from this part of Falcon).
172. See supra note 171.
173. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 2016 WL 2944069, at *3 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 17, 2016)
(noting the difficulty the court had in applying Barnes v. State, 423 Md. 75, 31 A.3d 203 (2011)
(plurality decision) because of a swing-vote silent concurrence); Feaster v. State, 2015 WL
9590659, at *2 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 30, 2015) (same); see also infra Section I.E.2.
174. See supra Section I.B.1. (explaining the all opinions approach, which necessarily requires
having opinions to examine); infra Section I.E.2. (providing examples of Maryland plurality
decisions with silent concurrences resulting in legal ambiguity). Of course, the Marks rule also
relies on concurring judges writing separately. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text
(explaining the Marks rule).
175. See, for example, the cases discussed infra in Section I.E.2. Besides the notion of
extracting actual precedent from plurality decisions, silent concurrences also deprive the court of
opinions that could at least aid the court as persuasive authority in developing and adopting rules in
the future. See supra notes 9, 52 and accompanying text; infra note 205.
176. See infra notes 197–206 and accompanying text.
177. State v. Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08 (2017); see supra text
accompanying notes 156–158.
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opinions authored by judges who deliberately wrote separately rather than
form a majority and (2) this mixing and matching seems to enable courts to
extract precedential propositions those judges would likely have disagreed
with based solely on the notion that the separate opinions “agree” in some
technical sense. 178
Before continuing, it is worth noting that proponents of the all opinions
approach only ever proposed it as a methodological tool for lower courts to
predict how a higher court would rule in a case under review by the lower
court, when the only case from the higher court addressing a similar question
is a plurality decision. 179 The all opinions approach was not intended for
courts of last resort to apply to their own plurality decisions as if theoretical
areas of overlap between opposing opinions were necessarily binding on
those courts. 180
Issues with the all opinions approach are clearest when one considers
how the Falcon court could have applied Schisler the same way based only
on the lead opinion and either one of the dissents. 181 While the Falcon court
found all seven judges in Schisler “agreed” on the relevant point, that point
would still have been precedential even if only the lead opinion and either of
the dissents had “agreed.” 182
As an initial matter, intuitively, one would think an opinion explaining
the result and an opinion dissenting in that result 183 do not “agree,” but rather,
by definition, disagree. 184 When the Falcon court stated the lead opinion and
the dissent “agreed,” it meant the following: The lead opinion in Schisler held
there was a constitutional violation because the termination of the
gubernatorial appointees had not been incidental to a restructuring of the
commission. 185 Conversely, the dissents did not believe there was a
constitutional violation because they believed the General Assembly had the
power to terminate early the members of a statutorily created entity,
regardless of who appointed the members, and regardless of whether the
178. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
179. Re, supra note 42, at 1988–89 (“The idea is to view all the opinions in a . . . [plurality]
decision, including the dissents, as contributing to the rule of decision for future cases, at least in
lower courts.” (emphasis added)); see id. at 1988–93 (explaining in more detail how lower courts
would use the all opinions approach).
180. See id. at 1988–93 (explaining the all opinions approach as only a tool for lower courts,
thus not considering the notion that a court of last resort could use the all opinions approach on its
own plurality decisions). Even the Supreme Court applies the Marks rule to its own opinions
sparingly, with the rule being more a creature of lower courts trying to interpret Supreme Court
plurality decisions. Id. at 1951–54; see also infra note 205 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 106 (quoting Falcon explaining that the Court of Appeals can find precedent
in a plurality decision by combining dissents with other opinions).
182. State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 172, 152 A.3d 687, 701 (2017); see supra note 106
(providing a quotation from Falcon citing another case that found a precedential point of agreement
between two concurring opinions and two dissenting ones).
183. And, for that matter, an opinion concurring only in the result.
184. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
185. Falcon, 451 Md. at 172, 152 A.3d at 707.
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termination was incidental to a restructuring. 186 Thus, technically, both
opinions would agree that nothing unconstitutional occurs when the General
Assembly amends the law defining who appoints members of a statutorily
created commission, and in so doing, ends the current terms of only the
governor-appointed members early. 187 The Falcon court reasoned that
neither the Schisler plurality nor the dissenters would have found a
constitutional violation in Falcon. 188
While examining implicit areas of overlap between opinions might be a
useful intellectual exercise, it is worrisome that a hypothetical opinion
stitched together from separate disagreeing opinions could be considered a
pre-existing precedent that a court of last resort must follow. 189 The
dissenters in Schisler 190 fundamentally disagreed with the lead opinion,
which is presumably why those judges dissented rather than help create a
precedential majority opinion. 191 The lead opinion believed the rule should
be that, even if the only thing at issue is whether the General Assembly can
terminate gubernatorial appointees on a statutorily created commission, the
dispositive question is whether the termination is incidental to a restructuring
of the commission itself. 192 If not, the termination is unconstitutional. 193 The
plurality could not convince a fourth judge of this. 194 Conversely, the
dissents believed such an analysis is irrelevant because the General Assembly
has the power to end the terms early, whether incidental to a restructuring or
not. 195 Thus, although it may be true that the lead opinion and the dissents
would have agreed no constitutional violation occurred in Falcon, they had
very different constitutional interpretations that led them to that
conclusion. 196 Still, though, the opinions were lumped together as if they
formed a binding majority under the maxim of stare decisis. 197
From a doctrinal standpoint, the problem is that a court of last resort
“careful[ly]” stitching together precedent based on what disagreeing judges
in a plurality decision would have theoretically agreed about has little to do
with why we subscribe to the maxim of stare decisis in the first place. 198
Forming precedent under the maxim of stare decisis traditionally requires (1)
186. Id. at 172–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08.
187. Id.
188. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 156–158.
189. See infra notes 190–226 and accompanying text.
190. And the concurrence, actually.
191. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 125–134, 152–155.
193. See supra notes 125–134, 152–155.
194. See supra notes 153–162 and accompanying text.
195. State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 161–73, 152 A.3d 687, 700–08 (2017); see supra notes 125–
134, 152–155.
196. See supra notes 125–134, 152–155.
197. See supra notes 125–134, 152–155.
198. Falcon, 451 Md. at 161–73, 152 A.3d at 700–08; see supra text accompanying note 107;
infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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that the majority of an appellate panel, (2) explicitly agrees on, (a) a particular
result, and (b) the legal reasoning that dictates that result. 199 Stare decisis
literally means “to stand by things decided,” 200 the idea being that when a
court has the chance to consider a particular set of facts, whatever reasoning
a majority can agree dictates the result in that case is binding on future cases
with similar facts. 201
The basic justification for basing our legal system on the principle of
stare decisis is two-fold. First, we assign inherent authority to a rule when
the majority of an appellate panel, faced with the same set of facts, could
agree on that rule, and applied it to those facts, to reach the same result.202
Second, stare decisis aids in predictability of the law, promotes fairness, and
“contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,” by
ensuring that the rules explained and applied in one case will apply to similar
cases in the future. 203
Yet, the all opinions approach, as applied in Falcon, allows a court of
last resort to give all the weight of a precedent to the notion that at least four
judges, who did not even agree on the result in one case, would hypothetically
agree, technically, with a proposition relevant to a new case with different
facts. 204 Having done so, a court can dispense with any discussion of the
merits of the rule and simply state there is a binding rule that shall now be
applied under the maxim of stare decisis. 205 Thus, under the reasoning of

199. BLACK, supra note 8, at 2–6, 10, 135–136; Re, supra note 42, at 1948 n.28, 1966; supra
text accompanying notes 40–43.
200. Stare Decisis, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis (last
updated Mar. 2017) (emphasis added).
201. See supra note 199.
202. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS OR THE
SCIENCE OF CASE LAW 3–6 (1912); see id. at 3 (“The authoritative force of judicial precedents rests
partly on the legal presumption that what has previously been decided by a court of competent
jurisdiction was correctly decided and therefore should not be reconsidered.”); id. at 5–6 (“The
operation of precedents is based on the legal presumption of the correctness of judicial decisions.”
(quoting JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 171 (2d ed. 1907))).
203. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015); accord BLACK, supra note
202 (“[I]t is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in
litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every
new judge’s opinion, as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined,
what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule.” (quoting SIR
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS 69
(1753))).
204. See supra Section I.B.1.
205. Compare Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994) (“We think it not useful
to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and
divided the lower courts that have considered it. This degree of confusion following a splintered
decision . . . is itself a reason for reexamining that decision.”), and id. at 746–47 (acknowledging
the Court was in fact adopting new rules based on the persuasive authority of various opinions in a
plurality decision, without insisting the plurality decision was somehow binding precedent under
the principle of stare decisis), with State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 171–79, 152 A.3d 687, 707–12
(2017) (basing its legal analysis almost entirely on how Schisler could technically be said to stand
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Falcon, a court can proceed as if there is authoritative precedent that dictates
a certain result—while at the same time contrivedly synthesizing that
precedent in a manner unrelated to what it means to “stand by things
decided.” 206 Stare decisis means standing by rules a majority previously
applied to a particular set of facts to reach a particular result—not standing
by complicated extrapolations of what four of seven judges, who did not even
agree on the result, would have, technically, agreed on given the chance to
opine on a new case with different facts. 207
In addition to the general doctrinal issues, the logic of Falcon is
potentially confusing for two reasons. First, no majority in Schisler could
agree whether the legislature’s early termination of governor-appointed
members needed to be incidental to be constitutional, and yet Falcon,
purporting to be following what all the judges agreed on in Schisler, found
that the termination in Falcon was constitutional because it was incidental. 208
Second, even if the concurrence had been silent, the Falcon court could have
done the same thing with only the lead opinion and a dissent, even though
the dissents quite clearly would have disagreed with the court undertaking an
analysis of whether the termination was incidental. 209
University of California-Los Angeles Law Professor Richard Re points
out that the all opinions approach could be considered problematic because
judges who write separately rather than join the lead opinion “prefer that no
precedent be established,” and so “they should be able to act on that wish
rather than having to join (and make precedential) views diametrically
contrary to their own” via subsequent application of the all opinions
approach. 210 A court treats the rule that it pieces together from separate
for a binding proposition, and then applying that proposition without further discussion of its
merits).
206. Stare Decisis, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis (last
updated Mar. 2017); cf. Re, supra note 42, at 1951 (explaining that the Marks rule itself was
established when “the clear precedential authority of a [Supreme Court] majority opinion indirectly
blessed the more dubious authority of a [Supreme Court] plurality”). If the above description of
why stare decisis exists in the first place is correct, then picking one opinion that is decided on what
a court deems “the narrowest grounds” and treating it as binding, i.e. the Marks rule, also seems to
have little to do with why the principle of stare decisis exists. See infra text accompanying notes
212–213; infra note 225 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 202–206 and accompanying text; see also Re, supra note 42, at 1992–93
(making a similar point, although in the context of lower courts applying the approach to a higher
court’s plurality decision, as lower courts trying to predict how a higher court might rule is the only
purpose for which the all opinions approach was ever proposed).
208. See supra notes 125–134, 152–155.
209. Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 606–14, 907 A.2d 175, 226–31 (2006) (Harrel, J., and
Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 614–32, 907 A.2d at 231–42 (Battaglia,
J., dissenting).
210. Re, supra note 42, at 1973 n.168; see also id. at 1990 (“Some judges and commentators
object to . . . giv[ing] binding force to dissents. Because they do not adjudicate rights or establish
precedent, dissents tend to be less inhibited than the sober majority opinions that they criticize.
Dissenters let off steam, offer visionary meditations, and otherwise act in ways that the dissenters
themselves would view as inappropriate in a ruling with the force of law.”).
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opinions as binding precedent, even though “not a single [judge from the
plurality decision] would necessarily approve of the resulting combination of
rules.” 211 Re ultimately argues that “[n]o approach to the Marks rule finds
footing in logic, prudence, or tradition,” 212 for reasons that are beyond the
scope of this Comment. 213
Exemplifying the concerns Professor Re notes above, the Falcon court
explained that its decision was dictated by what all the judges implicitly
“agreed” on in Schisler, while applying the very same analysis the Schisler
judges could not agree was necessary—an analysis of whether the early
termination was incidental to a restructuring. 214 The non-lead opinions’
authors apparently felt strongly enough that no such analysis was necessary
that they wrote separately—rather than allowing the case to result in a
precedential majority opinion whereby a future court would undertake that
analysis. 215 The Falcon court performed that very analysis, though, while
concluding that its decision was based on a precedential point of agreement
between all the judges in Schisler.
The all opinions approach allowed the Falcon court to read Schisler as
standing for the binding proposition that there was no constitutional violation
in Falcon—on the grounds that the “termination of the [gubernatorial]
Appointees’ terms was incidental to the General Assembly’s restructuring
and reconstituting of the Nominating Commission.” 216 The court, purporting
to follow stare decisis, could “[a]pply[] the rationale of Schisler here” to
determine “that, under Schisler, according to a majority of this [c]ourt, such
action does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 217 The court
proceeded to explain and analyze why what the General Assembly did could
rightly be considered “restructuring,” and why the termination was incidental
to this restructuring, even though undertaking such an analysis is something
the concurrence and the dissents did not think future courts need to do—

211. Id. at 1993.
212. Id. at 1997.
213. For a thorough analysis of the difficulties in extracting precedent from plurality opinions
via the Marks rule and its variants, and criticism on these grounds of both the rule, and of judges
failing to compromise sufficiently to reach a majority decision, see Richard M. Re, Beyond the
Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942 (2019).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 125–134, 156–158.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 125–134, 156–158; cf. supra notes 210–211 and
accompanying text (explaining why forming precedent by combining disagreeing separate opinions
could be considered ill-advised).
216. State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 171–74, 152 A.3d 687, 707–08 (2017).
217. Id. (emphasis added). But see supra note 205 and accompanying text (pointing out that
when a court of last resort faces a legal question that previously divided that court resulting in
confusion over what the rule is or should be, it is probably preferable for the court to explore and
discuss the merits of whatever rule it adopts—which is why it is concerning that the all opinions
approach can reduce a court’s analysis to declaring that the court is applying some pre-existing
binding precedent).

2020]

SILENT CONCURRENCES AND THEIR USE IN MARYLAND

155

which is presumably why they wrote separately rather than allowing Schisler
to set such a precedent. 218
Furthermore, had the concurrences in Schisler been silent, the Falcon
court, under its own logic, could still have reached the same conclusion based
only on the lead opinion and either of the dissents. 219 The Falcon court
interpreted the dissents as agreeing with the lead opinion that incidental
termination of only the gubernatorial appointees on a statutorily created
commission is not a constitutional violation. 220 While the notion that the lead
and dissenting opinions agreed about this is technically true, it ignores the
fact that the dissents’ point was that it should not matter whether the
termination is incidental to anything. 221 The Falcon court may be technically
correct that both the plurality and the dissenters in Schisler would not have
found a constitutional violation in Falcon. 222 Still, it seems odd that even
based on the most diametrically opposed opinions in Schisler, the court could
have proceeded as if the relevant analysis “under Schisler” 223 is whether the
termination was incidental, when the relevance of such an analysis is
essentially what no majority could agree on in Schisler. 224
3.

Summarizing the Effect of Silent Concurrences on the
Precedential Value of Plurality Decisions

Based on Sections I.B.1 and I.B.2, the following two propositions are
true. First, when a failure to reach a compromise results in a plurality
decision, the precedential value of the case is left uncertain, and it will take
further litigation that is likely to be complex and unpredictable to sort out
these ambiguities in the law. 225 Second, when a swing-voter concurs silently,
it can be even more difficult, if not impossible, to sort out these
ambiguities. 226 The silently concurring judge both disrupts the establishment
of precedent and offers no assistance to future courts or litigants in using the
Marks rule, or a technique such as the all opinions approach, to resolve
218. Id. at 172–74, 152 A.3d at 707–08; see supra notes 125–134, 152–155; cf. supra note 210
(offering criticism that would seem to apply to Falcon of the general notion of combining dissents
with concurring and lead opinions to form precedent).
219. See supra notes 89, 106 and text accompanying notes 156–163.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 156–163.
221. Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 606–14, 907 A.2d 175, 226–31 (2006) (Harrel, J., and
Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 614–32, 907 A.2d at 231–42 (Battaglia,
J., dissenting). Contra supra note 210 and accompanying text (explaining that judges probably do
not want their separate opinions to be mixed with diametrically opposed opinions to form precedent,
since they specifically chose to write separately rather than form precedent).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 156–163.
223. Falcon, 451 Md. at 172–73, 152 A.3d at 707–08.
224. See supra note 221.
225. For a thorough analysis of why litigation that requires applying plurality decisions can be
particularly complex and unpredictable post-Marks, see Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1942 (2019).
226. See infra note 227.

156

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 79:129

questions of law left confounded by the plurality decision. 227 Furthermore,
aside from the notion of actually extracting precedent from a plurality
decision, a swing-vote silent concurrence generally deprives future courts of
additional persuasive authority to help resolve questions left unanswered by
a plurality decision. 228
C. A Survey of the Criticisms of Silent Concurrences
Critics take particular issue with swing-vote silent concurrences because
they lead to plurality decisions, but also criticize the practice generally,
regardless of whether there is still a majority opinion. When a judge’s silent
concurrence results in a plurality decision, one criticism is the judge caused
there to be ambiguities in the law but did not explain why. 229 Rather than the
case settling a legal question, future litigants will need to re-litigate the same
issue before a clear legal rule can emerge. 230 While this is a criticism that
could be directed at a court as a whole when the judges’ inability to
compromise results in a plurality decision, 231 the key point is that with a silent
concurrence, there is no hint as to what the disagreement even was or what
legal principles the concurring judge thinks should have decided the case. 232
Furthermore, there is concern about the unilateral nature of a swing-vote
silent concurrence. 233 When a court as a whole leaves ambiguities in the law,
either by failing to find a compromise that allows for a majority opinion,234
issuing a summary disposition that does not explain the court’s reasoning, or
227. See Robbins, supra note 55, at 161–65 (explaining that swing-vote silent concurrences
leave ambiguities in the law that it will take further litigation to sort out definitively); infra note 349
and accompanying text (providing two examples where the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
noted particular difficulty in applying a Court of Appeals plurality decision because of a silent
concurrence); infra Section I.E.2; see also infra note 494 (addressing the potential argument that
the all opinions approach may in fact make silent concurrences more justifiable in Maryland).
228. See supra note 175 (explaining that silently concurring judges have also deprived future
courts of additional persuasive authority to help further develop the law even in the absence of rules
like the Marks rule, or where plurality-precedent-extracting rules are of no help in a given instance).
229. See Robbins, supra note 55, at 161–65 (criticizing swing-vote judges in particular for
issuing silent concurrences because they leave ambiguities in the law that will require further
litigation); see also supra text accompanying note 76 (explaining that plurality decisions leave
ambiguities in the law).
230. Robbins, supra note 55, at 161–65.
231. See supra note 225.
232. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (explaining how a silent concurrence tells
us nothing more than that a judge refused to join the main opinion); supra Section I.B.3; infra note
349 (citing two Maryland Court of Special Appeals cases where the court noted particular difficulty
applying a Court of Appeals plurality decision because of a silent concurrence, as it provided no
insight into the disagreement or alternative grounds for the result); infra Section I.E.2 (discussing
five Court of Appeals plurality decisions with one or more silent concurrences and the resulting
legal ambiguities from those cases); supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that one of
the reasons disagreeing judges should write separate opinions is to contribute to the development of
the law).
233. See infra notes 237, 240, 252.
234. See supra note 225.
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issuing an unpublished opinion, 235 this is at least the court acting as a
collective body. 236 A silent concurrence, however, allows a single judge to
stand in the way of precedent, for whatever reason the judge may have, and
not provide any rationale. 237 For example, a single judge may not want a
particular rule to become precedent for personal or political reasons. 238 If
that judge happens to be the swing voter, then the silent concurrence allows
that judge to exercise their will independently, unlike when the court acts
collectively, and without writing separately to explain their decision to the
public. 239
When the silently concurring judge is not a swing voter disrupting the
establishment of precedent, the general criticism of silent concurrences is
essentially that “[j]udges have a duty to write and to provide reasoning for
their decisions.” 240 Critics do not necessarily argue that a judge must write a
lengthy and detailed separate opinion. 241 Rather, the criticism is that a judge
ought to at least give some indication that they in fact considered the case
carefully before casting a vote in favor of a given result, 242 and some
statement as to why the judge is choosing not to join the main opinion.243
This statement may be as simple as explaining that the judge agreed with the
lower court’s reason for reaching the result rather than the reasoning in the

235. Robbins, supra note 55, at 118, 161–62 (describing these sorts of situations as comparable
to a silent concurrence insofar as the reasoning is left unstated).
236. Id. at 161, 163–64; see infra note 237.
237. Robbins, supra note 55, at 161, 163–64; see also Platt supra, note 4, at 160 (“Critics might
argue that silent concurrences are more subject to inappropriate use than other [methods by which
a court as a whole might withhold its reasoning] because they are exercised unilaterally.”). As will
be addressed in the Analysis, see infra notes 419–437 and accompanying text, Platt argues that the
unilateral nature of a silent concurrence is not a concern. Platt, supra note 4, at 160.
238. See Robbins, supra note 55, at 163–64 (stating that disrupting precedent without providing
any rationale “rais[es] the specter of arbitrariness”).
239. Id. at 161, 163–64; infra note 252; see also infra note 240.
240. Id. at 161 n.16; accord Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (“[W]ritten opinions provide
a measure of public accountability. . . . Obscuring justifications for votes may complicate the task
of maintaining or building institutional legitimacy.” (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on
Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 140 (1990))); infra note 247 and accompanying text.
241. See Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352 (“[Silent concurrences are] puzzling because Justices
have several low-cost alternatives . . . . As an initial matter, Justices might issue perfunctory
opinions that offer a brief explanation for staking out a separate position.”). This is worth noting
because a principle defense of the silent concurrence is that judges have limited time, and there can
be situations where a judge disagrees with the main opinion’s reasoning, but it would be a poor use
of limited judicial resources for the judge to write a full opinion explaining why. See infra notes
294–300 and accompanying text. But see infra Section II.B.1; infra note 441 (citing examples of
brief statements supplied in lieu of full separate opinions).
242. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352; see infra notes 247, 252–253 and accompanying text.
243. Robbins, supra note 55, at 162; see also Platt, supra note 4, at 141 (“The unexplained vote
is commonly understood to be the province of the legislator; judicial power is customarily exercised
through reasoned, written opinions.”).
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majority opinion. 244 Critics argue that a judge who agrees with the result
should only refuse to join the main opinion if the judge has substantial
concerns about the reasoning in the main opinion, and that if a judge has such
substantial concerns, the judge has a duty to explain them—“If the
disagreement is not substantial, the main opinion ought to be signed; if the
disagreement is substantial, the reason should be stated.” 245
In addition, “separate opinions may help foster public confidence in the
judiciary and promote institutional legitimacy,” 246 as “separate opinions help
demonstrate that legal conclusions are the ‘product of independent and
thoughtful minds.’” 247 The criticism, then, is that a judge who silently
concurs (for all anyone knows) may have no sound legal reason for voting in
favor of the result, which is precisely why our system presumes judges should
explain their decisions. 248
Another criticism in this same vein is that it is unfair to the parties of a
case for judges to be partly responsible for the result, but not explain their
reasoning. 249 One can imagine that it would be troubling to a party that loses
an appeal when one or more of the judges 250 responsible for providing the
vote(s) necessary for that party to lose does not explain why they voted for
that result. 251 Not only is the party unsure why the judge who silently
concurred voted for their side to lose, but they also have no assurance that
the judge’s decision is based on sound rational consideration of the merits of
the case. 252 That is, one function of written opinions in general is that they
assure not only the public, but also the litigants for whom the decision
impacts directly, that the judges responsible for the court’s ultimate decision
considered the litigants’ case and reached a reasoned result based on sound

244. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352; Robbins, supra note 55, at 163; see also infra note 441
(citing examples from the Court of Appeals of brief statements in lieu of full opinions accompanying
concurrences in the judgment).
245. ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (citing B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT
OPINIONS 223 (1977)); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
246. Fife, supra note 12, at 172.
247. Id. (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 35 (1999));
accord ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 149–50 (noting that one function of a concurring opinion is
“[t]o assure counsel and the public that the case has received careful consideration” (citing R. Dean
Moorehead, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 821, 823 (1952)));
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56.
248. See supra note 247 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.A.
249. See infra notes 250–254 and accompanying text.
250. Sometimes more than one judge silently concurs in a given case. See App. Tb. 1.
251. Robbins, supra note 55, at 118, 163 (“Concurring in result without providing reasons
undermines the judicial process and can be fundamentally unfair to litigants.”).
252. Id. at 163 (“By raising the specter of arbitrariness, this unchecked decision making seems
repugnant to the deeply rooted notions of justice and ordered liberty that due process undoubtedly
protects.”). Professor Robbins’ article goes so far as to argue that deciding for or against a party
without giving even a cursory explanation could violate due process, at least when the judge casts
a swing vote. Id.
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legal principles: 253 “[A]s Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone once explained,
separate opinions provide ‘some assurance to counsel and to the public that
[the] decision has not been perfunctory, which is one of the most important
objects of opinion writing.’” 254
In summary, critics argue that there does not appear to be any legitimate
reason for a silent concurrence since judges voting for the ultimate result are
supposed to explain their reasoning. If a judge does not think their reasons
are worth explaining, then the judge should simply join the main opinion
rather than cast doubt on it. Or, the judge should, at the very least, give some
cursory explanation rather than no explanation at all. 255
D. Potential Reasons Judges Use Silent Concurrences
In his article Silent Concurrences, Associate Professor of Political
Science at Utah State University Greg Goelzhauser examined “the private
papers of several” Supreme Court Justices from the Burger Court to try to
explain why a judge might silently concur. 256 He found that a silent
concurrence might be due to any one of the following: “time constraints,
perceptions about case importance or the importance of a prospective
concurring opinion, vote switching, uncertainty about the proper disposition
or legal rule, a desire to maintain a consistent voting record and withhold
support for disfavored precedents, and bargaining failures over opinion
language and scope.” 257
Appellate judges write separate opinions “on [their] own time,” on top
of their mandatory workload, so limited time could lead an appellate judge to
concur silently if the judge believes the case, or their issue with the opinion,

253. BLACK, supra note 8, at 4–6; Robbins, supra note 55, at 163–64; see supra note 247.
254. Fife, supra note 12, at 172 (quoting Harlan F. Stone, Dissenting Opinions are not Without
Value, 26 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 78, 78 (1942)). But see Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have
Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 514–
25 (2015) (explaining the potential downsides of separate opinions, including that too many may
actually decrease rather than increase the public’s confidence in the legitimacy of a court).
255. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
256. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 353.
257. Id. at 357–58; accord Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1127 (Cal. 1995)
(“[A silent concurrence] is equivocal. ‘It could mean that the concurring justice does not agree with
the principles; or that [the justice] agrees with the principles or some of them but not with the manner
of their statement or the reasoning or authorities set forth in support of them; or that [the justice]
neither agrees nor disagrees but wishes to stay aloof and keep himself [or herself] intellectually free
to examine the question anew at some later date (perhaps as the author of an opinion); or that [the
justice] objects to something in the opinion—a quotation, reliance on an authority that is anathema
to him [or her], humor or satire, or castigation of a litigant or counsel—and withholds his [or her]
signature because the author would not take it out.’” (second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations
in original) (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); see
also infra note 401 (providing another potential reason for silent concurrences suggested by Judge
Richard Posner that did not warrant full discussion in this Section, while explaining why that reason
does not negate this Comment’s argument).
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is not important enough to warrant the time expenditure. 258 For example,
Justice Blackmun once told Justice O’Connor, via notes on her draft, that he
took issue with a single footnote 259 in her majority opinion in Engle v.
Isaac. 260 Justice O’Connor indicated in her response that she would not be
deleting the footnote and urged Justice Blackmun to join the opinion and note
his concerns separately. 261 Justice Blackmun responded asking Justice
O’Connor to simply put at the end of her next draft “Justice Blackmun
concurs in the result.” 262 Professor Goelzhauser supposes that it is
“plausible” that Justice Blackmun simply found “it too tedious” to write even
a perfunctory opinion about his disagreement with one footnote. 263
Judges may also switch their votes multiple times during the
deliberation process, ultimately deciding that they are so uncertain that they
do not think it is prudent to go so far as to dissent, but nonetheless do not
want to give their support to the main opinion, nor are they confident enough
about what the best rule should be to author a separate opinion. 264 Time
258. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 358 (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing
Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 142 (1990)); accord Robbins, supra note 55, at 160 & n.11
(“One reason that judges might [concur silently] is that their dockets are large and
unmanageable. . . . In short, over-worked judges may be using [silent concurrences] simply as a
technique to avoid spending time articulating disagreement with the majority’s or plurality’s
rationale.”).
259. Justice Blackmun also took issue with the language on one page, although in subsequent
correspondences with Justice O’Connor, he said his main concern was with footnote 32.
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 359. The sentence to which the footnote is attached explains that a
writ of habeas corpus “undermines the usual principles of finality of litigation,” and the footnote
states:
Judge Friendly and Professor Bator suggest that this absence of finality also frustrates
deterrence and rehabilitation. Deterrence depends upon the expectation that ‘one
violating the law will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just
punishment.’ Rehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant realize that ‘he is
justly subject to sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation.’
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 & n.32 (1982) (first citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV 441, 452 (1963); then citing
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 142, 146 (1970)).
260. 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (reversing the Sixth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief to several state
prisoners because they had not raised their constitutional claims properly at the state level, holding
that prisoners must show “cause” and “actual prejudice” to overcome such procedural defaults);
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 358–59.
261. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 359. That is, Justice O’Connor asked that Justice Blackmun
issue a regular concurrence. Id.; see supra note 10 (explaining the difference between a special
concurrence and a regular concurrence).
262. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 359 (quoting Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Sandra Day
O’Connor,
No.
80-1430
(Mar.
12,
1982),
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1981/80-1430.pdf).
263. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 359. But see infra text accompanying notes 460–463
(arguing that Professor Goelzhauser’s explanation is dubious). In addition to the disagreement
between Justices O’Connor and Blackmun being an example where time pressures could have been
a factor, it is also an example of “bargaining failures over opinion language and scope.” See
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 353, 357–58, 373–74.
264. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 363–68.
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pressures can also be a factor in such situations, especially near the end of a
term. 265 Additionally, even if a judge does not switch votes during the
process, it is possible that a judge might “hedge” their bets with a silent
concurrence when they are simply puzzled by what the proper rule should be
and are unpersuaded by the majority opinion. 266
Issuing a silent concurrence due to general uncertainty is odd, though,
considering there is a less ambiguous mechanism by which a judge can
express amorphous doubts about the majority opinion. 267 A judge can join
the majority opinion dubitante, or author a “dubitante opinion.” 268 While
joining dubitante is rare, 269 it signifies that a judge has some doubts about
whether the majority opinion is correct but is not prepared to declare it is
wrong or refuse to join it. 270 If the judge would prefer to explain their doubts
rather than simply join dubitante, the judge can instead write a dubitante
opinion. 271 A dubitante opinion functions as a middle ground between a
concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion. 272 The judge is not claiming
the main opinion is wrong, the judge is just noting general doubts they have
about whether it is right. 273 Essentially, “these opinions can serve as a signal
to lawyers that a better, but not yet conceived, legal argument may exist.”274
Furthermore, “[d]ubitante opinions can also be brief and do not connote a
high level of disagreement with fellow judges.” 275 Thus, whether a judge
joins the main opinion dubitante or instead issues a dubitante opinion, the
judge is still officially supporting the majority opinion, unlike with a silent
concurrence. 276
265. Id. at 360–62.
266. Id. at 367.
267. See id. (explaining that judges can also express uncertainty by writing a dubitante opinion).
268. Jason J. Czarnezki, The Dubitante Opinion, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1, 1–5 (2006).
269. As of 2006, the term dubitante had only been used in 626 opinions in in the United States.
Id. at 1–2. Interestingly, the first appearance of the word dubitante in a court opinion in the United
States was a Maryland case. Id. (citing Fulton v. Wood, 3 H & McH. 99, 100 (Md. 1792)).
270. Id. at 1–5 (explaining the meaning of dubitante mainly in the context of dubitante
opinions); id. at 5 (“[A] judge can [also] join a majority opinion dubitante without a writing.”).
271. Id. at 1–5.
272. Id. at 4 (“The term dubitante can best be seen as a level of agreement between fully joining
the majority opinion and a concurrence.”); see id. at 2 (“A dubitante (pronounced d[y]oo-bi-tantee) opinion indicates that ‘the judge doubted a legal point but was unwilling to state that it was
wrong.’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 515 (7th ed. 1999))).
273. Id. at 4 (citing as examples Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 358 (7th Cir. 2004)
(Easterbrook, J., dubitante); Kartell, v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 592 F.2d 1191, 1195 (1st Cir.
1979) (Coffin, J., dubitante); Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Friendly, J., dubitante)).
274. Id. at 5.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 4 (“[T]he [dubitante] judge can be seen as agreeing with the rationale in the majority
opinion, but having reservations about the very same rationale.”); id. at 6 (“While issuance of a
dubitante opinion by a judge expresses reservations with the majority's holding, the dubitante
opinion nevertheless, by design, also indicates a judge’s (possibly reluctant) agreement with the
majority's rationale. Thus, an opinion issued dubitante should be considered to represent a vote
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Justice Burger apparently considered at least one of his silent
concurrences to be akin to voting dubitante, although if not for the records of
his letters, no one would ever know that vague doubts were why he concurred
silently in that case. 277 A more transparent example of a concurrence
functioning as a dubitante vote is Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Cudahy’s
regular 278 concurrence in World Outreach Conference Center v. City of
Chicago, 279 which reads in its entirety: “Cudahy, Circuit Judge, concurring.
Unfortunately; and I think the opinion must be stamped with a large
‘MAYBE.’” 280 Commentators noted that, technically, the concurrence
expressed the same meaning as having had the word dubitante next to Judge
Cudahy’s name instead of “concurring.” 281
Similar to having ill-defined doubts, a judge just might not be ready to
establish law on a certain point. 282 The judge might think it is best to
withhold support for an opinion setting a particular precedent, but not to vote
against the result. 283 The judge may prefer to have more than the factual
scenario at hand to base a definitive rule on, i.e. the judge would like to wait
for more cases to come along with other facts before settling on a binding
rule. 284 Preferring no precedent at all could be the reason a judge decides to
with the majority and does become binding precedent (i.e., not a plurality) where the dubitante
opinion is the deciding vote.”); supra Section I.B.3 (explaining that a swing-vote silent concurrence
prevents a precedential majority and results in a plurality decision).
277. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 367 (“[T]he best I can do is join the judgment. In that
‘dubitante’ status!, I am more comfortable joining only the judgment.” (quoting Letter from Warren
E.
Burger
to
William
J.
Brennan,
No.
78-740
(Nov.
19,
1979)
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/78-740.pdf)).
This was in
reference to the majority opinion in Andrus v. Allard, 441 U.S. 51 (1979). Id. Professor Goelzhauser
also notes that without access to a judge or judges’ private information, “[the use of a silent
concurrence in a given instance] cannot be explained . . . . [As] ‘the Justice has not revealed why
he or she is concurring, one is left to speculate regarding the possible reason.’” Id. at 357 (quoting
PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 19 (2010)).
278. See supra note 10 (explaining that a silent concurrence is just a “special” concurrence (i.e.
a concurrence in the judgment only) without opinion, while a regular concurrence is when a judge
does not refuse to join the main opinion but simply chooses to also write separately, which means a
regular concurrence necessarily could never be “silent”).
279. 787 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015).
280. Id. at 845 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
281. David Lat, The Greatest Concurrence Ever? Maybe False, ABOVE THE LAW (July 2,
2015),
https://abovethelaw.com/2015/06/the-greatest-concurrence-ever-maybe/?rf=1;
Debra
Cassens Weiss, 7th Circuit Judge Writes One-Sentence ‘Maybe’ Concurrence; Was it a ‘Dubitante’
BAR
ASS’N
J.
(June
3,
2015),
Opinion?,
AM.
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/7th_circuit_judge_writes_one_sentence_maybe_concurr
ence_was_it_a_dubitante; see also supra note 271 (providing the legal definition of dubitante).
282. Cappalli, supra note 13, at 355 (“The ‘silent concurrence’ may mean: ‘I am thinking, but I
am not ready to establish law.’”).
283. Id.
284. Id.; see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356
(2006) (describing a principle Professor Sunstein dubs “Burkean minimalism,” explaining that
“Burkean minimalists believe that constitutional principles must be built incrementally and by
analogy, with close reference to long-standing practices”). The author highly recommends the
Burkean Minimalism article for anyone interested in a thorough discussion of competing
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withhold their crucial swing vote and cause a plurality decision, thereby
thwarting the precedent that would have otherwise been set. 285 Similarly, a
judge might believe a rule is too broad to make for a prudent precedent at that
time, or believe the language used to explain the rule is too ambiguous or
problematic. 286 Of course, this is all still just a deductive guess based on
situations where it seemed reasonable to some commentators that this could
have been why a swing-vote judge silently concurred. 287
A judge may also concur silently when they dissented in a previous case
and the same issue arises in a new case. 288 The judge might prefer to adhere
to stare decisis by acknowledging that precedent dictates a certain result, i.e.
vote for a result that the judge’s preferred rule would not have reached. 289
Still, though, the judge might want to concur in the judgment only rather than
lend their name in support of a rule the judge previously explained they think
is incorrect, or maybe even that the judge detests. 290 The judge does not write
separately, then, because the judge does not have any alternative legal rules
to offer that would reach the same result, as the judge’s preferred alternative
would actually reach a different result. 291 The judge is only voting for the
result out of respect for precedent. 292 The judge could of course issue another
dissent instead, but it is possible the judge does not wish to fight the same
battle again and would simply rather vote in accordance with precedent, at
least as it pertains to the result, while maintaining their distaste for the rule
itself. 293
Alexander I. Platt argues that silent concurrences can be a legitimate
judicial technique because judges have limited time, and a judge may need to
save time by not writing an opinion in one case so the judge can spend more
time on another, presumably more consequential case. 294 Platt compares a
judge concurring silently to a federal court refusing to decide certain issues
in a case, the Supreme Court denying a petition for certiorari, or a court
issuing an unpublished (non-precedential) opinion. 295 In those situations, a
court is not necessarily explaining the reasoning behind its decision, but is
philosophies that often underlie judicial decisionmaking and how judges might find compromises
that allow for a majority opinion when a court is divided.
285. Cappalli, supra note 13, at 355–56; Robbins, supra note 55, at 161.
286. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 372–78. But see supra text accompanying notes 61–62
(giving an example where a disagreement over language that led to a silent concurrence seemed
inconsequential from a legal standpoint).
287. See, e.g., Cappalli, supra note 13, at 355–56; see also supra note 277 and accompanying
text.
288. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 368–72.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Platt, supra note 4, at 143, 149–62.
295. Id. at 151–54, 158, 160–62.
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just using its discretion to efficiently manage the limited judicial resources
available. 296 Platt argues that because courts must selectively focus their
attention on cases and issues that are the most efficient expenditure of time,
criticisms of the silent concurrence are “overstated,” as it is just one of several
“negative agenda-setting” techniques that are necessary to cope with the
reality of limited judicial resources. 297 Platt takes the time-saving
explanations described previously and goes so far as to affirmatively argue
that this is a legitimate reason to issue a silent concurrence:
Silent concurrences ought to be evaluated alongside other
instruments of negative judicial agenda-setting. A federal
appellate judge with doubts about an opinion by a colleague
(particularly an opinion that has already attracted a [majority] vote)
may dispense with the otherwise time-consuming process of trying
to resolve those doubts while drafting a concurring or dissenting
opinion, and instead issue a silent concurrence. This leaves the
doubting judge with surplus time to allocate to other opinions. 298
Platt’s argument is based on his examination of federal courts of
appeals, where he found data showing a correlation between silent
concurrences and workload. 299 That correlation bolstered his hypothesis that
silent concurrences are mainly used as a “negative agenda-setting” technique,
i.e. as a way for judges to choose what cases not to spend time on so that they
can use their time more efficiently. 300
So far, all of these potential explanations have related to some
substantive disagreement or issue with the main opinion itself, 301 but judges
can also have reasons for refusing to sign opinions authored by a particular
judge that are unrelated to any substantive issues with those opinions. 302 As
Judge McDonald implies in the quote that opens this Comment, a silently
concurring judge may very well have no substantive reason for refusing to
join the main opinion. 303 For example, former Supreme Court Justice
McReynolds, who was openly anti-Semitic, refused to join any opinion
Justice Brandeis, who was Jewish, authored. 304 Also, as suggested by
296. Id. at 143, 149–62.
297. Id. at 142, 162.
298. Id. at 154.
299. Id. at 142, 155.
300. Id. The data for silent concurrences in Maryland, however, show no such correlation. See
infra Sections I.E.1, II.C; see also App. Tb. 1.
301. But see supra text accompanying notes 61–62 (giving an example where a disagreement
over language that led to a silent concurrence seemed inconsequential from a legal standpoint).
302. See infra notes 303–305 and accompanying text.
303. State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring in
judgment only). (“When a judge on [the Court of Appeals] concurs in the judgment only, it is helpful
to explain why. Then the reader knows whether there is a substantive reason for that judge’s
reticence and can assess whether that reason has any merit.” (emphasis added)).
304. John Fox, Biographies of the Robes: James Clark McReynolds, THIRTEEN,
https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/capitalism/robes_mcreynolds.html.
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Bernard E. Witkin in the Manual of Appellate Court Opinions, and quoted
by the California Supreme Court, a judge may silently concur because they
prefer to remain “intellectually free” to author an opinion themselves that
addresses the same legal question in the future. 305
Again, the potential explanations for silent concurrences are educated
guesses based on the surrounding circumstances and whatever private
information may be available, since a silent concurrence, by definition, tells
us nothing. 306 Thus, one can do nothing more than speculate as to whether
something other than substantive legal disagreements may be the reason a
judge silently concurred, at least where there is some reasonable basis for
such speculation. 307 While Justice McReynolds “made no secret” of why he
refused to join Justice Brandeis’s opinions, 308 there could, of course, be
situations where a judge silently concurs and one can only reasonably guess
that, perhaps, the judge’s reasons for doing so were not necessarily
substantive disagreement with the legal reasoning of the main opinion. 309
While the author believes that speculation in the absence of authority is
generally ill-advised, silent concurrences compel one to speculate based on
whatever other information is available, since there is no opinion to
consider. 310 For example, this Comment posits that it is not unreasonable to
suppose Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge William B. Traxler might
have silently concurred in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump
because Judge Traxler did not want to be the lone conservative judge to join
an opinion otherwise joined exclusively by the liberal judges in a highprofile, politically sensitive, en banc case. 311 In the absence of a separate
opinion explaining why he refused to join the main opinion, one might
speculate that Judge Traxler concurred in the result because he agreed with
the majority, but refused to join the majority opinion because Judge Traxler
did not want the opinion to read “Chief Judge Gregory authored the majority
opinion, joined by Judges Motz, King, Wynn, Diaz, Floyd, Harris, and
Traxler.” 312

305. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1127 (Cal. 1995); see supra note 257
(providing a longer quotation from this portion of Amwest Sur. Ins. Co.).
306. Czarnezki, supra note 268, at 5.
307. Id.
308. James C. McReynolds, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/james_c_mcreynolds
(“McReynolds made no secret of his anti-Semitism by refusing to speak to fellow justices Louis
Brandeis and Benjamin Cardozo.”); see supra note 304 and accompanying text.
309. See infra note 310.
310. Czarnezki, supra note 268, at 5. The fact that silent concurrences compel guesswork and
speculation is perhaps one more reason, in addition to those discussed supra in Section I.C., to be
critical of silent concurrences.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 63–70 (discussing Judge Traxler’s concurrence in
International Refugee in more detail).
312. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (explaining how a silent concurrence tells
us nothing more than that a judge refused to join the main opinion, meaning one can only speculate
as to why they refused).
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E. The Silent Concurrence in Maryland: Silent Concurrences from
1990 to Present
Having discussed the criticisms of, and potential reasons for, silent
concurrences, this Section focuses on the use of silent concurrences in
Maryland from January 1, 1990, to August 31, 2019. Section I.E.1 discusses
noteworthy trends from the 175 cases with a silent concurrence during that
period. Section I.E.2 discusses the five cases from that set that were plurality
decisions leaving no clear precedent.
1. Trends of Note
From January 1, 1990, to August 31, 2019, there were 175 appellate
cases in Maryland where one or more judges issued a silent concurrence. 313
Four cases were from the Court of Special Appeals, and the rest were from
the Court of Appeals. 314 With the departure of Judge Greene in 2019, the
only sitting Court of Appeals judge who has issued a silent concurrence is
Judge Watts. 315 Judge Watts issued the last ten silent concurrences, 316 and in
the first nine of those ten cases, 317 Judge Hotten authored the majority
opinion. 318 While the data suggest that Court of Appeals judges over the
years have been more likely to silently concur when certain judges write the
main opinion, the trend with Judge Watts silently concurring when Judge
Hotten authors the opinion is by far the strongest and most obvious. 319 As
313. For all statements in this section about silent-concurrence trends in Maryland, see the two
tables in the Appendix. Table 1 lists all the cases in Maryland (both by the Court of Appeals and
the Court of Special Appeals) that had a silent concurrence(s) from January 1, 1990, to August 31,
2019. See App. Tb. 1. All cases in Table 1 of the Appendix were found by running the following
Westlaw searches and manually checking the results to confirm which cases had a silent
concurrence(s): advanced: (concur! /4 only) & DA(aft 12-31-1989 & bef 09-01-2019); advanced:
(join! /3 judgment /2 only) & DA(aft 12-31-1989 & bef 09-01-2019); advanced: (join! /3 result /2
only) & DA(aft 12-31-1989 & bef 09-01-2019). It is of course possible that this did not capture
every single silent concurrence. Table 2 shows the number of cases decided each year by the Court
of Appeals along with the number of silent concurrences that year. See App. Tb. 2.
314. See App. Tb. 1.
315. See App. Tb. 1.
316. Including one case in which Judge Watts and (retired) Judge Adkins silently concurred.
See App. Tb. 1.
317. See infra note 322.
318. See App. Tb. 1. What to make of this trend is anyone’s guess, as a silent concurrence by
definition tells us nothing, inviting one to speculate. See supra notes 10, 257, 277; supra text
accompanying notes 55–59; see also supra text accompanying note 2 (suggesting that in the absence
of explanation, one does not know why a silently concurring judge refused to join a main opinion,
including whether that reason was “substantive”); supra text accompanying notes 61–62, 301–312
and accompanying text (explaining that sometimes judges have reasons for refusing to join opinions
authored by a particular judge or judges that have nothing to do with the legal reasoning of those
opinions and providing examples); supra Section I.D. (presenting the findings of academics and
courts that speculate on why judges issue silent concurrences in general or in a given instance). This
Comment further discusses this trend in the Analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 481–487.
319. See App. Tb. 1. For example, former Chief Judge Bell issued the most silent concurrences
(by far) during the period studied, with fifty-one. See App. Tb. 1. The breakdown of these fifty-
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for the four silent concurrences on the Maryland Court of Special Appeals,
this is too small of a data set to examine for clear trends. The only “trend” to
speak of is that in two of the four cases, Judge Graeff silently concurred
where Judge Moylan wrote the opinion. 320
Unlike the data Platt found supporting his hypothesis that silent
concurrences are mainly used as a “negative agenda-setting” technique on
the federal courts of appeals, 321 there does not appear to be a similar
correlation on the Court of Appeals based on workload, nor on time
constraints as the term deadline approaches. 322 The use of silent
concurrences has increased over the years, with the Court of Appeals
averaging about five per year from 1990 to 1999, about six per year from
2000 to 2009, and about seven per year from 2010 to 2019. 323 The only years
in which the number of silent concurrences reached double digits were 2006
(10), 2010 (18), and 2011 (13). 324
2. Swing-Vote Silent Concurrences
Of the 175 cases with a silent concurrence from the period studied, five
of them are swing-vote situations resulting in a plurality decision, i.e. no clear
precedent. 325 Each case and the uncertainty resulting from it are discussed
below.
In Bible v. State, 326 the Court of Appeals reversed a Court of Special
Appeals decision, which reversed the convictions of a defendant convicted
one by the author of the majority opinion is: Raker (11), Harrell (10), J. Murphy (6), Karwacki (4),
Wilner (3), Barbera (3), Battaglia (3), R. Murphy (3), Adkins (2), Cathell (2), Chasanow (2), Greene
(1), Rodowsky (1). See App. Tb. 1.
320. See App. Tb. 1.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 294–300 (explaining that correlations with workload
and term deadlines indicated that federal circuit judges use silent concurrences to save time so they
can focus on writing opinions in more consequential cases).
322. See App. Tbs. 1–2. The Court of Appeals did not even have a term deadline until 2014
when Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera instituted one. Michael Wein, Maryland Court of Appeals
to Follow SCOTUS Policy of Deciding Argued Cases by Term’s End, MD. APP. BLOG (Oct. 11,
2013), https://mdappblog.com/2013/10/11/maryland-court-of-appeals-to-follow-scotus-policy-ofdeciding-argued-cases-by-terms-end/. Before that, decisions could, and sometimes did, come years
after a case was argued. Id. Since 2014, though, the court has been required to decide cases argued
between September and June by August 31. Id. The rate of silent concurrences on the court has
not increased since this deadline was established (any more than it was already increasing), nor does
the rate increase as the deadline approaches. See App. Tbs. 1–2. Thus, there is no correlation to
suggest that time pressures due to the nearing end of a term explain silent concurrences on the Court
of Appeals. The only potential exceptions are: (1) the most recent silent concurrence, which was
issued by Judge Watts in a case where Judge Getty authored the majority opinion, as this case was
decided August 29, 2019, two days before the term deadline; and (2) one of the nine silent
concurrences Judge Watts issued when Judge Hotten wrote the majority opinion in a case that was
also decided August 29 (2017). See App. Tbs. 1–2.
323. See App. Tb. 1.
324. See App. Tb. 2.
325. See supra Section I.B.
326. 411 Md. 138, 982 A.2d 348 (2009).
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of third- and fourth-degree sexual offenses. 327 Judges Battaglia and Eldridge
silently concurred. 328 The lead opinion’s reasoning was that the State had
failed to produce evidence proving the defendant touched the victim’s
buttocks “for the purposes of sexual gratification or arousal.” 329 The dissent
argued that the buttocks are an “intimate area,” meaning additional evidence
of purpose was not required, as purpose could be inferred from context. 330
Judges Battaglia and Eldridge’s silent concurrences mean it is unsettled
whether the State can convict someone of those sexual offenses based solely
on evidence that the defendant touched the victim’s buttocks or whether the
State must present additional evidence that the defendant touched the
victim’s buttocks “for purposes of sexual gratification or arousal.” 331
In Agurs v. State, 332 Judge Battaglia silently concurred in a plurality
decision that reversed a conviction because the police officer’s use of a
deficient warrant did not meet the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, and thus the evidence from that search should have been suppressed. 333
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Murphy, in an opinion joined
by Judge Adkins (who also joined Chief Judge Barbera’s dissenting opinion),
explained that he believed the case was so “close” that remand for an
evidentiary hearing on the good faith issue alone was appropriate, even
though this had never been done before. 334 The dissenting opinion by Chief
Judge Barbera argued that “[u]nless and until” the Court of Appeals
recognizes both that (1) there is an exclusionary rule under article 26 of the
Maryland declaration of rights and (2) this exclusionary rule does not
recognize the “good faith” exception, facts like those in Agurs require finding
the good faith exception applies. 335 Therefore, because Judge Battaglia
silently concurred, the issues left unanswered by this case are: (1) whether
remand for a good faith hearing is appropriate (or possible) in a “close” case,
and (2) whether there is an exclusionary rule under article 26 of the Maryland
declaration of rights. 336
In Smith v. County Commissioners of Kent County, 337 Judge Battaglia
silently concurred. 338 The court vacated the Court of Special Appeals
judgment and remanded the case on procedural grounds to the Court of
Special Appeals, “with directions [that the Court of Special Appeals] dismiss
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 138, 143, 160, 982 A.2d at 348, 351, 361.
Id. at 161, 982 A.2d at 348.
Id. at 160, 982 A.2d at 360–61.
Id. at 161–62, 982 A.2d at 361–62 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 138, 143, 160, 982 A.2d at 348, 351, 361 (plurality opinion).
415 Md. 62, 998 A.2d 868 (2010).
Id. at 66, 99, 998 A.2d at 870, 890.
Id. at 99–102, 998 A.2d at 890–91 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 102–13, 998 A.2d at 891–98 (Barbera, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 332–335.
418 Md. 692, 18 A.3d 16 (2011).
Id. at 720, 18 A.3d at 32 (stating that Battaglia, J., “join[ed] in the judgment only”).
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the appeal, vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court for Kent County, and
remand the case to the circuit court with directions that it dismiss petitioners’
petition for judicial review.” 339 The plurality opinion explained this was
proper because the case “raise[d] more questions than may (or should) be
answered on its record and briefs.” 340 Judge Adkins’ dissenting opinion,
joined by Chief Judge Bell and Judge Greene, argued that “[t]he appropriate
disposition of a prematurely filed review action depends, at least in part, on
the reason that action is premature.” 341 The dissent further argued that in
situations like Smith, where the reason the action is premature is “not because
of a jurisdictional defect,” but because the petitioner has not exhausted other
available administrative remedies, a stay of judicial review, rather than
dismissal, is appropriate. 342 Therefore, Judge Battaglia’s silent concurrence
makes it unclear whether in similar situations a dismissal is necessarily the
right outcome as opposed to a stay of judicial review. 343
In Barnes v. State, 344 Judge Greene silently concurred. 345 The plurality
opinion held that a motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 4-345(a) 346
should be dismissed as moot if the sentence has been served. 347 Both
dissenters argued the case should not have been dismissed as moot.348
Therefore, Judge Greene’s silent concurrence makes it unclear from this case
whether there is a strict delineation between motions to correct an illegal
sentence and equitable writs to correct an illegal sentence. 349 It now remains
unclear whether a motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 4-345(a) is
proper after the defendant’s prison term has ended, or whether the defendant
must instead file a post-conviction action or seek a declaratory judgment. 350
In State v. Bircher, 351 Judge Harrell silently concurred. 352 Bircher, who
had been convicted in a criminal case, argued that a supplemental jury
instruction given after closing arguments that introduced a new theory of the
case was prejudicial because the defense would have made different strategic

339. Id. at 718–19, 18 A.3d at 32.
340. Id. at 718–19, 18 A.3d at 32.
341. Id. at 720, 18 A.3d at 32–33 (Adkins, J. dissenting).
342. Id. at 720–32, 18 A.3d at 32–40.
343. See supra notes 337–342.
344. 423 Md. 75, 31 A.3d 203 (2011).
345. Id. at 88, 31 A.3d at 211 (stating that “Greene, J., join[ed] [in the] judgment only”).
346. MD. R. 4-345(a) (“The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”).
347. Barnes, 423 Md. at 87–88, 31 A.3d at 210–11.
348. Id. at 89, 31 A.3d at 211 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 89–91, 31 A.3d at 211–12
(Eldridge, J. dissenting).
349. Id. at 85–88 & n.4, n.5, 31 A.3d at 209–11 & n.4, n.5; see also Wright v. State, 2016 WL
2944069, at *3 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 17, 2016) (noting the difficulty the court had in
applying Barnes because of the silent concurrence); Feaster v. State, 2015 WL 9590659, at *2 n.4
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 30, 2015) (same).
350. See supra note 349.
351. 446 Md. 458, 132 A.3d 292 (2016).
352. Id. at 482, 132 A.3d at 306 (stating Harrell, J., “join[ed] in the judgment only”).
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decisions during trial had the defense known the instruction would be
given. 353 Bircher further argued that the trial court’s allowance for additional
closing arguments did not cure this prejudice. 354 The plurality held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the supplemental instruction
because: (1) the instruction was generated by the evidence (and was a correct
statement of the law) and (2) did not prejudice Bircher because (a) Bircher
never specifically conceded anything that would have “walked into” the issue
raised by the supplemental instruction, and (b) the trial court allowed the
defense to make additional closing remarks. 355 The dissent from Judge
Watts, 356 joined by Chief Judge Barbera and Judge Adkins, argued that
notwithstanding any of this, a supplemental instruction can still be prejudicial
(and was in this case), and that supplemental instructions are judged by “a
higher standard.” 357 Judge Watts explained, for example, that
[a]lthough a group of judges may be able to determine that neither
Bircher nor his counsel made an explicit concession [that would
have made it so the supplemental instruction undermined Bircher’s
legal argument], it is less clear that a jury of lay people would
necessarily have discerned the same. 358
Therefore, Judge Harrell’s silent concurrence makes it unclear
from this case whether a supplemental jury instruction introducing a
new theory of the case can ever be prejudicial to a defendant if the
instruction is generated by the evidence (and a correct statement of the
law), the defendant does not specifically concede anything during trial
that directly “walk[s] into” the issue raised by the supplemental
instruction, and the trial court allows for additional closing remarks. 359
Thus, these five cases represent instances in which silent concurrences
left ambiguities in Maryland law that now require further litigation to
resolve. 360 Furthermore, that litigation will require litigants to try to make
sense of these difficult-to-interpret plurality decisions rather than applying a
clearer, more predictable rule. 361

353. Id. at 477, 132 A.3d at 303.
354. Id. at 478–82, 132 A.3d at 304–06.
355. Id.
356. Which the author believes makes an excellent point.
357. Id. at 482–90, 132 A.3d at 306–11 (Watts, J., joined by Barbera, C.J., and Adkins, J.,
dissenting).
358. Id. at 489, 132 A.3d at 311 (Watts, J., joined by Barbera, C.J., and Adkins, J., dissenting).
359. Id. at 482–90, 132 A.3d at 304, 306–11 (Watts, J., joined by Barbera, C.J., and Adkins, J.,
dissenting).
360. See infra notes 514–516 and accompanying text.
361. See supra Section I.B.3; supra note 349.

2020]

SILENT CONCURRENCES AND THEIR USE IN MARYLAND

171

II. ANALYSIS
This Analysis explains why the criticisms of silent concurrences
outweigh their potential justifications, how the negative impacts of silent
concurrences could be mitigated, and how to reduce their use in general.
While commentators have offered potential explanations and justifications
for silent concurrences, no one seems to argue that they are an ideal practice
in their own right. 362 Furthermore, commentators who are not outright critics
of the practice mainly offer potential explanations for why judges sometime
concur silently, presumably for scholars and appellate advocacy wonks who
might be curious, but the commenters offer few, if any, normative judgments
about whether these explanations are satisfactory. 363 The exception is
Alexander I. Platt, who affirmatively argues that silent concurrences are
justifiable (i.e. excusable) insofar as limited judicial resources sometimes
make them necessary. 364 Otherwise, judgments about the practice come
mainly from those who are critical of it. 365
Section II.A gives a brief overview of why this Comment argues we
should generally discourage silent concurrences and question their use.
Section II.B explains why the potential justifications for why judges concur
silently are unsatisfactory in light of the criticisms. These justifications are
unsatisfactory because a judge could always explain something rather than
nothing at all, and parties and the public have the right to expect judges to do
so. 366 Section II.C argues that (1) regardless of whether these justifications
are valid, the data suggest they do not apply to the most recent uses of the
silent concurrence on the Court of Appeals; and (2) swing-vote silent
concurrences are even less defensible in Maryland because Maryland uses
the all opinions approach to determine the precedential value of Maryland
362. See Platt, supra note 4, at 162 (stating, while defending silent concurrences, that “[s]ilent
concurrences are surely flawed, and may impose significant costs on both the parties to an individual
case and the legal system in general. But any unfavorable evaluation of this technique must account
for the persistence of parallel techniques of negative agenda-setting that seem to pose similar
cost/benefit ratios and yet remain deeply entrenched in judicial practices”); supra notes 12–13 and
accompanying text; supra Section I.D.
363. See, e.g., Goelzhauser, supra note 4. Professor Goelzhauser does refer to the potential
explanations he lists as “[j]ustifications for [s]ilent [c]oncurrences”; however, he does not
affirmatively argue that any of the potential explanations he offers are satisfactory explanations in
light of the criticisms of silent concurrences. Id. at 357–80. Rather, Professor Goelzhauser lists and
explains the potential reasons a judge might silently concur based on what he discovered examining
the private papers of Justices who served during the Burger Court. Id.
364. See supra note 362.
365. See, e.g., supra notes 13, 55, 245; infra note 497 and accompanying text.
366. Put another way, the explanations offered for why a judge might silently concur are really
just (potentially valid) reasons a judge might not wish to join the main opinion, but this still leaves
the question of why the public, and the parties in a given case, should consider it acceptable for a
judge who concurs only in a judgment to leave everyone guessing as to which of these possible
reasons was the actual reason the judge refused to join the main opinion in that particular case. See
supra Sections I.A–C; infra Sections II.A–B. Not to mention what led the judge to vote for the
result at all. See supra text accompanying notes 247–252.
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plurality decisions. Finally, Section II.D argues that the Court of Appeals
should promulgate a rule that would (1) prevent a swing-vote silent
concurrence from impacting the precedential value of a plurality decision,
and, by extension, (2) discourage the use of silent concurrences altogether.
Section II.D further argues that the legal community should pay more
attention to silent concurrences and hold judges accountable for issuing them,
thereby supporting the expectation of transparency in judicial
decisionmaking that is central to our legal system.
A. Why Silent Concurrences Should Be Questioned and Discouraged
This Section provides the basic structure of the argument that will then
be expanded and relied upon in subsequent Sections. The practice of issuing
silent concurrences is generally unsound, and silent concurrences are
particularly indefensible when they result in a plurality decision. The reasons
not to issue silent concurrences outweigh the potential justifications for them,
considering that judges have better options. 367
The general expectation in our legal system is that judges who vote for
a result explain their reasoning. 368 Appellate cases are decided when the
majority of an appellate panel votes for a particular result, and opinions are
how those judges explain why they voted for that result. 369 Opinions
supporting the ultimate result are not only central to stare decisis but also
provide transparency and promote institutional legitimacy. 370 Usually, the
judges responsible for the result join a single binding opinion that both
announces the result and explains why those judges voted for that result. 371
When a judge concurs in the judgment only, that judge votes for the result,
but does not join that opinion. 372 The general assumption is that judges
concur only in the judgment because they have alternative reasons for
reaching the result, and we expect judges who concur only in the judgment
to write separately. 373 We expect them to write separately both to serve the
goals of transparency and institutional legitimacy noted above, but also
because a judge’s role is ultimately to contribute to the development of the
law by either joining an opinion or writing separately, not to take part in
results for reasons unstated. 374
367. See infra Section II.B; see also infra Sections II.C–D; cf. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at
352, 355–56 (“[Silent concurrences are] puzzling because Justices have several low-cost
alternatives . . . .”).
368. See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; infra note
497; see also supra Sections I.A, I.C.
369. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
370. Id.; see supra notes 240, 252; see also supra Section I.C.
371. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
374. See Fife, supra note 12, at 172 (explaining that Justice William J. Brennan believed judges
have an “obligation” to explain their legal conclusions because it “serv[es] a function within the
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Silent concurrences undermine all those principles. 375 When a judge
concurs only in a judgment without writing separately, i.e. concurs silently,
there is no explanation for why the judge voted for that result.376
Additionally, when a swing-vote judge concurs silently resulting in a
plurality decision, the situation is even worse because the judge, while
offering no explanation, stands in the way of precedent. 377 In either case, no
one really knows whether the judge had what people would consider
legitimate reasons for refusing to join the main opinion. 378 Since
transparency is one of the reasons judges are expected to explain their votes
by either joining or writing an opinion, it is worth questioning whether judges
should have the unilateral power to issue a silent concurrence. 379 Silent
concurrences allow judges to refuse to join an opinion for reasons litigants
and the public might consider questionable, unprofessional, or illegitimate. 380
For example, judges sometimes silently concur over inconsequential matters
related to language preferences in an opinion, 381 personal disagreements with
the author of the main opinion, 382 or possibly even political optics. 383
Moreover, even though judges sometimes issue silent concurrences
when they do not substantively disagree with the main opinion, a silent
concurrence nonetheless casts doubt on the main opinion. 384 Silent
concurrences cast doubt on the main opinion precisely because people
incorrectly assume that judges do not refuse to join main opinions for trivial

judicial process similar to that served by the electoral process with regard to the political branches
of government” (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 435
(1985))); ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“If the disagreement is not substantial, the main opinion
ought to be signed; if the disagreement is substantial, the reason should be stated.” (citing B.E.
WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); supra note 52 (citing multiple
authorities describing how judges ought to contribute to the development of the law by explaining
why they did not join the main opinion); supra note 240 and accompanying text (explaining that
judges have a duty to explain their votes, and that not doing so detracts from public accountability
and institutional legitimacy (citing Robbins, supra note 55, at 161 n.16; Goelzhauser, supra note 4,
at 355–56)); supra note 252; supra Section I.C; infra Section II.B.
375. See ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“The cryptic statement, ‘I concur in the judgment,’
[without a separate opinion] has bothered many readers. . . . It produces all the evils of a concurring
opinion with none of its values, i.e., it casts doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion
without indicating why they are wrong or questionable.” (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON
APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); supra note 240 and accompanying text; supra notes
251, 252; supra Section I.C; infra Section II.B.
376. See supra note 10 and notes 55–59 and accompanying text (explaining how a silent
concurrence tells us nothing more than that a judge refused to join the main opinion); see also supra
text accompanying notes 2, 61–62; supra notes 301–312 and accompanying text.
377. Robbins, supra note 55, at 163; see supra Section I.B.3.
378. Robbins, supra note 55, at 163; see supra Section I.B.3.
379. See infra Section II.B.1.
380. See supra Section I.C; supra note 376.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62; supra note 257.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 304–305.
383. See supra notes 311–312.
384. See supra note 375.
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reasons. 385 The assumption is that a concurrence only in the judgment means
a judge had substantive disagreements with the legal reasoning of the main
opinion. 386 Silent concurrences, therefore, give people the impression they
should treat the main opinion’s reasoning as suspect, because it seems as
though a judge had some worthwhile disagreement with that opinion. 387 This
ambiguity causes litigants, courts, and academics (and law students) to puzzle
over silent concurrences, trying to make sense of what a judge’s silence
meant. 388 In this way, silent concurrences also compel speculation based on
trends, context, and anything else that might shed light on why a judge voted
for a result but refused to join the main opinion. 389 Of course, educated
guesses and speculation based on trends can lead to inaccurate conclusions,
which is why a separate opinion that renders speculation unnecessary is
preferable. 390
The crux of this Comment’s argument against silent concurrences is that
there is no good reason to accept the ambiguity silent concurrences cause,
nor their potential for abuse, when a judge could instead write a brief
statement if they are unable to write a full opinion, or just join the main
opinion, if only dubitante. 391 This Comment recognizes that time constraints
can sometimes make it impractical for a judge to write a full separate
opinion. 392 Furthermore, sometimes a judge does not actually disagree with
the main opinion, but has amorphous doubts, or is otherwise uncertain as to
what the precise rule should be. 393 These situations preclude writing a full
separate opinion explaining any alternative legal reasoning for the result. 394
Time constraints and uncertainty do not justify silent concurrences, though,
because a silent concurrence is ambiguous and could just as easily mean the
judge does not care for the author of the main opinion’s writing style, or even
385. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (explaining that people tend to assume a
silent concurrence means the judge actually disagreed with the main opinion and why they are
incorrect to do so); see also supra text accompanying notes 2, 61–62; supra notes 9, 301–312 and
accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 9, 55–59 and accompanying text; see also Robbins, supra note 55, at 163
(“[S]ilence indicates that the judge failed either to find common ground with his or her colleagues
or to reach an independent basis for decision.”).
387. See supra notes 2, 9–10, 55–59, 61–62, 301–312 and accompanying text; notes 257 and
277.
388. See, e.g., supra note 257 (providing a quotation from the California Supreme Court
discussing the ambiguous nature of silent concurrences); supra note 349 (citing two cases from the
Court of Special Appeals that struggled to interpret a plurality decision with a silent concurrence);
supra Section I.D (discussing attempts to explain silent concurrences).
389. See supra Section I.D; infra Section II.C.
390. See infra text accompanying notes 460–463, 481–487; supra text accompanying notes 63–
70, 308–312.
391. See infra Sections II.B–D; cf. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352, 355–56 (“[Silent
concurrences are] puzzling because Justices have several low-cost alternatives . . . .”).
392. See infra Sections II.B.1, II.D; see also supra notes 258–263 and accompanying text
(discussing how time constraints can be a factor when a judge decides to issue a silent concurrence).
393. See supra notes 264–287.
394. See supra notes 264–287.
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the author themselves. 395 This ambiguity is unacceptable when the judge has
simple, less ambiguous options than a silent concurrence, which are joining
the main opinion anyway, concurring while at least writing a brief statement,
or joining dubitante. 396
If a judge has disagreements that are not worth the time it would take to
explain, or a judge has doubts they cannot articulate, one option could be to
just join the main opinion anyway, as no opinion is perfect. 397 In the event a
judge cannot bring themselves to do that, though, a judge could still write a
brief statement indicating something about what led the judge to vote for the
result but refuse to join the main opinion. 398 A judge can also express vague
doubts and uncertainty by joining the main opinion dubitante, meaning the
judge had doubts about the main opinion but was unwilling to declare it as
wrong, as opposed to refusing to join the main opinion altogether. 399
Therefore, while this Comment stops short of making a blanket assertion that
there can never be a legitimate reason for a silent concurrence, 400 it is
exceedingly difficult to think of one. 401
395. See supra notes 55–62, 302–313 and accompanying text.
396. See infra Sections II.B–D; supra note 391.
397. See Cohen, supra note 254, at 514–25 (explaining the potential downsides of separate
opinions, including that too many may actually decrease rather than increase the public’s confidence
in the legitimacy of a court); id. at 515–16 (explaining that it is unlikely appellate panels regularly
all agree with every single aspect of a single opinion, but single binding opinions without separate
disagreeing ones are more efficient and legally certain); see also supra text accompanying note 245.
398. See infra note 402, see also infra Section II.B.
399. See supra notes 268–281 and accompanying text; infra notes 532–535 and accompanying
text; see also infra Section II.B.
400. See infra note 497 and accompanying text.
401. See infra Sections II.B–D; cf. Cappalli, supra note 13, at 380 (“The ‘silent concurrence’ is
a debilitating practice with no visible redeeming value.”). But see Fife, supra note 12, at 172
(explaining that Judge Richard Posner thought silent concurrences (and silent dissents) were
indefensible until he realized they could be a way to maintain collegiality and promote legal
certainty, as opposed to separate opinions attacking the main opinion and introducing multiple
potential legal arguments). In response to Judge Posner’s point, one could argue that it promotes
collegiality and legal certainty even more if judges join the main opinion when they do not wish to
articulate any disagreement with it. See supra notes 378–390, 397 and accompanying text
(explaining that judges sometimes silently concur over personal disagreements, and that silent
concurrences cast doubt on the main opinion); infra note 402 and accompanying text. Furthermore,
the problem is that because silent concurrences are ambiguous, no one really knows whether a judge
silently concurred in a given instance to maintain collegiality and promote legal certainty, or if
instead the judge was obscuring some less “edifying” reason for voting for the result while refusing
to join the main opinion. Fife, supra note 12, at 172 (explaining that Judge Posner “c[a]me to realize
that there are other, more edifying explanations” for silent concurrences such as collegiality and
legal certainty) (alteration in original) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 174–75 (1999)); see Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (“[W]ritten
opinions provide a measure of public accountability. . . . Obscuring justifications for votes may
complicate the task of maintaining or building institutional legitimacy.” (citing Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 140 (1990))); supra Sections
I.A, I.C; supra notes 378–390 and accompanying text; infra notes 402–404 and accompanying text;
infra Sections II.A–D. Nonetheless, this Comment does appreciate the fact that its author is a mere
law student, while Judge Posner is an esteemed judge, and two other esteemed judges who are
harshly critical of silent concurrences only go so far as to state that silent concurrences should be
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Lastly, this Comment should not be interpreted as suggesting judges
should write separately or join opinions dubitante whenever they have minor
doubts or disagreements with the main opinion. 402 Ideally, judges with
relatively inconsequential concerns about a main opinion would, as they
often do, just join the opinion anyway since their disagreement is not
substantial. 403 This Comment merely asserts that when a judge votes for the
result but refuses to join the main opinion, remaining silent about why is an
unsound way to proceed. 404
B. Why Criticisms of the Silent Concurrence Outweigh Their Potential
Justifications
As explained in Section I.D, the substantive reasons 405 a judge might
concur silently are: (1) time constraints and perceptions about the importance
of the case (i.e. negative agenda-setting), (2) “vote switching” and
“uncertainty about the proper disposition or legal rule,” (3) “a desire to
maintain a consistent voting record and withhold support for disfavored
precedents,” and (4) “bargaining failures over opinion language and
scope.” 406 As explained in Section I.C, the criticisms boil down to that in our
legal system, appellate judges who vote for a result are expected to be
transparent and explain their reasoning to assure litigants and the public that
the merits of the case were properly considered, and to contribute to the
development of the law. 407 As such, if a judge does not think their reasons
are worth explaining, then the judge should simply join the main opinion
rather than cast doubt on it. 408 Or, the judge should, at the very least, give

used “sparingly.” See infra note 497 and accompanying text. Thus, this Comment assumes there
are some things its author just might not know or appreciate having never been a judge, and so rather
than argue silent concurrences can never be legitimate and must be banned altogether, this Comment
only argues silent concurrences should be questioned and discouraged, and that their impacts on
plurality decisions should be negated. See infra Section II.D.
402. See ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“If the disagreement is not substantial, the main
opinion ought to be signed; if the disagreement is substantial, the reason should be stated.” (citing
B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); Cohen, supra note 254, at
514–25 (explaining the potential downsides of frequent separate opinions—they can lessen the
degree of collegiality among the judges on a panel, decrease judicial efficiency and legal certainty,
and decrease the public’s confidence in the legitimacy of a court); Fife, supra note 12, at 173 (noting
the same concerns (citing Cohen, supra note 254, at 514–25)); see also infra note 514 (suggesting
that compromises that achieve majority opinions are preferable to frequent use of separate opinions).
403. See supra notes 397, 402; infra note 497.
404. See infra Sections II.B–D.
405. As in reasons related to the substance of the legal analysis in the main opinion, as opposed
to personal differences or inconsequential disagreements. See supra text accompanying notes 61–
62; supra notes 301–312 and accompanying text (providing examples of non-substantive reasons a
judge might silently concur).
406. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 357–58; see supra notes 257, 294–300 and accompanying
text.
407. See supra notes 240–254 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 240–254 and accompanying text.
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some cursory explanation rather than no explanation. 409 The additional
criticism levied at swing-vote silent concurrences is that a judge is
unilaterally standing in the way of precedent, leaving ambiguities in the law
that may adversely impact the public, while offering the public no
explanation (i.e. written opinion) for why the judge thought this to be
appropriate. 410
Platt’s “[l]imited [d]efense” of the silent concurrence is based solely on
the grounds that limited judicial resources require appellate courts to use
multiple time-saving techniques, such as issuing unpublished summary
dispositions, declining to decide all issues in a case, and denying petitions for
review altogether. 411 Platt argues that silent concurrences are no different
from these other time-saving techniques. 412 His argument, then, does not
consider whether the non-time related reasons a judge might silently concur
are justifiable. 413 Section II.B.1 addresses Platt’s argument, ultimately
concluding that, even assuming arguendo that judges can have legitimate
reasons for refusing to join a main opinion that are not worth the time it would
take explain, (1) silent concurrences are not as legitimate as other time-saving
techniques because they are exercised unilaterally, and (2) even if parties and
the public must accept the reality of limited judicial resources, they still have
the right to expect judges who vote for a result without joining the main
opinion to give some indication of why, however brief. Sections II.B.2
through II.B.4 discuss, respectively, each of the remaining potential
explanations listed above, 414 ultimately concluding that these are not
satisfactory justifications either.
1. Silent Concurrences Are Not as Legitimate as Other Judicial
Time-Saving Techniques
Harvard Fellow and Lecturer Platt argues that “any unfavorable
evaluation of [silent concurrences] must account for the persistence of
parallel techniques of negative agenda-setting 415 that seem to pose similar
cost/benefit ratios and yet remain deeply entrenched in judicial practices.” 416
Disagreeing with Platt’s underlying assumption that silent concurrences are
a “parallel technique[]” to other techniques courts as a whole use to save

409. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 229–239 and accompanying text.
411. See Platt, supra note 4, at 141, 160–62; supra note 362.
412. See Platt, supra note 4, at 141, 160–62; supra note 362.
413. See Platt, supra note 4, at 141 (defending silent concurrences only insofar as they can be
used as a time-saving technique).
414. See supra text accompanying note 406.
415. By parallel techniques, Platt means techniques such as summary dispositions, unpublished
opinions, declining to decide all issues in a case, and denying a petition for certiorari. See Platt,
supra note 4, at 141, 160–62; supra note 362.
416. Platt, supra note 4, at 162; see supra note 362.
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time, 417 this Comment argues that the silent concurrence is not a parallel
technique, but is in fact inherently less legitimate than these other
techniques. 418 Silent concurrences are inherently less legitimate because (1)
silent concurrences are exercised unilaterally rather than by the court as a
collective body, and (2) a lone judge could save time by writing a brief
statement indicating the judge’s specific concerns rather than writing nothing
at all. 419
Platt offers only three sentences to counter the notion that silent
concurrences are less legitimate than other “negative agenda-setting
practices” 420 because they are exercised unilaterally:
Critics might argue that silent concurrences are more subject to
inappropriate use than other negative agenda-setting practices
because they are exercised unilaterally. But unilateralism is a
feature, not a bug: A silent concurrence does not deprive the parties
(or the legal system) of anything except the opinion of the single
judge who deploys it. The majority opinion, fully reasoned and
published, is binding on the parties and on future panels. 421
There are three major interrelated issues with Platt’s reasoning. First,
Platt purports to address the argument “that silent concurrences are more
subject to inappropriate use . . . because they are exercised unilaterally,” 422
but his argument does not address the fact that a power exercised unilaterally
is more subject to abuse than one exercised collectively. Platt argues instead
that depriving litigants and the public of a lone judge’s reasoning is simply
not that big of a concern regardless of whether the silent concurrence is more
subject to inappropriate use. 423 Thus, Platt’s argument does not address
whether the fact that silent concurrences are more subject to inappropriate
use makes the silent concurrence inherently less legitimate than other judicial
time-saving techniques. Other time-saving techniques, however, require
multiple judges to agree to use the technique. This prevents individual judges
who do not want to explain themselves from exercising their will
independently of a collective judicial decisionmaking process. 424
As an analogy, imagine the common scene in modern war movies where
two people have to simultaneously turn two separate keys at a terminal to

417. Platt, supra note 4, at 162.
418. See infra notes 420–447 and accompanying text.
419. See infra notes 420–447 and accompanying text.
420. Platt uses the term “negative agenda-setting practices” to mean any technique by which
courts choose what not to spend time on so that they can efficiently focus their limited time on the
most pressing matters, e.g., denying a petition for certiorari. Platt, supra note 4, at 142, 154; see
supra text accompanying note 300.
421. Platt, supra note 4, at 160.
422. Id. (emphasis added).
423. Id.
424. See supra notes 239, 252 and accompanying text.
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launch a nuclear missile. 425 Imagine further, for the sake of argument, that a
separate terminal existed that only launched a firecracker, and only needed
one person to turn a key. That means one person can launch the firecracker
without having to convince a second person there are legitimate reasons to
do so. If someone pointed out that one-key terminals are more subject to
inappropriate use because one person can decide to turn their key whenever
they want, then Platt’s argument is akin to countering that firecrackers are
not as destructive as nuclear missiles. 426 That is a fair point to make. This
Comment still takes issue with Platt’s suggestion that a process requiring two
people to turn two keys can be a “parallel technique[]” to a process that only
requires one person to turn their own key. 427 Operating a two-key terminal
is not a “parallel technique[]” to operating a one-key terminal because a
power that requires multiple people to agree to its use is an altogether
different sort of thing than a power one person can exercise unilaterally.
Second, Platt’s unilaterality argument does not address swing-vote
silent concurrences. Platt argues that a lone silent concurrence only deprives
the legal system and the parties of one judge’s opinion because a binding
majority opinion still exists. 428 This ignores the fact that one of the criticisms
of the silent concurrence is that it allows a judge to unilaterally deprive the
legal system of a binding precedent, without writing separately to explain
why, if that judge happens to be the swing voter. 429 Thus, a silent
concurrence can deprive the public of a precedent. Unlike a court’s collective
decision to issue an unpublished opinion or deny certiorari, a lone judge can
issue a silent concurrence unilaterally any time they happen to be the swing
voter and do not want to explain their reasons. 430 While a swing-vote judge
can always unilaterally disrupt precedent by concurring in the judgment only,
when a judge does so without writing a separate opinion, then the swingvoter has also unilaterally deprived the legal system of any indication as to
what the proper rule should be when the issue arises again, including any help
with applying a Marks inquiry or similar test to extract precedent from the
case. 431
Third, our legal system presumes judges generally explain their judicial
decisions, 432 so the fact that a silent concurrence’s unilateral nature makes it

425. See, e.g., WAR GAMES (MGM 1983).
426. See supra text accompanying note 421.
427. Platt, supra note 4, at 162; see supra notes 294–297, 415–420 and accompanying text.
428. See supra text accompanying note 421.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 229–239, 245.
430. See supra Sections I.A–B.
431. See supra Sections I.A–B, I.E.2. Furthermore, unlike a swing voter who concurs in the
judgment only and writes separately, a silently concurring swing-vote judge has neglected to give
the public any indication as to why the judge thought disrupting the establishment of precedent was
a prudent course of action. See supra notes 240, 252.
432. See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; infra note
497; see also supra Sections I.A., I.C.
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more subject to inappropriate use is a concern in the abstract. 433 Judges are
generally expected to join or provide written explanations when they vote for
a result—in large part to promote fairness and transparency—so we should
automatically question the validity of a technique that allows judges to
unliterally decide to vote for a result without explaining why. 434 Moreover,
since a silently concurring judge is partly responsible for the result, the losing
party certainly has a right to expect some indication that this judge
thoughtfully considered the case. 435 Platt supposes that the parties have been
deprived of nothing of import, when really, the losing party is deprived of
any indication why that judge voted for that party to lose, which a litigant has
the right to expect a judge to provide. 436
Therefore, contrary to Platt’s argument, the fact that silent concurrences
are exercised unilaterally and are thus more subject to inappropriate use does
in fact distinguish silent concurrences from other judicial time-saving
techniques that require the court to act collectively. 437 There is more reason
to be critical of silent concurrences than there is to be critical of other
negative agenda-setting techniques used by courts as a whole, 438 even
assuming, arguendo, Platt is correct that negative agenda-setting is the main
reason judges concur silently.
Furthermore, even if Platt is right that judges sometimes have legitimate
reasons for withholding their name from a main opinion that are not worth
the time it would take to write a full separate opinion, this does not explain
why a judge could not write something rather than nothing, however brief. 439
As noted previously, 440 judges can, and sometimes do, concur only in a
judgement while writing (or authorizing the author of the main opinion to
write) a brief statement that gives an indication of where the disagreement
lies. 441 Some, such as former Third Circuit Judge Ruggiero Aldisert and
433. See supra Sections I.A., I.C.
434. See supra Sections I.A., I.C.
435. See supra notes 246–254 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 246–254 and accompanying text.
437. See supra note 252; cf. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (“[W]ritten opinions provide
a measure of public accountability. . . . Obscuring justifications for votes may complicate the task
of maintaining or building institutional legitimacy.” (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on
Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 140 (1990))).
438. See supra note 437.
439. See supra note 51; notes 241–245 and accompanying text.
440. See supra note 51; notes 241–245 and accompanying text.
441. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 434 Md. 209, 245, 73 A.3d 1108, 1129 (2013) (McDonald, J.,
concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion with the exception that I join in the judgment only as to the
Confrontation Clause issue, for the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in Derr v. State, No.
6. September Term 2010 (August 22, 2013).”); Mayor of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222,
277, 916 A.2d 324, 356–57 (2007) (“Judge Raker and Judge Harrell authorize [the author of the
majority opinion] to state that they join in the analysis and conclusion regarding immediacy in this
opinion and, therefore join the judgment; however, they do not join the analysis or conclusion
regarding public purpose”); Chesapeake Publ’g Corp. v. Williams, 339 Md. 285, 304, 661 A.2d
1169, 1179 (1995) (Chasanow, Bell, and Raker, JJ., concurring in the result only) (“Judges
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former California Supreme Court Judge B.E. Witkin, argue that if a
disagreement does not merit explanation, then the disagreement is not
substantial enough to justify refusing to join the main opinion in the first
place. 442 This Comment agrees, but adds that even if a disagreement is not
substantial enough to warrant thorough explanation, the judge should either
join the main opinion or provide some explanation. 443 Consider that even if
a judge only writes “I concur in the judgment only for reasons that are not
substantial enough to warrant thorough explanation,” such a minimal
statement still provides more information than a silent concurrence. At least
then people know that time constraints and a lack of particularly substantial
concerns were the reasons the judge refused to join the main opinion, rather
than having to guess whether the judge’s refusal was due to any other
potential reason. 444 This is not to imply that such a bare statement should be
considered acceptable. Ideally, a judge’s brief statement would touch on the
reasons they did not want to join the main opinion. 445 This type of
transparency is the expectation in the American legal system, so judges
should offer some explanation as to why they refused to join the main
opinion, even if they do not write a full separate opinion. 446
Therefore, silent concurrences are not simply one more unfortunate, but
equally valid and necessary, “negative agenda-setting” technique used by
courts to efficiently focus limited judicial resources. 447 Other techniques, like
denying certiorari or issuing summary disposition, require a court to act
collectively, while silent concurrences used as a time-saving technique allow
a single judge to obscure the reasoning behind their vote whenever a judge

Chasanow, Bell, and Raker concur in the result only because we believe the action is barred by the
statute of limitations. Maryland Rule 2–101(b) should not be applied retrospectively to toll
limitations where the time for filing the action has run years before the tolling rule was adopted by
this Court in 1992.”); Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 383, 605 A.2d 103, 111 (1992) (“Murphy,
C.J., and Chasanow, J., concur in the result only. They believe that the test enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington . . . is that there must be a ‘reasonable
probability’ that counsel’s deficient conduct affected the result.” (parallel citations omitted)); see
supra note 51 and accompanying text. Interestingly, there is at least one instance where there was
a brief statement by the author of a majority opinion that stated, “[c]onsistent with their positions in
[J.P. Delphey Ltd. P’ship v. Mayor of Frederick, 396 Md. 180, 913 A.2d 28 (2006)], Judges Cathell
and Harrell join in the judgment only.” River Walk Apartments v. Twigg, 396 Md. 527, 550, 914
A.2d 770, 783 (2007). What makes this odd is that Judges Cathell and Harrell also silently
concurred in Delphey, so this is a somewhat more elaborate than usual silent concurrence that seems
to point the reader to more information—but does not. Id.; Delphey, 396 Md. at 202, 913 A.2d at
41.
442. ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (citing B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT
OPINIONS 223 (1977)); see supra text accompanying note 245; infra text accompanying notes 532–
535.
443. See supra note 441 for examples of brief statements when concurring in the judgment only.
444. See supra notes 10, 257, 277; supra text accompanying notes 55–59.
445. See, for example, the brief opinions quoted in note 441.
446. See supra Sections I.A, I.C; see supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and
accompanying text; infra note 497; see also supra Sections I.A., I.C.
447. See Platt, supra note 4, at 142.
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does not wish to spend even the minimal time it would take to provide a brief
explanatory statement. 448
2. Vote Switching/Uncertainty About the Proper Legal Rule Does
Not Justify Silent Concurrences
If a judge is uncertain about the proper legal rule, the judge could concur
in the judgment only and simply state, for example, the judge is uncertain
about the legal rule and would prefer to withhold support for the main opinion
without having had more time, or factual scenarios, to consider. Or, join the
main opinion dubitante. 449 The judge could explain, for example, that they
were more persuaded by the main opinion’s result than the dissent’s, so they
concurred in the result, but as to the legal rule, the judge is not comfortable
lending support to one at this time. A silent concurrence, though, leaves
everyone guessing as to why the judge refused to join the main opinion—
even though the American legal system generally expects judges to explain
their votes. 450 Therefore, uncertainty about the proper rule might explain
why a judge cannot write a separate opinion explaining an alternative rule,
but it does not justify a judge explaining nothing at all.
For example, as noted in Section I.D., especially in a plurality decision,
one potential explanation for the silent concurrence is that “[t]he ‘silent
concurrence’ may mean: ‘I am thinking, but I am not ready to establish
law.’” 451 The operative words here are “may mean,” i.e. no one really knows
what a silent concurrence means in a given case, and can only guess. 452 This
is unacceptable when the judge could write something akin to “I am thinking,
but I am not ready to establish law.” Then, at least, people know that
uncertainty about the proper legal rule is the reason that judge concurred only
in the judgment in that case. If a judge prefers not to publicly state that they
concur only in the judgment because they are unsure what the legal rule
should be, then the judge could always join the main opinion, if only
dubitante. 453 Furthermore, the notion that silent concurrences are justifiable
because a judge might not want to join a main opinion for reasons they would

448. See supra notes 294–300, 412 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 268–277 and accompanying text; infra notes 532–535 and accompanying
text (explaining that unlike a silent concurrence, joining an opinion dubitante allows a judge to note
uncertainty without implying, unfairly, there is something seriously wrong with the main opinion).
450. See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; infra note
497; see also supra Sections I.A., I.C.
451. See Cappalli, supra note 13, at 355; see supra notes 282–287 and accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 277, 282–287 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 268–277 and accompanying text; infra notes 532–535 and accompanying
text (explaining that unlike a silent concurrence, joining an opinion dubitante allows a judge to note
uncertainty without implying, unduly, there is something seriously wrong with the main opinion).
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prefer not to state publicly is at odds with the general expectation in our legal
system that judges explain why they voted for a given result. 454
Therefore, uncertainty is not a satisfactory explanation for a silent
concurrence. A judge has other options besides deviating from the general
expectation that judges explain their votes, namely: (1) noting that
uncertainty about the proper legal rule is the reason the judge did not join the
main opinion (and perhaps what specifically, if anything, made the judge so
uncertain), (2) joining the main opinion anyway, or (3) joining the main
opinion dubitante. 455 The fact that judges have more preferable options than
a silent concurrence is why the next two Sections argue the potential
justifications those Sections address are also unsatisfactory. 456
3. Bargaining Failures over Opinion Language and Scope Are an
Unsatisfactory Explanation for Silent Concurrences
If bargaining failures over language and scope are the issue, the judge
could simply state as much. To explain nothing at all is to leave litigants and
the public puzzled only because the judge prefers not to publicly state that
the judge did not join the opinion, for example, because of a concern about a
single footnote’s language. 457 Litigants and the public should not be expected
to accept a mechanism enabling judges to vote for a result, refuse to join the
main opinion, and decline to explain why, simply because judges might
sometimes prefer not to explain why they are doing what they are doing. 458
Furthermore, in the example where a Supreme Court justice silently
concurred because he disagreed with the language in a single footnote, 459
Professor Goelzhauser believes that perhaps the Justice thought it was “too
tedious” to write even a perfunctory opinion about a single footnote. 460 This
is dubious. It takes no time at all to write “I concur in the judgment only
because I take issue with the language in footnote 32.” Even though the judge
454. See supra notes 432–436 and accompanying text; supra note 437; see also supra Sections
I.A., I.C.
455. See supra Section II.A.; see also supra note 241.
456. See Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 352 (“[Silent concurrences are] puzzling because Justices
have several low-cost alternatives . . . .”).
457. See, e.g., supra notes 259–263 and accompanying text.
458. See Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (“[W]ritten opinions provide a measure of public
accountability. . . . Obscuring justifications for votes may complicate the task of maintaining or
building institutional legitimacy.” (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65
WASH. L. REV. 133, 140 (1990))); see also ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 149–50 (“[One function of
a concurring opinion is] [t]o assure counsel and the public that the case has received careful
consideration.” (citing R. Dean Moorehead, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 AM. B. ASS’N
J. 821, 823 (1952))); Fife, supra note 12, at 172 (“[S]eparate opinions may help foster public
confidence in the judiciary and promote institutional legitimacy. . . . ‘[S]eparate opinions help
demonstrate that legal conclusions are the ‘product of independent and thoughtful minds.’” (quoting
Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 35 (1994))); supra text
accompanying notes 61–62; supra Sections I.A, I.C.
459. See supra notes 259–263 and accompanying text.
460. Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 359; see supra notes 259–263 and accompanying text.
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is not explaining why they take issue with the footnote, at least the judge is
only casting doubt on footnote 32, rather than the entire opinion. 461 If a judge
does not wish to admit that disagreement with some aspect of the language
or scope of an opinion is the issue, then the judge should simply join the main
opinion, 462 as opposed to making a judicial decision for reasons the judge is
not willing to stand by publicly and then obscuring that reason. 463
4. A Desire to Maintain a Consistent Voting Record and Withhold
Support for Disfavored Precedents Does Not Justify Concurring
Silently
Sometimes a judge might silently concur because they agree the result
is dictated by precedent, but they dissented in the case establishing that
precedent, so they do not want to support the rule by signing their name to
the majority opinion. 464 In this situation, however, a judge could write, “I
concur in the judgment only because, while I concede that precedent dictates
this result, I dissented in that precedent, and so do not wish to lend support
to the main opinion’s exposition of a rule I disagree with.” Since it takes
almost no time to write this, it seems the only reason a judge concurs silently
in this situation is that the judge prefers not to publicly state that they agree
an opinion is legally correct, but refuse to join it, because they wish it was
not legally correct. 465 While it might be understandable that judges might
prefer not to explain why they withheld their name from an opinion when
they do not want people to know the reason, this is an insufficient justification
for silent concurrences. 466 Judges in the American legal system are expected

461. See supra notes 75, 384–387 and accompanying text.
462. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
463. See supra Sections I.A, I.C (demonstrating that hiding reasons would be at odds with the
general principles and assumptions upon which our system is based); supra note 458.
464. See supra text accompanying notes 288–293.
465. See Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 368 (“In the ongoing empirical debate over the extent to
which precedent influences judicial decision making, one of the key tests has been whether Justices
change their voting behavior after dissenting in previous cases. The logic behind this test is that a
precedent becomes binding once decided and should therefore be followed in subsequent cases even
by those who initially dissented. . . . [S]ilent concurrences can serve as a type of middle ground
between joining an opinion that follows the previous precedent and writing a dissenting opinion
revisiting settled principles.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)). Another way of putting
this is that silent concurrences enable judges to obscure the reasoning behind their vote whenever:
(1) a judge would personally prefer the precedent were not what it is; (2) as a result of said
preference, the judge does not want to sign opinions that properly apply that precedent; (3) the judge
cannot bring themselves to openly suggest the result is incorrect, since the result is clearly dictated
by law as explained in the main opinion; and (4) the judge would also prefer no one knew that
numbers (1), (2), and (3) are why the judge nonetheless refused to join the main opinion. But cf.
Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (“[W]ritten opinions provide a measure of public
accountability. . . . Obscuring justifications for votes may complicate the task of maintaining or
building institutional legitimacy.” (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65
WASH. L. REV. 133, 140 (1990))).
466. See supra note 465.

2020]

SILENT CONCURRENCES AND THEIR USE IN MARYLAND

185

to explain their judicial decisions precisely because transparency in judicial
decisionmaking is one of our system’s ideals. 467
C. The Justifications for Silent Concurrences Do Not Seem to Apply to
the Use of Silent Concurrences in Maryland
Without access to judges’ private information, the potential explanation
for silent concurrences that can most confidently be assessed is whether their
use correlates with workload, i.e. whether time constraints are a likely
explanation. 468 Time constraints do not appear to be a likely explanation for
silent concurrences in Maryland. 469 Unlike Platt’s analysis of federal
courts, 470 the most recent silent concurrences in Maryland do not correlate
with term deadlines or caseloads. 471 The only clear trend that stands out from
the data is that nine of the last ten silent concurrences were issued by Judge
Watts in cases where Judge Hotten wrote the majority opinion. 472
In Maryland, there is no discernable trend based on the number of cases,
nor the approaching end of a term. 473 Also, the use of silent concurrences
was increasing in Maryland even before Chief Judge Barbera instituted the
term deadline in 2014. 474 Therefore, even if one agrees with the argument
that silent concurrences are a legitimate “negative agenda-setting”
technique, 475 the Court of Appeals of Maryland does not appear to use silent
concurrences mainly, if at all, as a “negative agenda-setting” technique. 476
Furthermore, it is important to note that federal circuit courts, which
may use silent concurrences as a “negative agenda-setting” technique, do not
have the same control over their workload that a court of last resort, like the
Court of Appeals, does. 477 The Court of Appeals can control its workload by
denying petitions for certiorari, 478 while federal circuit courts must review
appeals of final decisions by federal district courts. 479 Therefore, even if one
467. See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277and accompanying text; infra note
497; see also supra Sections I.A, I.C.
468. See supra note 277; supra note 300 and accompanying text. The assertion that time
constraints can be more confidently assessed than other possibilities means that a correlation based
on workload and deadlines would at least be hard data, rather than pure conjecture about what was
inside a judge’s head.
469. See App. Tbs. 1–2 (showing that silent concurrences in Maryland from 1990 to 2019 did
not correlate with workload or the nearing end of a term).
470. See supra text accompanying notes 294–300.
471. See App. Tbs. 1–2. But see supra note 322 (providing two potential exceptions where a
silent concurrence was issued two days before the term deadline).
472. See notes 313–319 and accompanying text; App. Tb. 1.
473. See Section I.E.1; App. Tbs. 1–2.
474. See supra text accompanying note 323.
475. Platt, supra note 4, at 142; see supra text accompanying note 300.
476. Platt, supra note 4, at 142.
477. Id.
478. MD. R. 8-303(f).
479. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
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agrees with Platt’s argument as it pertains to federal courts of appeals, that
argument does not necessarily extend to the Court of Appeals, which has far
more control over its workload. 480
Since the only recent trend in the Court of Appeals is that Judge Watts
often silently concurs when Judge Hotten authors the majority opinion,481
some discussion of this correlation is warranted. As noted previously,
however, one can only speculate, 482 and this Comment argues that is the real
point. 483 Judge McDonald points out that when a Court of Appeals judge
concurs silently, no one knows “whether there [was] a substantive reason for
that judge’s reticence.” 484 Also, judges can have other reasons for refusing
to join opinions authored by a particular judge unrelated to any substantive
concerns with the legal reasoning of those opinions. 485 Is it reasonable to
suppose something other than substantive legal disagreement might explain
nine silent concurrences in a row by one judge when another judge wrote the
majority opinion? The more pressing point is silent concurrences leave the
public with nothing but educated guesses, compelling people to speculate
based on trends and whatever other information is available, which may or
may not lead to accurate conclusions. 486 Such problems can be avoided by
adhering to the general expectation that judges voting for a result offer some
explanation for that vote. 487
Lastly, since Maryland (appears to) 488 use the all opinions approach to
determine the precedential value of Maryland plurality decisions, which
looks to all the opinions in a plurality decision to extract individual points of
law a majority agreed on, 489 swing-vote silent concurrences are particularly
indefensible in Maryland. 490 This is because the swing judge can, instead of
concurring silently, at least note which parts of the lead opinion they take
issue with, which would allow precedent to be easily extracted from the rest

480. See supra text accompanying notes 477–479.
481. See App. Tb. 1.
482. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
483. See supra Section II.A; infra text accompanying notes 486–487.
484. State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring in
judgment only) (emphasis added).
485. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62; supra notes 301–312 and accompanying text.
486. See supra note 310–312 and accompanying text (arguing that the fact that silent
concurrences compel speculation because there is no official explanation is perhaps an additional
criticism that could be levied at silent concurrences).
487. See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
488. See supra Section I.B.1 (explaining that while the Maryland Court of Appeals has not
explicitly labeled its approach the “all opinions approach,” the way the court extracts precedent
from Maryland plurality decisions appears to be identical to a technique known as the “all opinions
approach,” a “related principle” of the Marks rule that differs in important ways).
489. See supra Section I.B.1.
490. See infra text accompanying notes 514–519 (explaining how the Maryland cases discussed
in Section I.E.2 demonstrate why silently concurring in a plurality decision is problematic, while
discussing this Comment’s suggested solution to prevent those problems).
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of the lead opinion. 491 While the judge might not offer lengthy explanations
for why they disagree with those parts of the lead opinion or alternative rules,
at least a future court (and litigants) could easily determine that the rest of the
lead opinion is binding. 492 They could easily determine the rest of the lead
opinion is binding because a majority of the court (four of the seven, i.e. the
plurality plus the judge concurring in the judgment only) agreed on
everything in the lead opinion except those parts with which the concurring
judge noted disagreement. 493 A Maryland appellate judge who silently
concurs when they are the swing voter, resulting in a plurality decision, is
unilaterally disrupting the establishment of precedent and neglecting to spend
the minimal time it takes to make the precedential value of the case
significantly easier for future courts and litigants to determine. 494
Thus, silent concurrences are difficult to defend for a number of reasons,
but are even more difficult to defend in Maryland specifically, because: (1)
in Maryland, silent concurrences do not appear to be used as a “negative
agenda-setting” 495 technique (assuming arguendo that this would be
legitimate in the first place); and (2) a swing-vote judge in Maryland can
reduce the inherent ambiguity of a plurality decision with only a few
sentences. 496
491. See, e.g., supra note 441 and accompanying text; see supra notes 78–227 and
accompanying text (explaining how the court extracts precedent from plurality decisions).
492. Cf. supra note text accompanying note 203 (explaining that how our legal system works is
that prior decisions are followed so that the law is more predictable and fair).
493. See supra Section I.B.1 (explaining that the all opinions approach allows the Court of
Appeals to combine opinions from their plurality decisions to find precedent where there are
propositions that a majority of the judges could be said to have agreed on).
494. See supra Section I.B. One might make the counterargument that because Maryland uses
the all opinions approach, supra Section I.B.1, a judge might be justified in using a silent
concurrence if they prefer no precedent be established because they do not want to write anything
that would allow a future court to mix their opinion with others to form precedent. See supra Section
I.B.2.b (explaining how the all opinions approach can combine separate opinions in a plurality
decision to form a precedential rule even though the judges chose to write separately rather than
help form a precedential majority). Given that silent concurrences are generally an unsound practice
in their own right, see supra Section II.A, that argument is more a critique of the all opinions
approach than a justification for silent concurrences. See supra Section I.B.2.b (critiquing
Maryland’s use of the all opinions approach). If the all opinions approach leads to more silent
concurrences by discouraging judges from explaining themselves, this Comment’s response is that
is one more reason besides the reasons presented in Section I.B.2.b to be critical of Maryland’s use
of the all opinions approach. Furthermore, the situation still does not justify concurring silently
when the judge could instead just write “I concur in the judgment only for reasons I will not
elaborate on, lest parts of my opinion later be merged with parts of other opinions to form
precedential propositions. See, e.g., State v. Falcon, 451 Md. 138, 152 A.3d 687 (2017).” See supra
Section I.B.2.b (discussing how Falcon combined separate opinions in a plurality decision to extract
a precedential rule).
495. Platt, supra note 3, at 142.
496. A concurring judge can simply note which parts of the lead opinion the judge disagrees
with, allowing the rest of the lead opinion to remain precedential, even if there is no explanation as
to why the concurring judge disagrees with those parts. See supra text accompanying notes 488–
512; see also supra note 441 (providing examples of concurring judges in Maryland briefly noting
particular points of disagreement).
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D. The Court of Appeals Should Promulgate a Rule that Nullifies the
Precedential Effect of a Silent Concurrence in Plurality Decisions
This Comment does not argue that silent concurrences should be banned
altogether because its author is simply not prepared to suppose that there can
never be a legitimate instance where a silent concurrence is appropriate or
reasonable. 497 Nonetheless, silent concurrences are always indefensible
when they result in plurality decisions because the swing-vote judge is
unilaterally disrupting the creation of precedent without offering any
explanation, and silent concurrences are at least generally indefensible
otherwise. 498 This Comment, then, argues only for a rule that would nullify
the effect of a silent concurrence on the precedential value of a plurality
decision, and that would, by extension, at least discourage silent
concurrences generally.
While the manner in which precedent is extracted from plurality
decisions is a matter of case law, 499 the Court of Appeals could use its
authority to create procedural rules 500 to: (1) nullify the precedent-disrupting
effect of a swing-vote silent concurrence, 501 and, by extension, (2) discourage
judges from issuing silent concurrences in general. The rule would be
something to the effect of:
When an appellate judge concurs only in a judgment because the
judge has significant substantive disagreement(s) with the legal
reasoning of the main opinion, such a judge shall file a separate
opinion explicitly indicating that substantive disagreement with the
legal reasoning of the main opinion is the reason the judge did not
join the main opinion. 502
Under this rule, a judge who notes nothing more than that they “concur
in the judgment only” (i.e., concurs silently) does not imply any substantive
disagreement with the rules, legal principles, or tests announced in the main
opinion, nor any issues with the main opinion’s application of those rules,

497. Even two textbooks on opinion writing by two former appellate judges who are strong
critics of the silent concurrence only go so far as to state that “[the silent concurrence] should be
used sparingly.” ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE
COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977)); See also supra note 401 (elaborating on why this Comment stops
short of arguing for a blanket ban on silent concurrences). But see ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 152
(“The second type of improper concurrence is the naked statement, ‘I concur in the result.’ This is
the kind of thing that prompts the young to scoff, ‘Big deal!’ I scoff at the ‘concurrence in the result’
practice as an abomination. What is being served? Very little, except, perhaps—to use the
vernacular again—an ego trip.”).
498. See supra Section II.A.
499. See supra Section I.B.
500. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a).
501. See supra Sections I.B.3, I.E.2.
502. See infra text accompanying notes 511–515 (describing how California happened upon a
similar rule for plurality decisions via the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of a provision
in California’s constitution requiring that decisions be in writing with reasons stated).
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legal principles, or tests to the facts of that case. 503 Since a silent concurrence
would not imply any substantive disagreement, a silent concurrence could
only mean a judge had some esoteric reason for refusing to join the main
opinion unrelated to the main opinion’s legal reasoning. 504 Thus, Maryland
courts applying a plurality decision with a silent concurrence (that is decided
after the proposed rule is promulgated) can, and in fact must, treat the lead
opinion as binding. 505 Under the suggested rule, the swing-voter’s silence
would necessarily mean that the swing-voter substantively agreed with the
lead opinion, i.e. that a majority of the court agreed with the law and its
application as explained in the lead opinion. 506 Practically speaking, this rule
would make it impossible for a silent concurrence to result in a plurality
decision at all, since there is necessarily a majority in agreement about what
is written in a single opinion. 507 Thus, a judge could no longer unilaterally
stand in the way of precedent by “cryptic[ally]” writing nothing more than
that they “concur in the judgment only.” 508 Under the suggested rule, if a
swing-vote judge wants to disrupt precedent, the judge has to at least write
something.
The suggested rule is loosely similar to the California rule, where the
California Supreme Court held in Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. Wilson
that because California’s Constitution requires “that the decision of an
appellate court be in writing ‘with reasons stated,’” and that a “decision”
requires the majority of the court, a swing-vote silent concurrence resulting
in a plurality decision renders a decision invalid altogether. 509 When there is
a swing-vote silent concurrence, a majority of the court agreed on the result,
but this majority did not state its reasons because there was only a lead
opinion and a silent concurrence. 510 Thus, if a swing-voter wants to concur
in the judgment only, the judge must write separately so that a majority of

503. See supra text accompanying note 502; see, e.g., Goelzhauser, supra note 4, at 373
(describing when former Chief Justice Burger silently concurred in a case only because he preferred
the term “plea . . . negotiations” to “plea bargain,” and the author of the majority opinion (Justice
Blackmun) would not make the change (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra text
accompanying notes 61–62; supra notes 301–312 (describing other non-legally-substantive reasons
judges silently concur).
504. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 61–62; supra notes 301–312 (describing other
non-legally-substantive reasons judges silently concur).
505. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
506. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
507. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
508. See ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“The cryptic statement, ‘I concur in the judgment,’
has bothered many readers. . . . It produces all the evils of a concurring opinion with none of its
values; i.e., it casts doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion without indicating why
they are wrong or questionable.” (emphasis added) (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE
COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); see also supra Section I.B.3.
509. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1126–28 (Cal. 1995); Robbins, supra
note 55, at 160 (discussing California’s rule).
510. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d. 1112, 1126–28 (Cal. 1995); Robbins, supra
note 55, at 160 (discussing California’s rule).
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the court has both rendered a result in writing, and, as required by California’s
Constitution, “with reasons stated.” 511 Maryland’s Constitution has no such
provision. 512
Creating a rule that nullifies the effect of a silent concurrence in a
plurality decision is important because it would prevent situations like the
five cases discussed in Section I.E.2. 513 These five cases, like all plurality
decisions, represent the failure of an appellate court to reach a compromise
that allows for a majority opinion. 514 The fact that the concurrences are silent,
however, further leaves us with no insight as to what issues the concurring
judges had with their respective lead opinions. 515 These five cases, therefore,
represent examples of the worst case scenario, where silently concurring
judges not only leave the public guessing as to why they refused to join the
main opinion (as all silent concurrences do), but also disrupt the setting of a
precedent without explaining why (via an opinion), let alone any alternative
rules. 516 Under the suggested rule, a judge who silently concurs is not
indicating any substantive legal disagreement with the lead opinion, and so
the lead opinion is binding. It is a given under the rule that the silently
concurring judge only has some esoteric reason for not joining the main
opinion that is unrelated to the validity of the rules, principles, or tests
announced or discussed in that opinion. Thus, under the suggested rule, 517 it
would be impossible for a judge to disrupt precedent without any explanation,
as a swing-vote judge has to give some explanation rather than none at all if
the judge wishes to actually impact the precedential value of a case. 518
Furthermore, the rule would discourage judges from issuing a silent
concurrence except in those limited instances (if they exist) where a judge is
prepared to defend the fact that they refused to join a main opinion even
though they did not substantively disagree with the main opinion’s reasoning.
The suggested rule not only discourages silent concurrences generally,
but also directly neutralizes the use of silent concurrences in situations where
a judge uses one because the judge agrees the main opinion is legally correct,

511. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co., 906 P.2d at 1128 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14).
512. See MD. CONST (containing no such provision).
513. See supra Section I.B.3 (providing a concise explanation of why silent concurrences in
plurality decisions cause problems).
514. Assistant Professor at UCLA School of Law Richard Re argues that the Marks rule actually
encourages appellate judges to refuse to compromise rather than reach consensus. Re, supra note
42, at 1971–75. University of Chicago Law Professor Cass Sunstein suggests that when appellate
panels are divided, the judge authoring the opinion could alter the opinion to make it “shallow[er]”
or “narrow[er],” see Sunstein, supra note 284, at 362–66 (defining what Sunstein means by
“shallower” and “narrower”), to reach consensus (i.e. secure a majority opinion), rather than
refusing to compromise and issuing a plurality decision, see id. at 362–408.
515. See supra Section I.B.3; supra notes 229–239 and accompanying text.
516. See supra Section I.B.3; supra notes 229–239 and accompanying text.
517. See supra text accompanying note 502.
518. See supra text accompanying notes 503–504.
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but wishes the law were different. 519 Sometimes, a judge dissents in Case A,
and then later, in Case B, Case A is the applicable precedent. 520 The
previously dissenting judge may accept that Case A is now precedent and thus
dictates a certain result, but the judge still disagrees with Case A’s rule. 521
Such situations represent one of the potential reasons a judge might silently
concur rather than join the main opinion. 522 This Comment argues that there
is no reason to consider such a practice acceptable when the judge can easily
provide a simple explanation—or instead just join the main opinion, since
Case A is the precedent regardless of what the judge prefers. 523 Under the
suggested rule, such a judge cannot use a silent concurrence to withhold
support for the main opinion in Case B, as the silent concurrence does not
actually indicate the judge has any substantive issues with the rules applied
in Case B. 524 Again, under the suggested rule, it is a given that a silent
concurrence only means a judge has some unique reason for refusing to join
the main opinion unrelated to the rules cited and applied in the main
opinion. 525
If the judge still wants to vote for the result while indicating they have
some real point of contention, the judge would simply need to do what judges
normally do and are expected to do—write separately explaining why the
judge voted for the result but refused to join the main opinion. 526 For
example, the judge could easily write, “For the reasons expressed in my
dissent in Case A, I do not join the majority opinion. I accept that Case A is
now the applicable precedent and dictates the result in this case.” 527 This is
much more informative, and is in line with the general expectation that judges
who vote for a result either join the main opinion, or write separately to
provide some explanation for why they voted for the result. 528
Although a judge could still comply with the suggested rule by stating
no more than, “I concur in the judgment only because I have substantive
disagreements with the majority’s (or plurality’s) legal reasoning,” this is by
519. See supra Section II.B.4.
520. See supra Section II.B.4.
521. See supra Section II.B.4.
522. See supra Section II.B.4.
523. See supra Section II.B.4.
524. See supra text accompanying notes 502–503.
525. See supra text accompanying notes 502–503; see, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 61–
62 (describing when former Chief Justice Burger silently concurred in a case only because he
preferred the term “plea . . . negotiations” to “plea bargain,” and the author of the majority opinion
(Justice Blackmun) would not make the change (internal quotation marks omitted)); supra notes
301–312 (describing other non-legally-substantive reasons judges silently concur).
526. See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; supra
note 497; see also supra Sections I.A, I.C.
527. Cf. supra note 441 (providing examples of short statements in lieu of full separate opinions,
one of which points the reader to a previous separate opinion by that judge rather than restate the
judge’s argument in full).
528. See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; supra
note 497; see also supra Sections I.A, I.C.
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design. While such an opaque statement may seem no better than a silent
concurrence, 529 a judge has to call attention to the fact they have issues with
the main opinion they think are worth withholding their support over, but not
worth explaining. 530 This Comment posits that if judges were generally
willing to do this so explicitly, the silent concurrence would not exist in the
first place. More likely, a judge would at least give some indication of what
their concerns are, e.g., that the judge has substantive disagreements about
the scope of the rule being announced or a particular footnote’s language. 531
Additionally, the judge could always join the main opinion dubitante,
which allows the judge to note that they have vague doubts or concerns
without actually withholding their support for the main opinion. 532 Since the
judge is not actually refusing to join the main opinion, there is less concern
about the judge not explaining their doubts. 533 There is less concern because
the judge is not giving the impression they think the main opinion is wrong,
and it is a given when joining dubitante that the judge’s concerns must not
be very strong. 534 Joining the main opinion dubitante is unlike a silent
concurrence, where the judge does imply there is something seriously wrong
with the main opinion, going so far as to refuse to join it, but gives no hint as
to what is so wrong with that opinion. 535 The practice of voting dubitante
pre-dates the United States, but, interestingly, the first appearance of the word
dubitante in a court opinion in the United States was a Maryland case. 536
Moreover, the fact that a cursory statement can satisfy the rule is part of
the point, as there can be no accusation that the rule requires judges to spend
time that they do not have writing lengthy opinions. 537 If a judge agrees with
529. In that the judge is casting doubt on the main opinion without offering any explanation as
to what the judge’s concerns are. See ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“The cryptic statement, ‘I
concur in the judgment,’ has bothered many readers. . . . It produces all the evils of a concurring
opinion with none of its values; i.e., it casts doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion
without indicating why they are wrong or questionable.” (emphasis added) (quoting B.E. WITKIN,
MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))); supra notes 384–389 and accompanying
text.
530. Cf. ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“If the disagreement is not substantial, the main
opinion ought to be signed; if the disagreement is substantial, the reason should be stated.” (quoting
B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))).
531. This can be done in a way similar to the examples cited in note 441.
532. See supra text accompanying notes 268– 277 and accompanying text.
533. Cf. supra notes 240–245 (explaining that a criticism of the silent concurrence is that a judge
should explain why they did not join the main opinion).
534. See supra text accompanying notes 268–275 (explaining that a judge can also issue a
dubitante opinion noting their doubts, and that dubitante opinions are typically brief and do not
signify substantial disagreement with the majority opinion).
535. ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153; supra note 276 and accompanying text (explaining that
whether a judge simply joins the main opinion dubitante or writes a separate dubitante opinion, the
judge is still seen as supporting the majority opinion).
536. See supra note 269.
537. See supra text accompanying note 502 (the suggested rule). Time constraints are the
principal basis of Platt’s “limited defense” of the silent concurrence. Platt, supra note 4; see supra
notes 294–300 and accompanying text; see also supra Section II.B.1.
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a result, but not the main opinion’s reasoning, and the time it would take to
write separately could be better spent on other matters, the judge is still free
to save time by writing only a brief statement that still gives the reader more
information than a silent concurrence. 538
Lastly, announcing the new rule would draw attention to the existence
of silent concurrences and make the legal community better able to hold
judges more accountable for issuing them. Ultimately, it is up to the legal
community to notice silent concurrences and question their use because
judges are less likely to issue them if they think their peers notice, and care. 539
However, lawyers, law students, 540 and professors are often unfamiliar with
silent concurrences. Or, if they are familiar, they are unaware of the potential
impact silent concurrences can have on precedent-setting, and that there is
significant criticism of the practice in general. Certainly, the general public
was not aware of the silent-concurrence trends in Maryland noted
previously. 541 The conspicuous announcing of a new rule would make the
legal community in general more aware of what silent concurrences are and
that there is reason to be critical of them, which is also largely the ultimate
aim of this Comment. It is the legal community’s duty to uphold the
principles and assumptions under which our legal system operates, namely
that judges are generally expected to explain their votes, and should not take
part in a result without giving the parties, and the public, some indication of
the reasoning behind their vote. 542
III.CONCLUSION
Silent concurrences are a generally unsound practice that should be
questioned, discouraged, and officially defined as meaning only that a judge
had some idiosyncratic reason for refusing to join a main opinion. 543 Silent
concurrences cast doubt on main opinions 544 and confound the precedential
value of plurality decisions. 545 Judges, however, sometimes issue them for
trivial reasons even when they do not substantively disagree with the main

538. See, e.g., supra note 441.
539. Robbins, supra note 55, at 165.
540. Including the author before stumbling upon the topic.
541. See supra Section I.E.1.
542. See supra notes 9, 16, 38, 41, 52, 75, 243, 245, 247, 277 and accompanying text; supra
notes 497, 539; see also supra Sections I.A, I.C.
543. See supra Sections II.A–D.
544. See supra notes 384–390; see also ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 153 (“The cryptic
statement, ‘I concur in the judgment,’ [without a separate opinion] has bothered many
readers. . . . It produces all the evils of a concurring opinion with none of its values; i.e., it casts
doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion without indicating why they are wrong or
questionable.” (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977))).
545. See supra Sections I.B, I.E.2.
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opinion. 546 The fact that most nonetheless assume silent concurrences
indicate substantive disagreement causes ambiguity, confusion, and
speculation. 547 Furthermore, to promote transparency, fairness, institutional
legitimacy, and the development of the law, our legal system expects judges
to explain their votes through written opinions, particularly when they vote
for the ultimate result. 548 Yet a judge can unilaterally decide to issue a silent
concurrence whenever a judge, for whatever reason, wants to vote for the
result, not join the main opinion, and not explain why. 549
There is no reason to accept the ambiguity and confusion silent
concurrences cause, nor their potential for inappropriate use, when judges
who are short on time, or only have vague or relatively inconsequential
disagreements, could either (1) write a brief statement indicating where the
disagreement lies if a full opinion is not feasible, (2) join the main opinion
dubitante, or (3) join the main opinion anyway despite their relatively minor
concerns. 550 In short, silent concurrences do not appear to serve any function
so worthwhile that we should expect litigants and the public to ignore that
silent concurrences undermine the overall principles and ideals of our legal
system. 551 Attempts to explain silent concurrences boil down to the notion
that judges sometimes do not have enough time to write separately, or they
cannot really articulate their concerns because they only have vague doubts
about the main opinion or are just altogether uncertain about what the rule
should be. 552 While these guesses may sometimes be true, it also turns out
that judges sometimes silently concur even when they do not disagree with
the substance of the main opinion at all. 553 Furthermore, in Maryland, time

546. See supra note 257; see also ALDISERT, supra note 16, at 152 (“[One] type of improper
concurrence is the naked statement, ‘I concur in the result.’ This is the kind of thing that prompts
the young to scoff, ‘Big deal!’ I scoff at the ‘concurrence in the result’ practice as an abomination.
What is being served? Very little, except, perhaps—to use the vernacular again—an ego trip.”);
supra text accompanying notes 61–62, 301–312 (providing examples of reasons other than
substantive disagreement that judges silently concur). Judge McDonald, in the quotation that opens
this Comment, explains that when a Court of Appeals judge concurs silently, no one knows “whether
there [was] a substantive reason for that judge’s reticence.” State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104
A.3d 142, 165 (2014) (McDonald, J., concurring in judgment only); see supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
547. See supra text accompanying notes 385–390; supra notes 309–312, 481–487 and
accompanying text; see also State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 719, 104 A.3d 142, 165 (2014)
(McDonald, J., concurring in judgment only) (implying that when a Maryland Court of Appeals
Judge concurs silently, no one knows “whether there [was] a substantive reason for that judge’s
reticence”); supra Section I.D (presenting numerous scholars trying to make sense of what silent
concurrences mean).
548. See supra Sections I.C, II.A–D.
549. See supra Sections II.B.1–4.
550. See supra Section II.A; see also supra Sections II.B–D.
551. See supra Sections II.A–D; cf. Cappalli, supra note 13, at 380 (“[Silent concurrences are]
a debilitating practice with no visible redeeming value.”).
552. See supra Section I.D.
553. See supra note 546.
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constraints do not even appear to be a reasonable guess as to why judges issue
silent concurrences. 554
Regardless, the point is we should not have to guess. 555 Where time is
a concern, a judge can write briefly, even just noting what they disagreed
with without elaborating at length, and this is at least more in line with the
expectations of our legal system. 556 The same is true where a judge only has
vague doubts or is simply uncertain. 557 Furthermore, a judge also has the
option of indicating general uncertainty by joining the main opinion
dubitante, which is less ambiguous than a silent concurrence, and avoids the
problems caused by silent concurrences. 558 Better still, a judge can always
join the main opinion in full if they cannot conjure a substantive or articulable
point of disagreement. 559 All of these options are better than refusing to join
the opinion without explaining why, which leaves everyone confused as to
what level of skepticism the silent concurrence should imbue on the main
opinion, if any. 560
Therefore, not only should members of the legal community consider
silent concurrences a generally unsound practice and question their use, 561
but the Court of Appeals should also adopt a rule that would mean, officially,
silent concurrences do not indicate any substantive disagreement with the
main opinion. 562 If a judge has some other reason for refusing to join the
main opinion, then, under this rule, at least people would know there was not
a legal disagreement. 563 Not only would that discourage silent concurrences
generally, but it would also prevent swing-vote judges from using silent
concurrences to disrupt precedent by causing a plurality decision. 564 A
swing-vote judge can still disrupt precedent if they wish, they just would have
to do what judges normally do and are expected to do—write separately to
explain why—as silence would not indicate they disagree with the lead
opinion in any legal sense under the suggested rule. 565 Thus, the rule would
make silent concurrences in Maryland less ambiguous, less damaging, and
less common. 566 Reducing the frequency and impact of silent concurrences
is worthwhile because our legal system calls for judges to explain their votes,

554.
555.
556.
557.
558.

See supra Section II.C.
See supra Sections II.A–D.
See supra Section II.B.1; see also supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.2.
See supra notes 268–281, 532–536 and accompanying text; see also supra Sections II.A–

559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.

See supra notes 402–404 and accompanying text; see also supra Sections II.A.–II.D.
See supra Sections I.C, I.D, I.E.2, II.A–D.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.D.
See supra Section II.D.
See supra Section II.D.
See supra Section II.D.
See supra Section II.D.
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and in the absence of a satisfactory justification for deviating from that
principle, silence is unsound.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1. SILENT CONCURRENCES IN MARYLAND FROM JANUARY 1, 1990,
TO AUGUST 31, 2019 567
DATE OF
CASE CITATION

DECISION

Ademiluyi v. Egbuonu, 466 Md. 80, 215 A.3d 329
(2019)
Aug. 29
Comm’r of Labor Indus. v. Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co., 462 Md. 479, 200 A.3d 844 (2019)
Jan. 23

AUTHOR

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Getty, J.

Watts, J.

Hotten, J.

Watts, J.

Dec. 13

Hotten, J.

Adkins, J., Watts, J.

Nov. 20
Collins v. State, 238 Md. App. 545, 192 A.3d 920
(2018)
Aug. 30
C & B Constr., Inc. v. Dashiell, 460 Md. 272, 190 A.3d
271 (2018)
July 30

Hotten, J.

Watts, J.

Moylan, J.

Graeff, J.

Hotten, J.

Watts, J.

Otto v. State, 459 Md. 423, 187 A.3d 47 (2018)

June 21

Hotten, J.

Watts, J.

Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 179 A.3d 1006 (2018) Feb. 21
Burak v. Burak, 455 Md. 564, 168 A.3d 883 (2017)
Aug. 29
Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 164 A.3d 265 (2017)
July 12
State v. Bey, 452 Md. 255, 156 A.3d 873 (2017)
Mar. 27
Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373, 156 A.3d 940 (2017)
Mar. 27
Assateague Coastal Tr. v. Schwalbach, 448 Md. 112,
136 A.3d 866 (2016)
May 23
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Chanthunya, 446
Md. 576, 133 A.3d 1034 (2016)
Mar. 25

Hotten, J.

Watts, J.

Hotten, J.

Watts, J.

Hotten, J.

Watts, J.

Hotten, J.

Watts, J.

Watts, J.

Greene, J.

Cagle v. State, 462 Md. 67, 198 A.3d 209 (2018)
Owusu v. M.V.A, 461 Md. 687, 197 A.3d 35 (2018)

McDonald,
J.
Battaglia, J.

Watts, J.

567. See supra note 313 for an explanation of how the cases in this table were compiled.
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DECISION

AUTHOR

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Sharp v. State, 446 Md. 669, 133 A.3d 1089 (2016)
Mar. 25

Watts, J.

Battaglia, J.

Feb. 29

Greene, J.
Battaglia,
J.

Harrell, J.

Watts, J.

July 9

Greene, J.
Battaglia,
J.

Feb. 2

Battaglia,
J.

Harrell, J.

Oct. 23

Harrell, J.

Watts, J.

Aug. 4

Adkins, J.

Harrell, J.

July 29

Harrell, J.

Watts, J.

Apr. 23

Adkins, J.

Watts, J.

State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438
Md. 451, 92 A.3d 400 (2014)
Mar. 27

Harrell, J.

Battaglia, J.

Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Mahone, 435 Md.
84, 76 A.3d 1198 (2013)
Sept. 30

Bell, J.

Harrell, J.

In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jayden G., 433 Md.
50, 70 A.3d 276 (2013)
July 16

Adkins, J.

Bell, J., Harrell, J.

Georgia-Pac., LLLC v. Farrar, 432 Md. 523, 69 A.3d
1028 (2013)
July 8

Wilner, J.

Bell, J.

Toms v. Calvary Assembly of God, Inc., 446 Md. 543,
132 A.3d 866 (2016)
State v. Bircher, 446 Md. 458, 132 A.3d 292 (2016)
Feb. 23

Harrell, J.

Varriale v. State, 444 Md. 400, 119 A.3d 824 (2015)
Aug. 11
State v. Norton, 443 Md. 517, 117 A.3d 1055 (2015)
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Mixter, 441 Md.
416, 109 A.3d 1 (2015)

Harrell, J.

Burson v. Capps, 440 Md. 328, 102 A.3d 353 (2014)
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. DCW Dutchship
Island, LLC, 439 Md. 588, 97 A.3d 135 (2014)
Balt. City v. Fraternal Order of Police, 439 Md. 547,
96 A.3d 742 (2014)
Morgan v. State, 438 Md. 11, 89 A.3d 1149 (2014)
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State v. Fennell, 431 Md. 500, 66 A.3d 630 (2013)

DECISION

AUTHOR

199

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

May 17

Harrell, J.

Battaglia, J.

Apr. 25

Bell, J.

Raker, J.

Bd. of Dirs. of Cameron Grove Condo., II v. State
Comm’n on Human Res., 431 Md. 61, 63 A.3d 1064
Mar. 28
(2013)

Battaglia,
J.

Harrell, J.

Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 63 A.3d 582
(2013)
Mar. 26

Harrell, J.

Battaglia, J.

Oct. 22

Greene, J.

Battaglia, J.

Sept. 27

Bell, J.

Harrell, J.

Aug. 21

Harrell, J.

Bell, J.

Apr. 23

Harrell, J.

Bell, J.

Montgomery Pres., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Planning
Bd., 424 Md. 367, 36 A.3d 419 (2012)
Jan. 24

Adkins, J.

Eldridge, J.

Nov. 3

Raker, J.

Battaglia, J., Harrell, J.

Oct. 27

Adkins, J.

Greene, J.

Haile v. State, 431 Md. 448, 66 A.3d 600 (2013)

Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 85, 55 A.3d 10 (2012)
State v. Harris, 428 Md. 700, 53 A.3d 1171 (2012)
Ingram v. State, 427 Md. 717, 50 A.3d 1127 (2012)
State v. Stringfellow, 425 Md. 461, 42 A.3d 27 (2012)

Stoddard v. State, 423 Md. 420, 31 A.3d 603 (2011)
Barnes v. State, 423 Md. 75, 31 A.3d 203 (2011)
Harrod v. State, 423 Md. 24, 31 A.3d 173 (2011)
Stevenson v. State, 423 Md. 42, 31 A.3d 184 (2011)

Oct. 27
Oct. 27

In re Adoption/Guardianship of Chaden M., 422 Md.
498, 30 A.3d 935 (2011)
Oct. 25
Briscoe v. State, 422 Md. 384, 30 A.3d 870 (2011)

Oct. 24

Battaglia,
J. Murphy, J.
J.
J. Murphy,
Bell, J., Greene, J.
J.
Barbera, J.

J. Murphy, J.

Barbera, J.

Bell, J.
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Thomas v. State, 422 Md. 67, 29 A.3d 286 (2011)
Miller v. State, 421 Md. 609, 28 A.3d 675 (2011)

DECISION

AUTHOR

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Sept. 22

Barbera, J.

Sept. 20

J. Murphy,
Harrell, J.
J.

Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp. v. Annapolis Towne Ctr.,
July 20
421 Md. 94, 25 A.3d 967 (2011)
Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 419 Md. 649, 20 A.3d 765
(2011)
May 23

Eldridge, J.

Adkins, J.

Bell, J.

Adkins, J.

Battaglia, J.

Apr. 25

Adkins, J.

Harrell, J.

Smith v. Cty. Comm’rs of Kent Cty., 418 Md. 692, 18
A.3d 16 (2011)
Apr. 25

Harrell, J.

Battaglia, J.

Jan. 24

Harrell, J.

Battaglia, J.

Dec. 21

Greene, J.

Adkins, J.

State v. Harding, 196 Md. App. 384, 9 A.3d 547
(2010)
Dec. 10

Moylan, J.

Graeff, J.

In re Adoption/Guardianship of Cadence B., 417 Md.
146, 9 A.3d 14 (2010)
Nov. 22

Adkins, J.

Harrell, J.

In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C., 417 Md.
90, 8 A.3d 745 (2010)
Nov. 22

Adkins, J.

Greene, J.

Monmouth Meadows Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v.
Hamilton, 416 Md. 325, 7 A.3d 1 (2010)
Oct. 25

Adkins, J.

Battaglia, J.

Barbera, J.

R. Murphy, J.

In re Shirley B., 419 Md. 1, 18 A.3d 40 (2011)

Menefee v. State, 417 Md. 740, 12 A.3d 153 (2011)
Elliott v. State, 417 Md. 413, 10 A.3d 761 (2010)

State v. Pair, 416 Md. 157, 5 A.3d 1090 (2010)
State v. DiGennaro, 415 Md. 551, 3 A.3d 1201 (2010)
Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 399, 2 A.3d 360 (2010)

Oct. 7
Aug. 31
Aug. 23

J. Murphy,
Bell, J.
J.
Battaglia, J., Bell, J.,
Harrell, J.
J. Murphy, J.
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Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 248, 999 A.2d 1029 (2010)

DECISION

July 27

State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 999 A.2d 1050
(2010)
July 27
Caldes v. Elm St. Dev., 415 Md. 122, 999 A.2d 956
(2010)
July 22
Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62, 998 A.2d 868 (2010)

May 19

Prince George’s Cty. v. Brent, 414 Md. 334, 995 A.2d
672 (2010)
May 17
Smith v. State, 414 Md. 357, 995 A.2d 685 (2010)

AUTHOR

201

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Eldridge, J. Adkins, J.
Battaglia,
J.

Harrell, J.

J. Murphy,
Bell, J.
J.
Greene, J.

Battaglia, J.

Rodowsky,
J. Murphy, J.
J.

May 17

Greene, J.

J. Murphy, J.

120 W. Fayette St., LLP v. Mayor of Balt., 413 Md.
309, 992 A.2d 459 (2010)
Apr. 13

Barbera, J.

Battaglia, J., Bell, J.

Battaglia,
J.

J. Murphy, J.

Harrell, J.

Bell, J.

Flanagan v. Dep’t of Human Res., 412 Md. 616, 989
A.2d 1139 (2010)
Feb. 9

Harrell, J.

J. Murphy, J.

Md. Agric. Land Pres. Found. v. Claggett, 412 Md. 45,
985 A.2d 565 (2009)
Dec. 22

Adkins, J.

J. Murphy, J.

Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138, 982 A.2d 348 (2009)

Oct. 14

Adkins, J.

Battaglia, J., Eldridge,
J.

McQuitty v. Spangler, 410 Md. 1, 976 A.2d 1020
July 24
(2009)
Master Fin. Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51, 972 A.2d
June 9
864 (2009)

Battaglia,
J.

Greene, J.

Wilner, J.

Eldridge, J.

Henriquez v. Henriquez, 413 Md. 287, 992 A.2d 446
(2010)
Apr. 13
Mirjafari v. Cohn, 412 Md. 475, 988 A.2d 997 (2010)

Feb. 16
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AUTHOR

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Beatty, 409 Md.
June 8
11, 972 A.2d 840 (2009)

J. Murphy,
Bell, J.
J.

Decker v. State, 408 Md. 631, 971 A.2d 268 (2009)

May 13

Barbera, J.

Johnson v. State, 408 Md. 204, 969 A.2d 262 (2009)

Apr. 8

In re Deontay J., 408 Md. 152, 968 A.2d 1067 (2009)

Apr. 7

Bell, J.

J. Murphy,
Bell, J.
J.
J. Murphy,
Bell, J.
J.

McDowell v. State, 407 Md. 327, 965 A.2d 877 (2009) Feb. 19

Wilner, J.

Eldridge, J.

Jones v. State, 407 Md. 33, 962 A.2d 393 (2008)

Raker, J.

Bell, J., Eldridge, J.

La Belle Epoque, LLC v. Old Europe Antique Manor,
LLC, 406 Md. 194, 958 A.2d 269 (2008)
Oct. 8

Greene, J.

Harrell, J., Raker, J.

Wildwood Med. Ctr. v. Montgomery Cty., 405 Md.
489, 954 A.2d 457 (2008)
Aug. 22

per curiam

Cathell, J.

Nov. 8

Harrell, J.

Bell, J.

Arrington v. Dep’t of Human Res., 402 Md. 79, 935
A.2d 432 (2007)
Nov. 8

Wilner, J.

Bell, J.

Allen v. State, 402 Md. 59, 935 A.2d 421 (2007)

Boyd v. State, 399 Md. 457, 924 A.2d 1112 (2007)

Dec. 23

June 7

Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables, Inc., 398 Md. 611,
921 A.2d 799 (2007)
Apr. 11
Brown v. State, 397 Md. 89, 916 A.2d 245 (2007)

Feb. 7

River Walk Apartments, LLC v. Twigg, 396 Md. 527,
914 A.2d 770 (2007) 568
Jan. 10

Eldridge, J. Cathell, J.
Wilner, J.

Eldridge, J.

Raker, J.

Battaglia, J., Greene, J.

Battaglia,
J.

Cathell, J., Harrell, J.

568. Although the opinion states that “[c]onsistent with their positions in [J.P. Delphey Ltd.
P’ship v. Mayor of Frederick, 396 Md. 180, 913 A.2d 28 (2006)], Judges Cathell and Harell join in
the judgment only,” River Walk, 396 Md. at 550, 914 A.2d at 783, Judges Cathell and Harrell also
silently concurred in Delphey (a month earlier), J.P. Delphey Ltd. P’ship v. Mayor of Frederick, 396
Md. 180, 202, 913 A.2d 28, 41 (2006). Thus, this explanation does not actually point the reader to
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J.P. Delphey Ltd. P’ship v. Mayor of Frederick, 396
Md. 180, 913 A.2d 28 (2006)
Dec. 14

AUTHOR

203

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Battaglia,
J.

Cathell, J., Harrell, J.

Woodfield v. W. River Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 395
Md. 377, 910 A.2d 452 (2006)
Nov. 6

Wilner, J.

Cathell, J.

Mayor of Balt. v. Whalen, 395 Md. 154, 909 A.2d 683
(2006)
Oct. 19

Cathell, J.

Harrell, J.

Lowden v. Bosley, 395 Md. 58, 909 A.2d 261 (2006)
Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 908 A.2d 1220 (2006)
In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 906 A.2d 915 (2006)
State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 906 A.2d 374 (2006)
Garg v. Garg, 393 Md. 225, 900 A.2d 739 (2006)
Chmurny v. State, 392 Md. 159, 896 A.2d 354 (2006)
State v. Pitt, 390 Md. 697, 891 A.2d 312 (2006)

Oct. 17

Eldridge, J. Wilner, J.

Oct. 12

Harrell, J.

Cathell, J., Wilner, J.

Sept. 8

Battaglia,
J.

Wilner, J.

Sept. 1

Raker, J.

Bell, J.

June 8

Wilner, J.

Raker, J.

Apr. 13

Wilner, J.

Bell, J.

Feb. 1

Bell, J.

Cathell, J.

Raker, J.

Bell, J.

Battaglia,
J.

Bell, J.

Harrell, J.

Bell, J.

Raker, J.

Bell, J.

Anne Arundel Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md.
Dec. 12
93, 887 A.2d 1029 (2005)
Whiting v. State, 389 Md. 334, 885 A.2d 785 (2005)
Nov. 8
Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 884 A.2d 1171
(2005)
Oct. 14
Wynn v. State, 388 Md. 423, 879 A.2d 1097 (2005)

Aug. 11

any further information and means simply that Judges Cathell and Harrell were silently concurring
in River Walk just as they did in Delphey. Id.
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AUTHOR

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Rockwood Cas. Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Emp’rs Fund,
385 Md. 99, 867 A.2d 1026 (2005)
Feb. 8

Greene, J.

Bell, J.

Dehn v. Edgecombe, 384 Md. 606, 865 A.2d 603
(2005)
Jan. 14

Raker, J.

Eldridge, J.

Patton v. U.S. Rugby Football Union, Ltd., 381 Md.
627, 851 A.2d 566 (2004)
June 10

Harrell, J.

Bell, J.

Raker, J.

Bell, J.

Bell, J.

Raker, J.

Spencer v. Md. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515,
Mar. 11
846 A.2d 341 (2004)

Raker, J.

Bell, J.

Wilson v. Simms, 380 Md. 206, 844 A.2d 412 (2004)

Battaglia,
J.

Raker, J.

Harrell, J.

Bell, J.

Raker, J.

Bell, J.

Cathell, J.

Eldridge, J., Raker, J.

Krauser, J.

Alpert, J.

Battaglia,
J.

Bell, J.

Livering v. Richardson’s Rest., 374 Md. 566, 823 A.2d
687 (2003)
May 9

Raker, J.

Cathell, J.

Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 814 A.2d 543
(2003)
Jan. 7

Wilner, J.

Cathell, J.

Raker, J.

Bell, J.

State v. Tolbert, 381 Md. 539, 850 A.2d 1192 (2004)

June 8

Richardson v. State, 381 Md. 348, 849 A.2d 487
(2004)
May 14

Mar. 11

Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 831 A.2d 18
Aug. 27
(2003)
Creveling v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 376 Md. 72, 828
July 3
A.2d 229 (2003)
Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003)

June 12

Miller v. State, 151 Md. App. 235, 824 A.2d 1017
May 29
(2003)
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Awuah, 374 Md.
505, 823 A.2d 651 (2003)
May 9

Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 813 A.2d 231 (2002)

Dec. 19
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Gross v. State, 371 Md. 334, 809 A.2d 627 (2002)

DECISION

Oct. 11

AUTHOR

205

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Raker, J.

Bell, J.

Cathell, J.

Raker, J.

Battaglia,
J.

Bell, J.

Cathell, J.

Bell, J.

Harrell, J.

Bell, J.

Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 766 A.2d 98
Feb. 5
(2001)

Harrell, J.

Bell, J.

Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 765 A.2d 97 (2001)

Jan. 9

Harrell, J.

Cathell, J.

Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 762 A.2d 125 (2000)

Nov. 16

Bell, J.

Cathell, J.

Markov v. Markov, 360 Md. 296, 758 A.2d 75 (2000) Aug. 23

Raker, J.

Bell, J.

Cty. Council of Prince George’s Cty. v. Collington
Corp. Ctr. I Ltd. P’ship, 358 Md. 296, 747 A.2d 1219 Mar. 13
(2000)

Rodowsky,
Eldridge, J.
J.

McNeil v. State, 356 Md. 396, 739 A.2d 80 (1999)

Wilner, J.

Eldridge, J.

Raker, J.

Rodowsky, J.

Moose v. Fraternal Order of Police, 369 Md. 476, 800
June 13
A.2d 790 (2002)
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Angst, 369 Md.
June 12
404, 800 A.2d 747 (2002)
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Lane, 367 Md.
Feb. 7
633, 790 A.2d 621 (2002)
Clark v. State, 364 Md. 611, 774 A.2d 1136 (2001)

June 26

Oct. 19

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 739
A.2d 58 (1999)
Oct. 14
Calabi v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 353 Md. 649, 728 A.2d
206 (1999)
Apr. 21
State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311 (1998)
Edwards v. State, 350 Md. 433, 713 A.2d 342 (1998)

Nov. 17

Cathell, J.

Bell, J.

July 17

Wilner, J.

Chasanow, J.

Pettit v. Erie Ins. Exch., 349 Md. 777, 709 A.2d 1287
(1998)
May 21
Argyrou v. State, 349 Md. 587, 709 A.2d 1194 (1998)

Rodowsky,
Chasanow, J.
J.

May 18

Rodowsky,
Chasanow, J.
J.
Bell, J.

Eldridge, J.

206

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 79:129

DATE OF
CASE CITATION

DECISION

Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 705
A.2d 1144 (1998)
Feb. 18
Kroll v. Nehmer, 348 Md. 616, 705 A.2d 716 (1998)

Feb. 11

Ginsberg v. McIntyre, 348 Md. 526, 704 A.2d 1246
(1998)
Jan. 23
Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 697
A.2d 1358 (1997)
Aug. 22

Williams v. State, 344 Md. 358, 686 A.2d 1096 (1996)
In re Lakeysha P., 343 Md. 627, 684 A.2d 5 (1996)

Davis v. Dipino, 337 Md. 642, 655 A.2d 401 (1995)

Raker, J.

Wilner, J.

Eldridge, J.

Rodowsky,
Eldridge, J.
J.

Karwacki,
J.

Bell, J., Eldridge, J.

Mar. 14

Karwacki,
J.

Bell, J.

Dec. 26

Bell, J.

Raker, J.

Nov. 1

per curiam

Raker, J.

June 30

Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 656 A.2d
307 (1995)
Mar. 28
Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 655 A.2d 901 (1995)

Chasanow,
J.

Chasanow, J.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 341 Md. 408,
671 A.2d 22 (1996)
Feb. 7
Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995)

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Karwacki,
J.

Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 697 A.2d 432
(1997)
July 28
Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21, 690 A.2d 1000 (1997)

AUTHOR

Mar. 22
Mar. 13

Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Saul, 337 Md. 258,
Feb. 6
653 A.2d 430 (1995)
Chambers v. State, 337 Md. 44, 650 A.2d 727 (1994)
Dec. 19

R. Murphy,
Chasanow, J.
J.
Eldridge, J. Chasanow, J.
R. Murphy,
Eldridge, J.
J.
R. Murphy,
Bell, J.
J.
Chasanow,
Eldridge, J.
J.
Karwacki,
Chasanow, J.
J.
Raker, J.

Rodowsky, J.
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Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661,
645 A.2d 1147 (1994)
Aug. 22
Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 645 A.2d 1160
(1994)
Aug. 22
Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522 (1994)

July 18

Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 643 A.2d 906
(1994)
July 5

AUTHOR
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SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Chasanow,
J.

Bell, J.

Chasanow,
J.

Bell, J.

Karwacki,
J.

Bell, J., Chasanow, J.

Raker, J.

Bell, J., Eldridge, J.

In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99,
June 7
642 A.2d 201 (1994)
State v. Montgomery, 334 Md. 20, 637 A.2d 1193
(1994)
Mar. 9

Karwacki,
J.

Bell, J., Raker, J.

Bell, J.

Eldridge, J.

B. Frank Joy Co. v. Isaac, 333 Md. 628, 636 A.2d 1016
(1994)
Feb. 10

Orth, J.

McAuliffe,
Rodowsky, J.

Walsh v. Walsh, 333 Md. 492, 635 A.2d 1340 (1994)

Condon v. State of Md.–Univ. of Md., 332 Md. 481,
Nov. 1
632 A.2d 753 (1993)

Chasanow,
McAuliffe, J.
J.
Rodowsky,
Eldridge, J.
J.
R. Murphy,
Bell, J.
J.

State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 629 A.2d 731 (1993)

Bell, J.

Eckard v. Eckard, 333 Md. 531, 636 A.2d 455 (1994)

Jan. 27
Jan. 18

Aug. 26

Chasanow, J.

Beatty v. Trailmaster Prod., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 625
June 10
A.2d 1005 (1993)
Prince George’s Cty. v. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 330
Apr. 22
Md. 297, 623 A.2d 1296 (1993)

R. Murphy,
Bell, J.
J.
Rodowsky,
Bell, J.
J.

Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992)

Bell, J.

Dec. 9

Kline v. Cent. Motors Dodge, Inc., 328 Md. 448, 614
Nov. 16
A.2d 1313 (1992)
Willey v. State, 328 Md. 126, 613 A.2d 956 (1992)

Oct. 13

Eldridge, J.

Rodowsky,
Chasanow, J.
J.
Chasanow,
McAuliffe, J.
J.

J.,
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DATE OF
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DECISION

Eldridge, J.

Apr. 14

Bell, J.

Eldridge, J.

Apr. 14

Bell, J.

Eldridge, J.

Apr. 10

Rodowsky,
Chasanow, J.
J.

Feb. 28

Motz, J.

Cathell, J.

Bell, J.

R. Murphy, J.

Campbell v. State, 325 Md. 488, 601 A.2d 667 (1992) Feb. 19
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Le, 324 Md. 71, 595
A.2d 1067 (1991)
Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 589
A.2d 944 (1991)
Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co. v. Grp. Hospitalization Med.
Servs., Inc., 322 Md. 645, 589 A.2d 464 (1991)
Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Trs. of Clients’ Sec. Tr.
Fund of Bar of Md., 322 Md. 442, 588 A.2d 340
(1991)
Girouard v. State, 321 Md. 532, 583 A.2d 718 (1991)
Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 582 A.2d 525 (1990)

SILENTLY CONCURRING
JUDGE(S)

Chasanow,
J.

Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 610 A.2d 782 (1992) Aug. 24
Hare v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 326 Md. 296, 604
A.2d 914 (1992)
Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Chamberlain, 326 Md. 306,
604 A.2d 919 (1992)
Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 604
A.2d 445 (1992)
C.N. Robinson Lighting Supply Co. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Howard Cty., 90 Md. App. 515, 602 A.2d 195 (1992)

AUTHOR

Sept. 13

Eldridge, J. Chasanow, J.

May 10

Eldridge, J. McAuliffe, J.

May 6

McAuliffe,
J.

Eldridge, J.

April 8

McAuliffe,
J.

Eldridge, J.

Jan. 8

Cole, J.

Eldridge, J.

Dec. 5

Cole, J.

Eldridge, J.
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TABLE 2. CASELOADS AND SILENT CONCURRENCES BY YEAR

YEAR

NUMBER OF CASES DECIDED BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS 569

NUMBER OF SILENT CONCURRENCES

2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1990–1994

138
161
194
174
177
208
239
217
237
186
176
174
206
211
203
200
227
192
143
134
148
132
126
114
155
See note 569

2
6
4
5
3
5
7
5
13
18
9
3
6
10
6
5
7
5
3
3
3
7
3
3
5
29

569. Maryland
Appellate
Court
Opinions,
MD.
CTS.,
https://www.courts.state.md.us/opinions/opinions. This data was only available from 1995 onward.

